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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

The Background of Indo-Paki stan Tensions

South Asia contains

a

tremendous assortment of racial groups

and subgroups, their distribution appearing
to bear little relation to

present national boundaries.

The whole region is the cluster of dif-

ferent countries, different in culture, traditions and
languages, but

sharing

a

common past; an historical experience of colonial rule.

The region is comprised of Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Nepal,
Sikkim, Bhutan

ghanistan.

,

Bangladesh

,

and, according to some, even Burma and Af-

Indeed some of the countries in the area have serious

inter-racial problems within themselves, but the majority of the people
of South Asia can be broadly divided into four major groups: the Mon-

goloid races which spread southwards from China; Aryans, who first entered India from the northwest and spread southwards and eastwards;
the Dravidians, whom the Aryans displaced and drove southwards.^

The history of the area has been one of continuous social move-

ment and conquest, the general tendency having been for northern races
to spread farther and farther southwards.

The Aryan conquerors carried

the Hindu religion from the Hindu Kush to Indo-China and Malaysia.

Buddhism spread southwards and eastwards from India, and later Islam

Angus Maude, South Asia: A Background Book (London: The Bodley
Head Ltd., 1966), pp. 12-16.
^

1

2

swept into India, Malaysia and Indonesia,
with the voyages of Arab and
Indian traders.

Finally Christianity entered the region,
with the

Catholic Portuguese and French, together with
the Protestant English,
Scots and Dutch.
South Asia has seen the rise and fall of many
great empires.
India came under various

i

nvasions— Greek

Afghan, and more recently British.

,

Persian, Mongol, Turkish,

The Chinese in the early fifteenth

century sent naval expeditions throughout Asia, exacting
tribute from
Ceylon and Malaysia and reaching even to the Persian Gulf.
In

the specific case of the South Asian countries many circum-

stances have combined to make their present-day mutual relations feeble.
Perhaps the strongest thread that binds them is the historical experience they have shared and its subsequent effects on their view of political

problems and process.

The periods of colonial rule, though of

varying length, were of such duration and intensity as to leave
finite imprint on almost every aspect of their existence.

a

de-

The recent

liberation of these countries has been of great importance to their entire national

life.

But in all of them independence was brought about

by members of the small articulate el

Initially all

i

te groups within the "educated."

2

these countries declared their intentions to build

their constitutional and civic structure on the lines of Parliamentary

democracy, based on free elections and adult suffrage for men and women.
But in none of the South Asian countries has the experiment with the

ultra-modern political democracy been anything like
2

In

a

complete success;

the special sense, the term in South comprises only a small

percentage of the total population.

3

many of them have come under authoritarian
rule of one shape or another.
South Asian countries are similar in
their basic economic conditions.

The majority of the people are poor.

Social and economic

inequalities are their common feature; the reason
being

a

long period

of economic stagnation.^
The first major breach in the walls of colonial
domination came

with the peaceful ending of British rule in India
in 1947 and the

creation of the Union of India and the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan
as successor states.

lowed in 1948.

Political

independence of Burma and Ceylon fol-

Indonesia did not achieve full

independence until 1949.

Malaysia became independent in 1957 and Singapore in 1959.
In

retrospect it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the

dissolution of colonial rule in South Asia was inevitable.
colonies, the arrival of independence was

a

traumatic experience and

one that justifies the common description of it as
tion.

All

But in the

a

political revolu-

of the new states had to face the fact that independence

did not automatically bring about

a

condition of national consolidation.

Instead, each new state faced the immediate task of asserting its

authority over its territorial inheritance.

The Subconti nent--rol e of religion

variety and contrast.
In

.

The Indian subcontinent is full of

Within its vast area are all types of terrain.

the north are the Himalayas, with their perennial

snowcapped peaks

and desolate, never-ending ranges of the mountains that form the roof-

3

Gunnar Myrdal Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of
Nations (New York: Pantheon Books, 1971), pp. 20-27.
,

4

top of the world.

In

the west are the barren Rajasthan and
Baluchistani

deserts, with their biting winter cold
and ferocious summer heat.

In

the west, above the Rajasthan desert,
are the fertile wheat-growing

plains of the land of the five rivers, the
Punjab.

Also in the north,

from the Punjab in the west to Bengal in the
east, stretches the IndoGangetic plain, hundreds of miles of flat farmland.
side the Ganges, that early kingdoms flourished.

It was

here, be-

Hinduism developed

here and later Muslim culture put down its roots and
adapted itself to
the new Indian environment.

The people of this vast subcontinent are as diverse as its

topography.
own.

Each part, each region, has

a

distinctive flavor of its

Not only does the north differ from the south and the east from

the west, but so do regions adjacent to one another.

regional

Each has its own

language, its own set of customs, food habits and dress and

each has its own separate regional history with its local heroes and

moments of triumph, just as each is also

a

part of the overall history

of the subcontinent and of its wider historical processes.
Indian society is particularly complex, and can be viewed from

many angles.
social

Religion

is

one of them.

It

provided

a

rationale of

organization; it bound individuals together in certain ways,

identified them in distinct groups and set them apart from other individuals.

It

is

responsible for bringing into existence certain kinds

of social groups and determining their relationships with others.

By

the nineteenth century there were two main religions on the subconti-

nent, Hinduism and Islam.
Islam first came to India about the eighth century and for some

.

5

time was limited to the area around the Indus
River.

ment of

a

The establish-

Muslim Kingdom in the north around Delhi in the
eleventh

century brought this religion into the heart of the
subcontinent.

By

the end of the eighteenth century Islam had
become established as the

second largest religion in the area.

On a country-wide basis, Muslims

were outnumbered by Hindus roughly in the proportion
of five to one.
In

some regions, however, they were in

and in the northwest frontier province.

a

majority--in Bengal, in Sind,
In

the Punjab they constituted

the largest community followed by Hindus and Sikhs.
is

It

argued that the Muslims of India as

tinct community, that they possessed

a

a

whole were

a

dis-

sense of identity resulting from

their corunon religion which not only set them apart from Hindus, but
gave them

a

positive identification with one another as Muslims.

The

fact that they were all followers of Muhammad was used in the twen-

tieth century in an attempt to bring them together on one political

platform as one community.

As the formation of Pakistan demonstrates,

the attempt to emphasize an Islamic rather than an Indian nationality

proved successful
The breakup of the Mughal empire and the defeat of the Marahtas,

who had hoped to fall heirs to it, happened to coincide with the emergence of the British as the unchallenged European trading power in
India.

By the end of the seventeenth century, the East India Company

was established in Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, and was becoming not

only

a

trading corporation but

a

military power in its own right.

.
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The pre-independen c e background of Hi
ndu-MusI 1m tension

.

T.W. Wall bank

describes the plural society of India as the
basic factor involved in
the process of partition.^

J.S.

Furnivall views it as "a society com-

prising two or more elements or social orders
which live side by side,

yet without mingling

in one political

Wallbank adds that

a

unit."^

shared history normally calls for in-

creasing cooperation and even for forms of integration
between different political units, but the contemporary world, he says,
presents

disturbing evidence of
tical

a

contrary tendency, various societies and poli-

units have been or are being torn apart by rival groups made an-

tagonistic by their differences.

The Indian subcontinent is the most

outstanding case of that sort of plural society, which has failed to
compose ethnic and cultural differences.
cal

unit created under British rule

is

The partition of the politi-

one of the most significant

events in the twentieth century Asian history.

This division was fol-

lowed by violent strife in which thousands of Muslims, Sikhs, and

Hindus lost their lives.

Between India and Pakistan it created

a

con-

stantly burning fire of hatred and discord symbolized by the Kashmir
i

ssue
In

the centuries that mark Indian history from its earliest

civilization

in

the Indus valley (2500 to 1500 B.C.) up to the Gupta

empire, the subcontinent experienced numerous invasions.

The intruders,

Wallbank, ed.. The Partition of India: Causes and Re ties (Boston: D.C. Heath & Company, 1966), p. 1.

"^T.W.

spons ibi

1 i

^J.S. Furnivall, Indi a quoted
Cambridge University Press, 1939).
,

in

Ibid., p. 446 (England:

7

however, were usually absorbed by Hinduism and
had no difficulty in
finding

a

place for themselves in the Hindu caste system.

however, one group of invaders who were not absorbed.

Muslim people who entered India remained

a

social and political fabric of Indian life.

There was,

The various

distinct entity in the
They worshipped God, and

accepted Muhammad as his prophet; their bonds with one another
were
closer than those with Hindus.

Socially, this was reinforced by

range

a

of customs and practices which marked off the adherents of one
religion

from the other.
During the nineteenth century, Muslims began to develop the
political sense of being

a

separate community, distinct from the Hindus.

The Hindus quickly responded to the Western impact that brought new op-

portunities in business, the professions, and government service.

Mus-

lims had not recovered from their loss of political power when they

were supplanted as rulers of the subcontinent by the British and they
lived in the past, in a nostalgic world of former glories.

They were

hence predisposed not to accept the alien ideas, methods, and language
of the new government.

While Hindus were taking to some aspects of

modernization, Muslims were not.

For several decades after the War of

Independence of 1857, they remained apathetic, falling behind the
Hindus in the new India that was emerging.

After the War of Independence of 1857, the position of Muslims
worsened.

They were held responsible for the outbreak and the British,

as a result, discriminated against them.^

The overall picture presented

^Wallbank, pp. 5-20; see also Jim Masselos, Nationalism on the
Indian Subcontinent (Australia: Thomas Nelson, 1972), pp. 10-40.
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was of

a

community in decay, economically backward
and deprived of ac-

cess to positions in government service by

a

rival

Hindu community.

Not only were Muslims demoralized, they
were becoming increasingly

impoverished.

It

became evident even before 1857 when English
re-

placed Persian as the official language of
the bureaucracy and the
law courts.

Consequently, Muslims were gradually replaced by Hindus

who were quicker to learn English.
The 1870s witnessed movements for the promotion of
Western

education among Muslims.

The most significant personality of this time

was Sir Sayyed Ahmed Khan (1817-98).

In

placement of Urdu by Hindi in the U.P.

the 1860s, he opposed the reHe became convinced that the

interests of Hindus and Muslims were opposed and that they were vir-

tually two separate nations.

He was a great modernizer among Muslims,

an educationalist, who founded the Muslim university at Aligarh, and a

social

reformer who waged war against non-rational dogma.

Emergence of nationalism: Formation of the Congress

.

The Indian scene

from 1857 to 1912 was characterized by the expansion of modern com-

munications, the growth of English, the establishment of Western education and the rise of

professional and business middle class.

a

trends helped to stir

a

These

spirit of nationalism which appeared by the

founding of the National Congress in 1885.
In

theory

actually much more
ship.

truly national and secular party, the Congress was

a
a

Hindu than

a

Muslim organization in its member-

A Hindu religious and ideological

be anti-Muslim as well

renaissance that tended to

as anti-British and which was closely tied with

-

9

the rise of political nationalism,
represented by the Congress, alien-

ated many Muslims, including Sir Sayyed
Ahmed Khan.

By the 1890s, such

Muslim support as the Congress enjoyed
was diminishing.

At the 1894

Madras session, there were only 23 Muslim
delegates as against 1163
Hindus and at Poona in 1895, the comparative
numbers were 25 and 1584.^
Comr^nal differe nces between Hindus and Muslims
and formation of the

—

lim League

.

various parts of the country, Muslims and Hindus were

In

gradually being divided and antagonized.
in the

The process was intensified

'nineties with the growth of Hindu militancy, the emergence
of

cow protection movements, and the outbreak of
riots.
tural

a

rash of Hindu-Muslim

The other side of the coin was the development of

a

Muslim cul-

revivalist movement in the north after the early 1880s.

The ef-

fect of all

these factors was to promote the idea of

community.

Increasingly, the religious community was being viewed as

a

a

separate Muslim

social and political entity, one which could undertake activity in its

own right as

a

distinct unit.

It

is often maintained that Muslim

separation was engineered by interfering British officials who were applying

a

policy of divide and rule in an attempt to set one community

against the other.

In

any case, the sum effect was to intensify com-

munal awareness and to segregate further the two communities.

such an environment emerged the All -India Muslim League.

Out of

As it appeared

that representative and democratic institutions might advance in India,
the Muslims, fearful

Hindu majority in

a

that they would be overwhelmed by the much larger

democratic political system, demanded safeguards

^Masselos, pp. 99-104.
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and

a

system of separate communal representation in
legislative bodies.

On October 1, 1906,

a

Muslim deputation called on the Viceroy, Lord

Minto, and made these demands.

Minto proved unexpectedly sympathetic;

he acknowledged their aspirations and assured the delegation
that their

political rights and interests as

a

community will be safeguarded by

any administrative organization with which

I

am concerned."^

The "Minto-Morley Reforms" in 1909 included

separate Muslim electorates.

provision for

The rights of the Muslims as

community were recognized and guaranteed.
tionalized Muslim separatism.

a

This

a

distinct

recognition institu-

Leaders of the newly formed Muslim League

increasingly spoke of the two separate nations in India (the Hindus and
the Muslims), claimed to represent the Muslim nation, and challenged the

Congress Party's claim to represent all of India.

From now on, two,

not one, nationalisms began to develop in Indian politics and this

tendency would intensify in the years to come and culminate in
demand for

a

a

Muslim

separate homeland to be called Pakistan.

During and following World War

operated briefly.

In

I,

Hindu and Muslim leaders co-

the "Lucknow Pact" of 1916 between the Congress

and the League, the former accepted separate electorates for Muslims.
At the end of the war, Indian-Musl ims were greatly disturbed over the

danger to the institution of "Khilafat" (Caliphate) in Turkey following
that nation's defeat in the war and loss of territory.

under Gandhi's leadership, launched

a

The Congress

civil disobedience movement to

press the British to give India independence and to support the Muslim

®R.C. Majumdar, History of the Freedom Movement in India (Calcutta, 1963), p. 223.
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demand that the Allies treat Turkey fairly
at the Paris Peace Conference.

But soon the movement became violent.

Besides, there were ter-

rible Hindu-Muslim riots in Kerala and elsewhere.

And, thus, a brief

attempt to forge Hindu-Muslim unity ended in
failure.

^win g

Muslim dissatisfaction and demand for
•

a

separate homeland for

Relations between the Congress and the Muslim League went

from bad to worse.

The Congress won legislative majorities in most pro-

vincial elections held in 1937 under the Government of India
Act, 1935.
The resulting Congress governments in these provinces were seen
by Muslims as suppressing Muslim language (Urdu), culture, and religion in

areas under their control.

Muslims became convinced, more than ever

before, that their cultural and religious identity would be destroyed in
a

united independent India ruled by the permanent Hindu majority.

meeting in Lahore in March 1940 the Muslim League passed

In a

resolution

a

demanding the partition of India and the constitution of contiguous

Muslim majority areas

in

the northwestern and eastern parts of India

as independent Muslim states.

tion.

This is known as the "Pakistan Resolu-

"

Initially the Congress and the British both denounced the

demand for Pakistan as absurd.
central and provincial

But the legislative elections to the

legislatures in 1945 and 1946 showed the Muslim

League, which was contesting on the Pakistan platform, win virtually
all

Muslim constituencies.

the demand for Pakistan.

The Muslim League victory was

a

victory for

The demand became so irresistible that ul-

timately both the British and the Congress accepted it.

On August 14,

12

1947,

India was partitioned and Pakistan came into being.

But it did

not happen without a great deal of bloodshed and a massive
transfer of

populations.

chapter

II

MAJOR DISPUTES BETWEEN INDIA AND
PAKISTAN
Pakistan came into existence under quite
unfavorable conditions.

Geographically awkward, it remained as

a

unique example of dual boun-

daries, composed of two wings divided by
hostile India for
miles.

a

thousand

As the background of the partition
reveals the deep-rooted ill

feelings of the two nations, it wasn't
unexpected that born in bloodshed
and strife Pakistan would not be tolerated
easily by its immediate

neighbor, India, as it had spoiled the Indian dream
of an independent
and united subcontinent.

Circumstances that created the feelings of mistrust between
India and Pakistan were mostly due to the events which
took place im-

mediately after the partition.
mained harsh and unsympathetic.

India's attitude towards Pakistan re-

They not only withheld Pakistan's

share of military supplies, but also denied Pakistan its share of cash
balances.^

The latter was released when Gandhi threatened to go on an

indefinite fast.

2

Another immediate and most explosive problem Pakistan faced
was related to the question of sharing the waters of the Indus basin.
India cut off the supply of water from the two head works under its

^At the beginning of December 1947, India and Pakistan mutually
came to an agreement that Pakistan would get RS.750 as her share.
2

S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis
(London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 13.
13

^

control

in April

1948 when a joint committee of the
officials failed

to settle the questions relating to the
division of joint assets.

A

Pakistani delegation had to rush to Delhi and
sign an agreement at India

s

bidding before the flow was resumed.

Both the governments agreed

to negotiate in order to find the solution
of the problem in 1952, but

the negotiations were not finalized until September
19, 1960, when

President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Nehru signed the Indus
Waters
Treaty.

Relations between India and Pakistan became tense in 1949
when following the devaluation of the British pound sterling vis-a-vis
the American dollar, India similarly devalued her rupee and Pakistan

did not.

India was shocked with this decision of Pakistan and refused

to pay the 30 percent higher price for Pakistani jute, cotton and food

grains.

Along with that the urgently needed supply of coal to Pakis-

tan was stopped by India.

Thus, by the end of 1949, trade between India

and Pakistan reached an almost complete standstill.

Later on Pakistan

started trading with China, which bought cotton from Pakistan and supplied coal which was badly needed for running the railways.^
"A recurring pattern

in the relations between Asian states can

be found in their acceptance or rejection of borders and frontier zones

initially drawn up by the former colonial powers."

grow out of disputed boundaries have played

^Ibid., pp.

11-12.

^Ibid.

14-1 5.

,

pp.

a

5

The tensions which

major part in the life of

^Rene Peritz, Changing Politics of Modern Asia (New York:
Nostrand Co., 1973), p. 4.

D.

Van
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nearly every nation, especially where

a

nation's frontier area in-

cludes people of different customs, social
structure and ethnic background.

Wherever boundaries have been arbitrarily
demarcated by out-

side powers decades or centuries ago, deep-rooted
national resentments
and distrust continue to simmer and affect
present-day national atti-

tudes

.

Along with some other di sputes on the Western frontiers
of
India and Pakistan, the problems on the Eastern borders
were largely

due to the unnatural Radcliffe Boundary Award.

Conflicts also arose

due to the confusion about the names of rivers or changes in
their
courses.

The enclaves posed another problem which came under the

category of boundary disputes.

The enclave of Berubari union situated

on the Rangpur (East Pakistan) and Jalpaiguri

them.

In

(West Bengal) was one of

September 1958, the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India,

Firoze Khan Noon and Jawaharlal Nehru, signed an agreement whereby
India agreed to cede the Berubari enclave.

But the agreement became

an issue of constitutional controversy in India and the subject of

a

tussle between the central government of India and the provincial

government of West Bengal.

In

its ruling of March 1960, the Supreme

Court of India declared the agreement illegal, thus the Noon-Nehru

agreement was never implemented.
The Farakka Barrage dispute^ was also a matter of profound con-

g

For the details, see Mujtaba Razvi , The Frontiers of Pakistan
A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy (Karachi:
National Publishing House LTD., 1971), pp. 45-60.

^Burke, pp. 381-384; also Ibid., pp. 60-69.

:
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cern for Pakistan.

India decided to construct Farakka
Barrage in West

Bengal, about eleven miles from East
Pakistan's border.

stop between

third and

a

a

This would

half of the peak flow of the Ganges
into

East Pakistan and divert it into the
Hoogly-an Indian river-in order
to

improve navigation in the Calcutta port.

things, cause
tan.

a

This would, among other

serious shortage of water for irrigation
in East Pakis-

The dispute remained unsettled until
recently, when Bangladesh

3nd Indid rGachGd an agpGGniGnt.
Many of thG contGmporary issuGS dividing
thG Asian nations portain to boundariGS and frontiGrs bGtwGGn
nGighboring statGS.

DisputGS

initially arising from torritorial quGStions ofton
tond to transcGnd

thoir spGcific focus and assumo idoologica! dimonsions
as dotorminod by
a

nation's gonoral diplomacy with others.

and Pakistan over political

The quarrel between India

and legal control of Kashmir represents

a

major obstacle to South Asian regional cooperation efforts.

Kashm ir Dispute and the First War in Kashmir,
1948-1949

Of all

the issues dividing India and Pakistan, the Kashmir dis-

pute has proved to be the most tenacious.

"Plebiscite partition, inter-

nationalization, political settlement: all the textbook solutions for

a

territorial dispute have been proposed for Kashmir and all have been

fruitless."

8

Kashmir has prompted three wars between the two countries

and still remains the major obstacle to
g

a

peace settlement in the sub-

G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India (Meerut:
Meenakashi Prakashan, 1971 ) , p. 103.
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conti nent.

When Pakistan and India achieved
their freedom under the Inde-

pendence Act of India in 1947, many of
the subcontinent's variously
located princely states became technically
independent as well.

The

rulers of these states could choose,
under the terms of the statute,

whether to join India or Pakistan.

The most difficult case was that

of the states of Jammu and Kashmir,
predomi nantly Muslim, but with

Hindu ruler.

a

The Maharaja vacillated in his decision to join
either

of the two states.

His motives remain

a

matter of speculation.

It is

not clear whether he initially wished Kashmir
to remain independent

from both India and Pakistan or wanted to accede to India.
It

may be said that geographically Kashmir would seem rather to

belong with Pakistan than with India, since its rivers and its trade
flowed mainly towards Pakistan.

Muslims.

It

is not,

Moreover, its inhabitants were mainly

however, surprising that the Hindu ruler should

have felt that his own personal position would be seriously weakened if
his state were incorporated in

a

Muslim country.

Although he hoped to

retain some measure of independence, he nevertheless recognized the
natural orientation of Kashmir towards Pakistan, and concluded

a

"Stand-

Q

Still Agreement" with it.

The situation in Kashmir became more and

more difficult as the infection of communal disorders spread from the
Punjab.

The ruling family had never been particularly popular with

its Muslim subjects, and these now began to demonstrate in favor of im-

9

"Paki stan-Kashmi r Standstill Agreement," August 1947, reproduced in The Kashmir Question , ed. K. Sarwar Hassan and Zubeida Hassan
(Karachi; Pakistan Institute of Internal Affairs, 1966), p. 43.
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mediate accession to Pakistan.
Unfortunately, at this stage in October
1947, large numbers of
tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier
Province (N.W.F.P.) began to

stream into Kashmir.

It

is doubtful

whether this incursion was de-

liberately encouraged or organized by the
government of Pakistan in
the first instance; but the tribesmen
certainly came from the territory

which was under its control, and it made no
apparent move to check
them.

The Maharaja then appealed to the Indian government
for help
and protection, but this was refused unless he
signified the accession
of Jammu and Kashmir to India.
In

this atmosphere of civil

strife and considerable political

turbulence, the Maharaja acceded the area under his jurisdiction
to India on October 27, under less than clear condi tions

.

After the

Maharaja agreed to join India, the Indian Army entered Kashmiri territory.

The Indian Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, informed Mr. Attlee (the

British Prime Minister) that India's action in Kashmir had been forced
upon her by circumstances and by the "imminent grave danger" to Srinagar; and that India had no desire to intervene in Kashmiri affairs once
the state had been cleared of raiders and law and order established.

Pakistan, however, denounced this action of India and stated that "the

accession of Kashmir to India is based on fraud and violence and such
cannot be recognized.

^^Ibid.

,

pp.

^

When the Indian troops began to gain the upper

55-57.

1

"Press Communique" by the Pakistan Government on October 30,
cited
in Keesing's Report
1947,
p. 45.
,

2
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hand, Pakistan started to aid the
tribesmen, finally entering the field

with regular Pakistani forces.

During 1947, the Indian forces in

Kashmir, supported by the Royal

Indian Air Force, were in operation

against the tribesmen from time to time in

a

number of areas.

By the

end of the year the tribesmen's advance
towards Srinagar had been ef-

fectively halted and by the end of 1948 Indian
forces were in control
of the greater part of Kashmir.

After the Indian government had announced in December
1947 that
it would place its dispute with Pakistan
before the U.N.

cil

Security Coun-

the latter considered the question between January 15 and
April 22,

1948, when it adopted a resolution against Pakistani objections
and

with the Soviet Union abstaining.

The resolution provided for the with-

drawal of Pakistani forces from Kashmir; for

a

progressive reduction

of Indian forces, once ceasefire arrangements were effective, to the

minimum required "for the support of the civil power
of law and order"; and for the holding of

Kashmir's future.

1

The U.N. arranged

a

a

in

the maintenance

plebiscite to determine

tenuous ceasefire between the

belligerents, but by that time the territory of Kashmir had in fact been
divided into Indian and Paki stani -control led portions.
India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, declared that once

order had been restored to the territory, India would be willing to undertake

a

plebiscite in Kashmir in order to ascertain the political

wishes of the people.
results.

He also agreed that New Delhi would abide by the

This statement was subsequently approved by the Kashmiri

leader Sheikh

^^Ibid.

Muhaiiuiiad

,

pp.

Abdullah.

55-57.

Moreover, the essence of the plebis-
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citary commitment was also
of August 13. 1948.

i

ncorporated in

a

United Nations resolution

More specifically, this resolution was
supplemented

by a later one of January 5,

1949, which provided for

a

ceasefire ar-

rangement between the contending Pakistani and the
Indians to be followed by
and

a

a

true demarcation line, an agreement to demilitarize
Kashmir,

decision to hold

a

free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted

by a United Nations appointed administrator.^^

There is very little agreement by Pakistanis and Indians as
to the meaning or even intent of the various United
Nations resolutions.
In

defending their version of the United Nations' del iberations and deci-

sions both India and Pakistan tend to stress different parts of the

relevant 1948-1949 documents.

Since the resolutions commit both nations

on specific matters, various conditions have to be met by both of the

interested parties before the conflict can be settled.

Importance of Kashmir for both India and Pakistan

Pakistan in Kashmir is not only ideological.
too, one of which is economic.

In

.

It has

The interest of

other interests

1947, Pakistan looked at Kashmir in

view of its ideological perspective, according to the basis of the two-

nation theory.

Kashmir with its Muslim majority should have become

a

part of Pakistan, but for India, Kashmir has become the symbol of

secularism and unity.
Economically speaking, Pakistan depends on the waters of the
Indus for its irrigation.

ed.

K.

The Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers flow

^^Text of the resolutions may be found in The Kashmir Question
Sarwar Hassan and Zubeida Hassan, pp. 180-183 and 212-215.

,
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through Kashmiri territory before
entering the Punjab.

It has

been a

constant fear to Pakistani leaders that
India would exploit this potential

and their fears were confirmed in
the times of crisis in 1948 and

1965.

Religious and cultural affinity is also
one of the factors that

has injected

a

strong feeling of emotionalism among
the people.

Another equally important factor
Kashmir for Pakistan

in

is the

strategic position of

its relations with India, Afghanistan
and China.

During the first war in Kashmir, Pakistan
fought desperately to retain
the northern areas in order to prevent India
from gaining territory

which would provide

a

link with Afghanistan.

The Chinese title to Kashmir's remote section of
eastern Ladakh
has centered on the acquisition of Aksai Chin crucial

to China's

strategic needs for an all-weather military road linking Sinkiang
to
Tibet.

Despite the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, the Chinese have kept

this territory.^^

Indian position.

In

this conflict, the United States supported the

This move was to have regional

repercussions.

Pakis-

tan, disturbed by its ally's attitude, which was acting in opposition
to her national

favor of China.

interests, began to change her national policies in

Fearing that both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S would sup-

port India's political and military needs while undermining her own,

Pakistan recognized Chinese claims to northern Ladakh.

In

return, she

received from China the acknowledgment that the other parts of Kashmir

rightfully belonged to Pakistan.
A comprehensive and formal

14

settlement between Pakistan and China

For China's Indian hostilities and Chinese gains in Kashmir,
Politics of Indian Ocean Region: The Balance of
see Ference A. Val i
Free
Press, 1976), pp. 88-91.
Powe r (New York:
,

5
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secured transfer of
and

a

part of Paki stani -control led Kashmir
to Peking

a

part of the territory under Chinese
control to Pakistan.

The set-

tlement enabled the Chinese to reach the
vital approaches to the Kara

Koram pass.

However, neither Chinese nor Pakistani
rights to any

parts of Kashmir have been formally accepted
by the Indian government.
Thus political

forces within and outside of India, Pakistan

and the United Nations have made any legal or
political settlement of
the manifold Kashmir dispute even more difficult
to realize.

No less

than three major wars (1947, 1965, 1971) involving
Kashmir and innumer-

able skirmishes and ceasefire violations have kept alive
the PakistaniIndian hostilities.

India and Pakistan have tried to settle the dis-

pute through negotiations but these failed, too.

Rann of Kutch Dispute

The Indo-Paki Stan War of 1965 was preceded by various inci-

dents in April 1965 in the Rann of Kutch, on the frontier between the
Indian state of Gujrat and West Pakistan, and continued at intervals
until

the end of the month.

about 8,400 square miles, is
during the monsoon season.

value as
grazing.

a

The Rann (desert), which covers an area of
a

vast expanse of tidal mud flats, flooded

Uninhabited, it has some slight economic

source of salt, and it provides some areas of rather poor
In

British times, the status of the Rann was unsettled.

At

that time, the Rann was the bone of contention between the princely

1

For the detailed study on the Chinese interests in the region
and its border agreements with Pakistan, see Anwar Syed, China and
(Amherst, Mass.: University
Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale
of Massachusetts, 1974).

^
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State of Kutch and the British Indian
Province of Sind.

The majority

of British maps showed the Kutch-Sind
border as running along the edge
of the Thar desert, though towards
the end of the British period
such

maps also indicate that this boundary
was "disputed."

The border along

the edge of the Thar desert, of course,
was never intended to serve as
an international border.'®

At the time of partition. India and
Pakistan

inherited the dispute as Sind became part of
Pakistan and Kutch was

joined to India.
The Indian government claimed that the whole
of the Rann for-

merly belonged to Kutch, and hence became part of India
when the state
acceded to the Indian union in 1947.

The Pakistan government, on the

other hand, claimed that about 3,500 square miles of the Rann
lying
north of the 24th parallel were formerly under the control and
ad-

ministration of Sind.

It also

contended that the Rann was

sea or boundary lake, and that under international

a

landlocked

law the boundary

must run through the middle of the area; this argument was rejected
by India, on the grounds that the British Government of India formally

decided in 1906 that it was more correct to define the Rann as
rather than

a

lake.

a

marsh

^

To solve the dispute, moves were started by exchanging diploma-

tic notes in 1948.

But it did not prove successful as both countries

stuck to their previous positions.

After four months armed clashes

^^Alastair Lamb, The Asian Frontiers (London: Pall Mall Press,
1968), p.

109.

^^For more details on the Rann of Kutch dispute, see D.C. Jha,
Indo-Paki Stan Relations (1960-1965) (Patna: Bharti Bhawan, 1972), pp.
187-190.
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took place on February 17, 19, and
25, and March 2, 1956, at border

pocket-posts of Chad Bet.

The Pakistan government proposed to
the

Indian government that "the Indian forces
should be withdrawn immedi-

ately from Chad Bet, Nara Bet and the status
quo restored pending
final

settlement of the dispute."''^

the matter cooled down
a

a

Nothing happened after that, only

little, as no other armed clash took place for

time.

The matter was again taken up and discussed at
the diplomatic
level.

It was

agreed that "all outstanding boundary disputes, raised

so far by either country, should, if not settled by
negotiations, be

referred to an impartial tribunal for settlement.
However, the situation took

a

serious turn in 1965 as border

incidents became very frequent and the relations between India and

Pakistan became tense.

Fights broke out on

a

large scale on April 9,

1965, and as usual each side blamed the other for provoking the clash.

The fight continued until the end of April when

effect.

a

ceasefire came into

Before that it seemed that the clashes might develop into full-

fledged conflagration.

Indian Prime Minister Shastri said on April 29

that, if fighting continued, "the army will decide its own strategy and

deploy its manpower and equipment in the way it deems best."
interpreted to mean that India might attack Lahore.

It was

Due to this tense

situation, the need for mediation was expressed by many Western coun-

^^Pakistani note of April 9, 1956, quoted in Ibid.,
1

^^

Joint communique of October 23, 1956 in India.
Hindu Weekly

,

May 3, 1965.

p.

188.
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tries.

President Johnson expressed his anxiety
over the trouble and

stressed the need for

peaceful settlement

a

But the U.S. could not

offer its good offices to mediate due to
the embarrassing decision by
President Johnson to cancel visits to Washington
of Indian and Pakistani

leaders.

Moscow was also trying to be neutral in the matter
but

she also showed her concern and appealed
to both the countries to find
a

peaceful solution to the problem.

Britain, however, undertook the

task of direct mediation between India and
Pakistan.

British efforts that

a

It was

due to the

ceasefire was agreed upon on April 30, 1965.

After that, while attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers
Conference,
President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri were persuaded by Prime

Minister Harold Wilson to sign an agreement on June 30, 1965 to resolve
the dispute peacefully.
In

the agreement India and Pakistan agreed to refer the matter

to a tribunal

if they could not reach any agreement through bilateral

discussions.

They also agreed further that the decision of the tribunal

"shall

be binding" on both governments, and that the tribunal shall

main in force until its findings have been implemented in full.
In

re-

22

solving this matter, both Pakistan and India showed their

utmost sincerity, though their relations have deteriorated so much that
they entered into

a

full-fledged war in September 1965, but both faith-

fully acted according to the terms of the June 30, 1965, agreement.

meeting between the Foreign Ministers to be held at Delhi
^^

22

New York Times

,

in

The

August was

April 25, 1965, and April 28, 1965.

Text of the agreement in Pakistan Horizon

,

third quarter, 1965.
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cancelled due to the tension, and
the matter was automatically
referred
to a tribunal.

Pakistan nominated Nasrullah Entezam,
an Iranian diplo-

mat. and India nominated Alex Bebler,
a Yugoslav judge.

Gunnar Lager-

gem of Sweden was the chairman of
this tribunal.
The tribunal worked seriously to solve
the dispute, and its

verdict came on February 19, 1969.

As a result, about 350 square miles

in the northern part of the disputed
territory was awarded to Pakistan,

and the rest went to India.

India's share was much larger but it was

mostly sea-marsh, often under water, while
Pakistan's included some
crucial elevation points.

Neither side got what it actually wanted,

and this decision came under severe criticism by
some Indian factions.^
The end of the dispute came by the signing of the Rann
of Kutch Agree-

ment at Islamabad on July 4, 1969 by Indian and Pakistani
representati ves

.

Before we conclude this topic, another interesting point worth

noticing

is

about the weapons used by both sides.

Though India was

more vocal about her complaint against the American weapons used by
Pakistan during the clash, the New Delhi correspondent of the New York
Times pointed out that both sides had used the American-supplied war

material against each other.

The War of 1965

After the agreement in June 1965 that the Kutch dispute would

^^Burke, pp. 325-326.
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be settled by negotiations or
arbitration, hopes were expressed that

this might be a precedent which would
direct the future relationship

of the two countries.
"a

all

President Ayub Khan described the
agreement

turning point" in the future relations of
India and Pakistan.

But

these high hopes proved to be short-lived
as tension increased im-

mediately after that and took the shape of an
all-out war, started on
September 6, 1965.
In the armed clash

in Rann of Kutch,

India was certainly out-

fought by Pakistan, 26 something that most Indians
were unwilling to accept.

Nehru's successor Lai Bahadur Shastri

pressure to redress the Kutch defeat.

,

came under increasing

The Times of India warned about

the situation, and urged India to be cautious as after testing
her

strength in Rann of Kutch, Pakistan would try to repeat the same thing
in Kashmir.

27

On the other hand, Pakistan emphasized the importance of find-

ing

a

solution to the Kashmir problem.

After the conclusion of the

agreement, while explaining the futility of

a

war over Kutch, Pakistan's

Foreign Minister, Z.A. Bhutto, told Pakistan's National Assembly that
if Pakistan were to fight,

"then it is not in Dharmsala or Chad Bet or

Biarbet that we have to fight, we have to fight where the problem lies,
i.e.,

in Jammu and Kashmir," and that Pakistan

"can never be complete

^^"Text of the President's Statement," Dawn
26

,

July 1, 1965.

'^Jhon G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War (New York: St.
Martin's Press, Inc., 1974), p. 155.

^^The Times of India, July 18, 1965.

-
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without the people of Jammu and Kashmir.
The number of clashes between the Indians
and Pakistanis on
the ceasefire line in Kashmir had
greatly increased during 1964, and
still more during the first half of
1965.
in

Finally,

a

serious crisis

Indo-Pakistani relations, resulting in large-scale
fighting between

their armed forces, was precipitated when
on August 5, 1965, armed in-

filtrators from Azad Kashmir began entering
India-held Kashmir in an
unsuccessful attempt to foment revolt.
the responsibility to both sides.

The U.N. observers attributed

Exchange of fire all along the

ceasefire line became increasingly frequent after August
8, and on
August 16, Indian troops crossed the line and occupied some
Pakistani
posts.

These moves from both sides were expected as Ayub Khan, over-

confident due to Pakistani successes in Rann of Kutch, tried to repeat
the action in Kashmir.

India, embarrassed by the defeat inflicted on

her by China in 1962, was no more ready to take another defeat--especi
al ly

from Pakistan.
On September 5, the Indian Defense Ministry announced that

Pakistani aircraft had attacked an Indian Air Force ground unit near
Ami tsar, without causing any damage;

the operation was the first re-

ported to have occurred outside Kashmir.
troops, without

a

On the following day, Indian

declaration of war, launched an offensive across the

Punjab frontier into West Pakistan.

The Indian Defense Minister claimed

that the Indian attack had been launched in order to forestall an attack
po

"Speech in the National Assembly, July 13, 1965," published by
The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi
1966, p. 45.
,
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The Times of India

,

September 6, 1965.
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by Pakistan on Indian Punjab.^O

But actually this Indian move
was to

reduce and halt the Pakistani
advance into southern Kashmir;
Pakistani
forces had advanced so rapidly
that they threatened the vital
road link
ing Srinagar with the plains
of India.

If Pakistan captured this
road,

Indian forces in Kashmir would be
encircled.

Thus India was left with

the choice of yielding or expanding
the war.

Slie

decided to escalate

the war.

Fighting continued on three fronts until
September 23, both
sides having fought each other to

a

virtual

standstill.

Security Council adopted early on September
20

a

The U.N.

draft demanding

a

ceasefire and subsequent withdrawal of all armed
personnel back to the
positions held by them before August 5, 1965.^^
At Pakistan's request a special meeting of the
Security Council

was held on September 22, at which Mr. Bhutto announced
Pakistan's

decision to order

a

not bring about

settlement of the Kashmir question within

a

ceasefire but warned the council that "if it did
a

limited

time Pakistan would leave the United Nations.
The ceasefire came into effect as ordered, but was jeopardized

from the outset by
refusal

a

series of violations by both sides and by their

to withdraw from the positions which they held in each other's

territories.
30
31

September
32

The Indian government alleged that after the ceasefire

Ibid., September 7, 1965.

"The U.N. Security Council's Resolution," reproduced in Dawn,
21 , 1965.
"Mr.

ber 23, 1965.

Bhutto's Address to the Security Council," Dawn, Septem-

.
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strong Pakistani forces had intruded
into both the Fazilka area and
many border areas of Rajasthan which
they had not previously occupied. ^3
In

an emergency meeting, the U.N. Security
Council adopted

a

resolution

demanding that both India and Pakistan
should "urgently honor their commitments to the council," and called upon
them "promptly to withdraw
all

armed personnel
In a

note on October 1, the Indian Foreign Minister,
Swaran

Singh, told the U.N. Secretary General that
"India was not prepared to
link the ceasefire or withdrawal of forces with
any political question,
as Kashmir was an integral

part of India and therefore not negotiable.

The arguments were finally ended through the efforts
of Premier
Aleksei Kosygin of the Soviet Union, who invited both parties
to come
to Tashkent to settle their differences.

Reasoning that

a

continued

conflict between India and Pakistan would probably benefit China, the

Soviet leader decided to assume the role of

a

peacemaker.

And so the world was treated to the strange spectacle of

a

Convnunist state successfully fashioning a truce between two bourgeois

nations.

The Kashmir problem was not resolved, of course.

Both sides

merely set forth their "respective positions" on the issue.
the deeper animosities removed, or even mitigated.

signified
33
34

a

pause in

a

Tashkent merely

protracted conflict that, so far, had proved in-

"Swaran Singh Informs

U.

Thant," The Statesman

,

October 2, 1965.

The Security Council's Resolution of September 27, 1965.

^^"Swaran Singh Informs
36

Nor were

U.

Thant," The Statesman

,

October 2, 1965.

The Tashkent Declaration is discussed in Chapter III.
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conclusive.

The decisive encounter was to come
half

a

decade later when

the flames of war burst forth once
more with terrible ferocity.

The "1971" War and the Disintegration
of Pakistan

Pakistan differs from most other Asian
states which attained

independence after the Second World War in that
it
colonial successor state but the portion of

a

is

not merely a

colonial successor state.

Other countries, like India, Burma, Ceylon and
Indonesia inherited the
whole apparatus of government and had
tions,

In

a

continuity of thought and tradi-

the case of Pakistan, it was torn from the colonial
succes-

sor state, and launched with little administrative or
official inheritance.

It was

born in fact from wtiat was really

ment within the state.

a

revolutionary move-

Its strength had therefore to come from the in-

ner dynamic or consciousness of that movement at the time of its birth.

Unique in the regions of modern Asia, rather in the whole world, its
limits were defined explicitly by religious criteria.

Britain's Indian

Empire was partitioned in such a way that the Muslim majority areas in
and contiguous to Punjab and Bengal v^ere joined together in one political entity, Pakistan.

In

some ways, this was

a

strange match.

West

Pakistan and East Pakistan, apart from Islam, had very little in common
with each other; as one observer put it, "the only bonds between the

diverse and distant wings of their Moslem nation were the Islamic faith
and Pakistan International Airlines,"

37

There were major ethnic and

cultural differences between the two regions.
37

(August

2

"Indeed only modern com-

Dan Coggin, "Pakistan: The Ravaging of Golden Bengal," Time
1971), p. 26.
,
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munications, wireless, power-driven ship
and aeroplanes had made possible the political unification of
two such widely separated tracts
as
the West and East wings of the Islamic
state of Pakistan.

Gri^nces

of East Pakistan.

The union between the two parts was
an

uneasy one from the beginning.
Mohaiiunad A1

i

Unfortunately, the founder of Pakistan,

Jinnah, died one year after the creation of
the state,

and his successor, Liaquat A1

i

Khan, was killed two years later.

The

loss of these two leaders left a serious
void and contributed to the

declining popularity of the Muslim League that had
provided

a

semblance

of unity throughout Pakistan.
The East Pakistanis had complaints about the unequal
distri-

bution of economic resources between the two wings of
Pakistan.

accused the West Pakistanis of exploitation.
try was in the western part.
west.

They

The capital of the coun-

Most government officials came from the

The army was made up of West Pakistanis, the major portion com-

prised of the Punjabis.

Yet

a

majority of Pakistanis (55 percent)

lived in the East.

The ci vi -mi
1

1 i

tary bureaucracy and other professions were

dominated by the Punjabis and the migrants from northern and western
India.

Though ethnically and linguistically

a

minority, they became

the national elite of Pakistan from the start.

Bengalis found them-

selves left far behind in the process of state building and economic

^^Lamb, p. 94.
39

Only

5

percent of Pakistan's 275,000-man army were Bengalis.
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development, and felt that they
were not adequately represented.
The language issue came as

deeply alienated East Pakistanis.

a

blow to the unity of the
nation and

Proud of their language and
its rich

literary heritage, they were greatly
shocked when the Pakistani policy
makers initially rejected Bengali's
claim for recognition as a national

language and attempted to make Urdu-a
minority language-the only national

language.

Pakistan.

This decision aroused an intense
resentment in East

Students came out on the streets and
demonstrated against

this decision.

There was rioting, police firing, and
bloodshed.

Sub-

sequently, the government of Pakistan
revised its decision and both
Bengali and Urdu were recognized as national

languages.

But the two

languages hardly gained any substantial acceptance
in the other wing.
Economically, West Pakistan appeared better off in
comparison
to the eastern part.

From the American military and economic aid, the

west remained the main beneficiary.

Initially, the Bengali jute and tea

supplied between 50 and 70 percent of the nation's foreign
exchange
earnings, but the Bengalis received only 25 to 30 percent
of Pakistan's
total

income.

42

The west had

a

virtual monopoly of Pakistan's power

elite: 85 percent of all government positions were held by West Pakis-

tanis; two-thirds of the nation's industry and four-fifths of its banking and insurance assets were controlled by West Pakistan.
40.

York:

Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National
Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 4-8.
41

42

43

Ibid.

,

pp.

12-14.

Ibid., pp. 68-89.
Ibid.

,

pp.

91-108.

Integration (New
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Even the religious tie couldn't
keep the two parts together.
Not all East Pakistanis were
Muslims; about 10 million out of
80 million were Hindus.
To some extent the two parts
of Pakistan were held

together by
the east.

a

common fear of India.

The Bengalis were less concerned
with the Kashmir issue;

they seemed more willing to seek
In part,

But this fear was not so great
in

a

peaceful settlement with India.

Bengalis felt this way because large numbers
of ethnically

similar Indian citizens lived across the
border from East Pakistan
the Indian state of Bengal.

in

Sharing language and culture, they found

it hard to see each other as permanent
enemies.

Despite these differences, the fragile union
continued until
1969 when the government of General Ayub Khan
collapsed as
a

a

result of

mass movement seeking his overthrow and restoration
of democracy.

Ayub Khan handed over power to another military general,
Yahya Khan.

^n^ral

elections in Pakistan

.

Yahya Khan got power in

a

situation in

which he could not maintain the status quo without granting concessions
to the counter elite.

For that he had to seek

a

new political order.

Knowing the mood of the people and sensing the volatile political situa
tion he first tried to placate the angry masses by announcing new educa
tional and wage policies for meeting the demands of students and labor.
He emphasized the transitional nature of his regime and promised the

transfer of power to the people's representatives elected freely and im

partially on the basis of adult franchise.

In

preparation for the

election, full-scale political activities in Pakistan--including the
44

Yahya Khan's Address to the Nation," Dawn, April 1, 1969.
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lifting of all restrictions
on public meetings and
processions-were re
Slimed on January 1
1970.
Vahya Khan returned West
Pakistan to Its
former four provinces and
decreed that West and East
Pakistan would be
represented In the future National
Assembly on the basis of population,
thus ensuring East Pakistan's
majority.
The measure of provincial
autonomy that East Pakistan might
have was left for people's
representa
tives to decide.
.

The autonoiTiy Tor the federating
units was

controversial political

a

very important and

issue which needed serious consideration
as

maximum legislative, administrative and
financial powers were demanded
for the provinces.

Provinces were promised the maximum legislation,

administrative and financial powers, but the
point was made clear that
the federal government also should have
adequate powers to discharge
its responsibilities in relation to
external

the independence and territorial

affairs and to preserve

integrity of the country.

The 1970 general elections were the first ever
held in Pakistan
on the basis of universal adult franchise.

These elections showed that

none of the political parties were popular in both wings
of Pakistan.
The Awami League had mass support in East Pakistan and the
Pakistan

People

s

ties.

The elections also showed the clear-cut confrontation of the

Party had strong support in the west.

east and west.

In the National

Both were regional par-

Assembly, the Awami League emerged as

majority party by getting all the seats from East Pakistan and the
45

A presidential order was issued in April dissolving the oneunit structure in West Pakistan and reviving the four former provinces
of the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province.
Under the order, Bahawalpur went to the Punjab, Karachi to Sind, and
Las Bela to Baluchistan.

a

.

.
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Pakistan People's Party got the
majority in the Punjab and Sind
provi nces

Sheij^Muj^

Rahman, the Awami Lea gue, and the
National MovPmPnt in
From the very beginning the Awami
League had been pre-

dominantly an East Pakistani party
of support.

in

its program,

leadership, and base

After Suharwardy’s death, none of its
leaders was nation-

ally known and equally acceptable
to both the wings.

So whatever at-

tempts were made to make it an all
-Pakistan party were not successful.
Its powerful

secretary. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was nationally
known,

but due to his strong commitment to East
Pakistan's autonomy he got

very little sympathy and support in West
Pakistan.

Besides, the East

Pakistan Awami League had been the champion
of the Bengali rights and

advocated full regional autonomy--a goal which the
leaders of the party
from West Pakistan could hardly endorse wholeheartedly.
East Pakistani

leaders decided against trying to be

party and opted to work on

a

regional

level.

a

national

The 1965 War with India

reinforced this decision as Bengalis saw that they were defenseless
in

case India decided to invade East Pakistan.

Shortly after the War,

in the spring of 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman launched his famous Six-

Point Movement.

The six points were as follows:

1.

A federal

2.

The Federal Government would control only defense and foreign
policy, all other subjects being vested in the federating
states

46

form of government would be established.

Rounaq Jahan, pp. 138-140.
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3.

Two separate freely convertible currencies
would be introduced for East and West Pakistan, or if a single
currency
was maintained constitutional provisions would be
made to
stop the flight of capital from East to West
Pakistan.
There would be a separate banking reserve and a
separate
fiscal and monetary policy for East Pakistan.

4.

The states would have exclusive authority to levy taxes,
federal expenses being met from a uniform percentage of
all states' taxes.

5.

Separate external trade accounts would be maintained for
each of the states, and foreign exchange earned from external trade would be at their disposal.
Federal foreign exchange requirements would be met by the states on the basis
of an equal percentage rate.
Indigenous commodities would
move between tfie states free of taxation or tariffs. The
states would be allowed to maintain trade representatives
abroad and to negotiate trade agreements with other countries
.

6

.

A militia or paramilitary force, an ordnance factory, a military academy and the Navy headquarters would be set up in

East Pakistan.
The party also advocated nationalization of the banks, insurance

companies, fieavy industries, foreign trade, transport, shipping and

other key industries; development of cooperative enterprise, workers'
participation in the management of industry; exemption from land revenue
tax on holdings up to

holdings.

8^2

acres; and cancellation of tax arrears on such

Fundamental rights should be guaranteed by the constitution

and should be limited only in war time.

Pakistan should pursue an in-

dependent foreign policy, and should withdraw from SEATO, CENTO and

other military pacts.
This program of the Awami League, which got massive support in

^^The text of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Six Points is reproduced in
Kessing's Contemporary Archives (London: Kessing's Publication Ltd.,
Vol. XIII, 1966), p. 23217.
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East Pakistan, was severely criticized
by many West Pakistan leaders.
The Awami League thus became completely
isolated from other parties

of the West Wing with no hope for any
cooperation in the future.
The election results turned out to be
an unpleasant surprise
for the military leadership as well as
for the other political parties.

Although it had been generally anticipated
that the Awami League would
win

a

majority of the seats in East Pakistan, its success

75 percent of the votes and all

pected.

in

securing

but two of the seats was totally unex-

Even greater surprise was caused by the success in West
Pakis-

tan of the Pakistan People's Party which had been
expected to win at the

most forty seats.
The western leadership found this outcome of the election re-

sults simply unacceptable.^^

It was

feared that the Awami League,

with its absolute majority in the National Assembly, would vote itself
a

program for virtual self-government,

50

thus removing East Pakistan

from the control of the central government.

election were marked by

a

The weeks following the

feverish contest of power that finally

erupted into bloody conflict.
48

"Criticism by Jamat-e-Islami
February 15, 17, 18, 1966.

,

Nizam-i -Islam, NAP," Dawn

49

Mr. Bhutto said on December 15 that he would do everything possible to frame an agreed constitution, but not at the cost of Pakistan's
unity, solidarity and integrity, although he was prepared to negotiate
on certain adjustments here and there.
In Dawn , December 16, 1970.

50

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared on December 20 that the constitution would be based on the Six Point formula, and there could be no
compromise on this issue. See Dawn December 21, 1970; New York Times
December 21, 1970; and also Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's address to a public
meeting in Dacca on January 3, 1971, in which he threatened that he
would launch a strong mass movement if anyone opposed the framing of
the constitution, in The Guardian, January 7, 1971.
,

,

.
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The East Pakistan

The post election period in
Pakistan

brought three major powers to the forefront
which had to dictate the
course of the events in its history.

The Yahya regime, the Awami

League, and the People’s Party were to find

a

solution of the problem

which became difficult due to the divergent and
conflicting nature of
their policies.

President Yahya Khan triggered the crisis when he
an-

nounced the postponement of the National Assembly's
session to be convened in Dacca.

The Awami League, perceiving this as a deliberate

attempt to disregard popular mandate for Bengali autonomy, launched

a

campaign of civil disobedience.
With the situation in East Pakistan deteriorating. President
Yahya Khan on March

3

invited all the leaders of the parties and groups

represented in the newly elected National Assembly to meet him in Dacca
on March 10.

This proposal was promptly rejected by Mujib, who al-

leged that the army was shooting down unarmed Bengalis in the streets
of Dacca.

52

In

response to this pressure, Yahya Khan scheduled the
ro

date of the assembly session for March 26,

arrangements for

a

but at the same time made

massive airlift of West Pakistani troops to East

51

Dawn

,

President Yahya Khan's broadcast to the nation, cited in
March 2 1 971
,

^^"Sheikh Mujib's Statement," New York Times March 5, 1971.
Nurul-Amin, leader of the Pakistan Democratic Party, the only East
Pakistan party, other than the Awami League, with only two seats in the
National Assembly, also declined President Yahya's invitation.
,

Mr.

53

President Yahya's broadcast to the nation on March 6, 1971.

40

Pakistan.

Sheikh Mujib at this point was under great
pressure from the

radicals of his own party to declare independence.^^

pressure for the time being and decided to adopt

a

He resisted that

middle course.

He launched a nonviolent non-cooperation movement
which gave him the

opportunity to force the regime to accept his terms.

But while the re-

gime was offering negotiating terms, violent clashes were
going on

between the army and the people in parts of East Pakistan, which
made
the acceptance of these terms difficult.
got complete control of East Pakistan.

Under this situation, Mujib
"The whole of East Pakistani

administration, even the Bengalis serving in central government agencies
and in the civilian branch of the armed forces, complied with Mujib's
call

for non-cooperation."

56

Faced with Mujib's de facto assumption of power, Yahya Khan
came to Dacca to talk with him in order to find the solution of the
54

Yahya Khan indicated in the March 6 broadcast, "No matter what
happens, as long as I am in command of the Pakistan Armed Forces and
Head of the State I will ensure the complete and absolute integrity of
Pakistan [and that] I will not allow a handful of people to destroy
the homeland of millions of innocent Pakistanis.
It is the duty of
the Pakistan Armed Forces to ensure the integrity, solidarity and
security of Pakistan, a duty in which they have never failed." The full
text if in Dawn March 7, 1971.
,

55

The Bhashani group was the first group to call for a declaration of independence.
A pledge of full support for Sheikh Mujib was
made on March 9 by Mulana Bhashani (Pro-Muslim faction of the Awami
League) at a rally in Dacca.
Mulana Bhashani declared that Pakistan
could no longer remain a united country, that Bengalis might have to resort to violent methods to achieve their aims, and that he was not a believer in non-violence, recalling that he had said as much to Gandhi.
See the New York Times March 10, 1971; and Rounaq Jahan, pp. 194-197.
,

56

Rounaq Jahan,

p.

195.
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crisis.

At this point negotiations were not
easy to launch.

After

five days of continuous talks, Yahya Khan
and the Awami League agreed
on a draft proclamation to be issued by
Yahya Khan for an interim ar-

rangement for

a

transfer of power.

The proposed proclamation was ac-

cording to the Mujib's four conditions: the
immediate cessation of martial

law and transfer of power to the five provinces,
without such

transfer in the center.

a

It also provided for the division of the Na-

tional Assembly into two committees to draft separate
reports on the

basis of which the constitution would be formed.

Autonomy was granted

to East Pakistan on the basis of the six points
while the amount of

autonomy for the four other provinces was left to mutual agreement.
This was not approved by the People's Party and Bhutto issued very

strong statements against this arrangement and considered it

a

great

betrayal of West Pakistan.

Bhutto suggested direct negotiations with Sheikh Mujib but
his request did not get any attention from the Awami League which was

now under heavy pressure to declare independence as the non-cooperation

movement had completed its one month.

The Awami League pressed the

government for quick acceptance of its draft proposal and warned that
if it was not accepted within forty-eight hours it would be too late
to bring peace by any other means.

59

Events during the last day or so

of Yahya Khan's stay in Dacca are still not quite known.

Each side of-

^^The account of the talks is in Dawn , March 16-20, 1970. Also
see Z.A. Bhutto, The Great Tragedy (Karachi, 1971).
^^

Dawn

,

March 20, 1971.

White Paper on the crisis of East Pakistan, pp. 18-20.

1
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fered different versions of who betrayed
whom.

On the afternoon of

March 25. President Yahya Khan flew back
to West Pakistan.

Upon his

return to Islamabad, he denounced Sheikh
Mujib's activities as "acts

of treason."

He ordered the immediate arrest of Awami

League leaders

and directed the army to crush the secessionist
movement and restore
full authority to the central

which led to the end of

a

government.

Thus was begun the civil war

united Pakistan.

On March 26, 1971, a clan-

destine radio broadcast announced the proclamation by
Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman and the Awami League of the "Sovereign Independent
People's

Republic of Bangl adesh.

Deteri oration of the relations between India and Pakistan

.

Relations

between India and Pakistan, already tense, escalated sharply as
sult of the civil war in East Pakistan.

It

a

re-

started with acrimonious

exchange of notes between the two countries and to numerous charges
and counter-charges by each side.

The Indian government's concern at

the events in East Pakistan was first expressed in the Lok Sabha on

March 26, 1971, by Sardar Swaran Singh, the Foreign Minister, and Mrs.
Gandhi, the Prime Minister.

Sardar Swaran Singh accused the Pakistani

Army of "suppressing the people of East Pakistan."
The Pakistani government lodged

a

strong protest describing it

^^Yahya Khan's broadcast to the nation, March 26, 1971.
6

On April 11 a clandestine radio broadcast announced the formation "somewhere in Bangladesh." But its formal proclamation came on
April 17.
The Bangladesh "government" set up its headquarters in the
village of Chuadanga, only a few hundred yards from the Indian frontier.
April 12 and 18, 1971.
A full report is in The New York Times
,

^^The Statesman, March 27 and April

1,

1971.

A

,
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as

"highly exaggerated malicious and provocative
stories about the

situation in East Pakistan.

Congress Party resolution supporting

the people of East Pakistan^^ caused

and
U.

a

a

lot of resentment in Pakistan

strong note of protest was delivered to U.N.
Secretary General

Thant, charging India with harboring designs
to undermine the solidar-

ity and national

integrity of Pakistan.

The actual

friction between India and Pakistan was heightened

by alleged incidents on their borders and by
the defection of the Pakis-

tan Deputy High Commissioner in Calcutta,

which was followed by the

closing of the Pakistan Deputy High Commission in that city and of
the
Indian Deputy High Commission in Dacca.

The immediate aftermath of the civil war in East Pakistan was

mass influx of refugees into India from East Pakistan "on

a

a

scale un-

precedented in any part of the world since the Second World War."^^
63

in Dawn

,

64

^^

"Notification of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs," published
March 28, 1971.
The Statesman

Dawn

,

April

,

9,

April 5, 1971.
1971.
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On April 18, the Pakistani Deputy High Commissioner in Calcutta,
M.V. Hussain A1 i
announced his allegiance and that of other Bengali
members of his staff to the "Sovereign Democratic Republic of Bangladesh," hoisted the Bangladesh flag over the mission, and stated that the
latter would henceforth be known as the "Diplomatic Mission of Bangladesh."
See New York Times April 19, 1971.
Mr.

,

67

it was stated in New Delhi that the Government of India had acceded to demands of Pakistan to close its mission in Dacca with immediate effect, though an official spokesman "deeply deplored" Pakistan's decision to close her Deputy High Commission in Calcutta and asserted that
this was a "calculated and studied diplomatic escalation on the part of
the Pakistan Government." See T he Statesman April 25, 1971.
,

^^

Times (London), May 12, 1971.
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This large influx of refugees was
one of the reasons that

drew India into the civil conflict
and led to the war.

India could

not very well have stopped the flow
of refugees across its borders

even if it had wanted to, for political
as well as sheer physical reasons.

But the cost to the Indian government
of maintaining these re-

fugees was enormous.'’®

about $1.2 billion for

The World Bank estimated that
it would run at
a

full year.

The refugees would also use up

India's food reserves and administrative
talent would have to be di-

verted to caring for

a

sudden addition of ten million people.

By mid-July, Mrs.

Gandhi had evidence that

a

war with Pakistan

would be cheaper than the economic burden of coping
with the refugee
problem for

a

single year.

This evidence was supplied by the Institute

for Defense Studies and Analysis in New Delhi.

The Indians concluded

that the refugees would cost their country $900 million within

a

year

or more than the cost of the entire Kashmir war with Pakistan in
1965.
This report was widely circulated and resulted in

emotion in favor of war.

a

wave of popular

The Indian leadership had to respond force-

fully in order to alleviate this economic pressure.

India's preparation for war

.

Facing this situation, the most desirable

foreign policy goal for India was to create
Pakistan.

Such

a

a

separate state in East

state would be able to take back the millions of re-

fugees, relieving the economic and administrative burden they imposed on
69

Mrs. Gandhi's statement on May 24 to the Lok Sabha is reported
May 25, 1971.
Mrs. Gandhi told the Lok Sabha that
,
the estimates on relief alone may exceed Rs. 1,800,000,000 for a period
of six months.
in the Statesman
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India.

Such a state would have the additional
benefit for India by re-

ducing Pakistan's power and thus its ability
to threaten Indian security.

The goal of a new state of Bangladesh could
be achieved in

number of ways.

a

The Pakistani government itself could grant East
Pakis-

tan independence out of enlightened self interest.

Failing this, the

Indian government could apply diplomatic pressure.

If diplomatic

tiatives failed, the Indians could resort to military action.
by no means an unthinkable or irrational

ini-

War was

policy option for India.

The

only constraints were those imposed by the great powers and the United
Nations.

With proper preparation the Indians could avoid great power

interference.

If the war were swift and decisive, the United Nations

would not have time to act.
India began

a

series of diplomatic and military moves that by

themselves might have persuaded the Pakistanis to allow Bangladesh its
independence, but, if not, would also serve as preparations for

a

war

against Pakistan to accomplish the same goal.

India improved its ties

with the Soviet Union, going so far as to sign

a

This twenty-five year treaty had all the signs of

"friendship treaty.
a

military alliance.

Reflecting the popular mood the Indian Parliament hailed the new "realism"

in

India's foreign policy and praised Mrs. Gandhi for having "put

^^The Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, signed on
August 9, 1971, concluded in the first instance for twenty years and was
automatically renewable thereafter for five year periods. Signed by Mr.
Gromyko and Mr. Swaran Singh, the treaty contained clauses which provided for the immediate consultations between India and the U.S.S.R. in
the event of either country being subject to attack or threat of attack
See Th e Statesman August 10, 1971.
by a third country.
,

.
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some meat in our vegetarian diet of
non-alignment."^^

Then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi set
off on
get countries to cut off or reduce aid
to Pakistan.

a

world tour^^ to

By presenting the

case against Pakistan on the issue of the
Bengalis, she could make it

easier for these countries to remain neutral

if not actually to support

India in the event of war.
India also began military preparations, some of
which could be

interpreted as more severe forms of "diplomatic pressure."

At the same

time India began to supply arms and training for Mukti
Bahini.

This

support to 6,000 or 7,000 Mukti Bahini forces was kept hidden
from
foreign observers, including U.N. observers.

The guerrilla raids^^ pro-

vided provocations to which the Pakistani army responded, providing
the
Indian army with excuses for "probes" and "incursions" and "protective

reactions" across the border into Pakistan.

War between India and Pakistan

.

Both India and Pakistan made repeated

allegations in September and October that their territory had been
shelled from either side of the East Pakistan border.

During October

^^Quoted by Sydney H. Schanberg, "Pact Said to Bury India's
Non-Alignment," The New York Times August 14, 1971.
,
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Mrs. Gandhi visited the Western capitals of Brussels, Vienna,
London, Washington, Paris, and Bonn.
She demanded the release of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman which she hoped would result in Bengali autonomy
and the return of the refugees to their former homes.
73

For the guerrilla activities by Mukti Bahim, and incidents
on the border between India and Pakistan, see the reports in: The Dawn ,
The Statesman The Times (London), and The Daily Telegraph of July 20
through 26 and August 22; The New York T imes , September 21, 1971; and
The Dawn , September 26, October 6 through 12, October 20, and November
through 20, 1971
1
,
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the Indian press claimed that the
Pakistan Army was concentrated
near
the West Pakistan frontier, that
new defense lines were being
con-

structed on the border, and that the
civilian population had been

evacuated from

a

500 mile stretch to the frontier
opposite the Indian

State of Rajastan.

President Yahya Khan, on the other hand,
stated

that a large number of Indian Air
Force units and Army formations had

been brought forward towards the West
Pakistani border.
The Indian main attack evidently was
deliberately delayed until

late fall, when preparations were completed
and the winter snow had

closed the Himalayan passes, preventing any Chinese
assistance to Pakistan.

The fighting on the East Pakistan border was
greatly intensified

after November 21.

The war itself began on December 3, 1971,^^ and

lasted two weeks until the ceasefire on December
17, 1971.
India limited the war to the single goal of creating

East Pakistan.

a

Initially,

new state in

Indian attacks were intended only to defeat the Pakis-

tani Army, but the Indian Army, however, was prepared to take the offen-

sive in Kashmir and West Pakistan if Pakistan decided to widen the war.
On December 4,

74

India launched an integrated ground, air, and naval of-

President Yahya Khan's broadcast on October 12.
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On November 21, Mukti Bahini launched an offensive against
Jesore, reportedly with Indian support. Western correspondents in the
area agreed that the Indian Army was supporting the guerrillas.
Report
by Clare Holingworth in The Daily Telegraph
November 29, 1971, and
The Times London Report, December 2, 1971.
,

'
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Though the state of emergency
Khan on November 23, declaring that "a
created because Pakistan is faced with
servists were called up on November 24
ber 29.

was proclaimed by President Yahya
most critical situation has been
external aggression," Army reand Air Force reservists on Novem-
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fensive against East Pakistan.

The Indian Army, along with the
Mukti

Bahini. entered East Pakistan from five
main directions, the aim being
to divide the Pakistani units stationed
around the border and to pre-

vent them from uniting in defense of
Dacca, which, as the provincial

capital, occupied

a

strong strategic position.

Two days later war came

to West Pakistan also.

Indian recognition of Bangladesh's provisional
government came
on December 6. 77

The Pakistan government reacted by breaking
off

diplomatic relations with India and described India's
action as evidence
of its

deep hatred" of Pakistan and of its determination to
break up

the country.
By this time the situation was entirely in the hands of the

Indian Army.

December

7

The Indian Army Chief of Staff. General Manekshaw, on

asked the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan to surrender "be-

fore it was too late."

Since East Pakistan was cut off from West Pakis-

tan, there was no way of coniiiunication left for General Niazi, the

Pakistani military cofnmander, to consult or communicate with the high

command in the west wing.
On December 15, as the Indian forces closed in on Dacca from
all

sides. General Niazi sent

a

message to General Manekshaw through

the U.S. Consulate in Dacca, proposing a ceasefire.

He asked for

facilities for regrouping his forces with their weapons in designated
areas pending their repatriation to West Pakistan;

a

guarantee of safety

for the paramilitary forces and for all those who had settled in East
77

Mrs. Gandhi's address to the Lok Sabha on December 6, 1971
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Pakistan since 1947, and an assurance
that there would be no reprisals

against those who had collaborated with the
martial law authorities.
In

his reply, however. General Manekshaw
insisted on the unconditional

surrender of the Pakistani forces.
Finally, on the morning of December 16, General
Niazi accepted
the Indian terms of surrender.

Those provided that all Pakistani regu-

lar, paramilitary and civilian armed forces
would lay down their arms,

and guaranteed that they would be treated in accordance
with the Geneva

Convention, and that foreign nationals, ethnic minorities and
personnel
of West Pakistani origin would be protected.

In a

broadcast on Decem-

ber 16, President Yahya Khan admitted defeat in East Pakistan, though

without mentioning that the Anny had surrendered and declared that the

war would go on.

The next day,

India declared

a

unilateral ceasefire

on the western front, which Yahya Khan reciprocated.

Violent demonstrations against the military regime in West
Pakistan, beginning on December 18, led to the resignation of President
Yahya Khan.

Thereupon, Mr. Bhutto was sworn in as Pakistan's new Presi-

dent on December 20, 1971.
The war brought complete success for India due to careful

preparation, both diplomatic and military, and favorable circumstances.
India was better armed, getting arms from both Russia and its own arms

industry.

Pakistan suffered from

a

United States embargo on arms that
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General Manekshaw' s reply to General A.A.K. Niazi published in
The Statesman December 16, 1971.
,

^^For the text of the instrument of surrender signed by General
Aurora and General Niazi, see The New York Times, December 17, 1971.
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had been imposed against both India
and Pakistan after their last war
in

1965.

Pakistan was getting only limited arms from
China and France.

Pakistan fought from

a

disadvantageous strategic position.

Forces in East Pakistan were cut off and
could not be reinforced.

The

Indians outnumbered the Pakistanis in the east,
160,000 to 93,000.

Pakistanis also had to fight in the midst of

a

The

hostile population,

including by this time as many as 50,000 Mukti Bahini.
When the fighting began, the United Nations General Assembly
had condemned India by

a

vote of 104 to 11, with 10 abstentions.

with Indian victory, world opinion rapidly shifted.

But

No more resolu-

tions were brought before the Assembly condemning India or asking her
to stop.

India not only won the war but won the support of the world

for its policy by doing so.

.

CHAPTER

III

ATTITUDE OF BIG POWERS TOWARDS INDIA AND
PAKISTAN

After the partition in 1947, the subcontinent
was first considered as an area where British responsibilities
and capabilities were
paramount.

But soon afterwards the atmosphere of suspicion,
quarrel

and conflict between India and Pakistan drew the
attention of non-regional

countries to these developments.

course, not conducted in

a

vacuum.

The regional cold war was, of

Elements of global politcis, par-

ticularly those that related to the three dominant sets of conflict
the international

system--the Sovi et-American

,

in

the Sino-Soviet and

Si

no-American--directly or indirectly interfered in the regional con-

f1

icts

Given the geo-strategic location of the subcontinent bordering
on two of the three great powers, with an outlet into the Indian Ocean

and contiguous to the Persian Gulf, the intrusion of global and extra-

regional conflicts into the subcontinent was perhaps inevitable.^

external major powers'

The

involvement in South Asian region was sometimes

related directly to their regional interests in the subcontinent, but

more often they were related to their larger goals of international competition and domination.

In

this game South Asia became merely another

chessboard on which pawns could be moved one way or another.

Their in-

Vor the detailed study of the Big Power interests in the region, see Ference A. Vali, Politics of the Indian Ocean Region (New
York: Free Press, 1976).
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terests and related moves were
further complicated by Indo-Pakistan
relations and often made the regional
cold war very bitter and severe.

I ndia's and Pakis t an's Relations with the United

Statp<;

After the liquidation of British
rule in 1947. India and Pakistan emerged as two independent
countries in South Asia.

ning both countries got nothing
more than

a

begin-

warm greeting from the

United States, as new members of the
world community.
the U.S.,

In the

At that time,

like the U.S.S.R., was preoccupied with
more urgent problems

in Europe and the Far East.

oping cold war.

However, things changed due to the devel-

Washington now turned its attention towards South Asia,

which seemed as an ideal region for the
implementation of new U.S.
policy.

Friendly gestures of good will and modest amounts
of economic

aid were first contemplated without any major political
and military invol vement

Between India and Pakistan the former got greater attention
from

Washington, because of its size, popularity of its leaders, like Nehru,
who was quite well known in the Western world and was emerging as
the

leader of Afro-Asian countries.

But when the United States started

formulating its new policy towards the Middle East and gave serious
thought to regional defense arrangements for the Middle East as well as
South Asia, Pakistan's geographical position gave it
gic importance.

a

special

strate-

West Pakistan bordered on the region surrounding the

Persian Gulf and East Pakistan could become an outlet to the countries
of Southeast Asia.

From these strategic locations, the United States

could deal with the problem of international Communism from

a

"position

^

"
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of strength

ILS.:.

.

policy towards the subcontin ent
(1954-59)

The real

.

incentive in

this regard came when the West was
confronted with the Korean War.

Southeast Asia and the Middle East became
strategically and economically
important areas, which needed to be
defended from the "threats of aggression" from communists.

John Foster Dulles, the Secretary of
State

under the Eisenhower Administration, set
out on

a

fact-finding mission

to countries of the Middle East and
South Asia on May 9, 1953, during

which he visited India and Pakistan.

Dulles'

talks with Nehru were

unsuccessful, the Indian Prime Minister had fundamental
differences on
the issue of regional military pacts, and like
most Asian and Arab coun-

tries, was not convinced of "any imminent Communist
threat."

Secondly,

Nehru was not prepared to give up his policy of non-alignment
which had

earned for his country high prestige and

a

favorable image in the Third

Worl d.
In

Pakistan, the atmosphere was quite different and of course

favorable to the U.S.

Pakistan in her quest for security in the face

of unending Indo-Paki stan tensions, was eager to find an ally.

plans for regional

The

pacts which the U.S. was ready to sponsor had great

attraction for Pakistan.

The United States was happy to get the sup-

port of an Asian country, with its significant geo-political location,
at a time when non-alignment was the dominating theme among the Asian

countries.

2

On the other hand, Pakistan was delighted to get the help

G.W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major
Powers (New York; Free Press, 1975), pp. 77-83.
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of

super power to increase her
military strength to meet
the threats
of aggression from India.
a

Pakistan became

a

member of SEATO as well as the
Baghdad Pact

(CENTO) after entering into a
bilateral military agreement
with the
U.S. in 1954 and subsequently
an additional one in 1959.
^
India re-

acted violently to the U.S.
decision to include Pakistan in her
global
strategy; thus Indo-U.S. relations
were put to severe strains and
Stresses in the mid-1950s.

N ew U.S.

policy toward_the subcontinent in the
1960s

.

With the coming

of the Kennedy administration in
1961, great changes were brought in
U.S. policy towards the subcontinent.

The keynote of the new policy was

favorable to neutralists like India, but it
worked to the disadvantage
of allies like Pakistan.''

The Indo-U.S.

relation had already taken

a

turn for the better during 1959-60 because of
the growing tensions be-

tween India and China.
the situation.

President Kennedy wanted to take advantage of

Other factors like the Soviet-Chinese ideological con-

flict and prospect for an East-West detente also influenced
alignment

and non-alignment in the policies of India and Pakistan.

The most im-

portant factor affecting U.S. policy towards the subcontinent was the
common objective of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. concerning China in the
1960s and the role that India was expected to play in their global

policy for the containment of China.
3

Ibid., pp. 84-90; see also, Sukhbir Choudhry, Indo-Pak War
and Big Powers (New Delhi: Trimurti Publications, 1972), pp. 1-17.
4

Pall Mall

Hugh Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis (London:
1967), p. 2.
,
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Kennedy enunciated

a

"new alliance for progress" in
lieu of

military alliances for the developing
countries, emphasis being on
economic aid.

India was very much delighted with
this change in U.S.

policy, whereas Pakistan was worried.

Kennedy seemed to make extra-

ordinary efforts to maintain good relations
simultaneously with India
and Pakistan.

But the task was not easy; rather, it was
difficult and

complex like having good relations at the
same time with the Arab

countries and Israel.
States in 1961.

Both Ayub and Nehru were invited to the United

As a result of Kennedy's meetings with
the leaders of

India and Pakistan, the U.S. was successful
equal

in

treatment with both India and Pakistan.

maintaining

a

policy of

India, satisfied with

this move, had new hopes and was optimistic.^
But the situation changed when the Indo-China armed conflict

started in October 1962.

Due to the hostile attitude then prevailing

towards China, the Western countries reacted in favor of India, which
was supposed to be the victim of "naked aggression" by China.

This

was the most appropriate moment for the United States, which showed its

great favor by rushing arms and supplies to India.

after China's unilateral declaration of
India embarked upon

a

a

This continued even

ceasefire.

huge military build-up with the military

supplies not only from the United States but from the Soviet Union as
well.

The Indo-Chinese conflict not only brought India closer to the

United States but also the Sino-Soviet rift was further widened as

result of the Soviet support to India.

5

Choudhury, Chapter

5.

a

So the policy of strengthening
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India's military strength suited
the objectives of U.S. foreign
policy.^

Pakistan made protests against
U.S. policy of arming India
which
greatly upset the balance of power
in the subcontinent.
The United
States tried to remove Pakistan's
fears and anxieties over the Indian
arms build-up but it did not help
much.

Rather, the tension between

India and Pakistan (which had never
diminished) increased, which finally

culminated in the Indo-Paki stan War of
1965.

At that time the United

States suspended military assistance
to both India and Pakistan.

military supplies to Pakistan were never
resumed.

Gratis

Sales were subse-

quently limited to spare parts for weapons
already supplied and these
too were treated on a "case-by-case" basis.

In

the 1970s,

a

few sales

of whole units, notably fighters, were negotiated
but not actually executed.

Disheartened by the unfortunate events of the subcontinent,
particularly Indian wars with Pakistan and China, the United
States was

convinced that there was no hope of building up India against China in
Asian affairs.

In

the case of Pakistan, the special

relations were for-

mally broken when Pakistan gave notice to close the important U.S.
strategic communication center at Bedaber near Peshawar from where the
U-2 plane had once taken off and was shot down in Russia.

Johnson administration, the United States began

a

During the

process of disengage-

ment from military commitments in the subcontinent.

President Johnson

wanted to make it clear to both India and Pakistan that the U.S. military assistance to them was not meant for their fighting against each

^Ibid., pp.

108-118.
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other.

The changed attitude of the
United States was mostly due to her

military venture in Vietnam.
became

a

top priority area.

Due to this involvement, Southeast
Asia

At the same time, the United
States paid

attention to the Middle East, where the
Soviet Union was rapidly expanding her influence by taking
advantage of the regional conflicts
between the Arabs and Israel.^

liie

U^^^nd_tl2 e_^^^

Richard Nixon

became the President of the United States
in January 1969, U.S. policy
towards the subcontinent had undergone great
changes since the days of
his vice presidency in the mid-1950s.

the political

Though President Nixon, due to

importance of the subcontinent, could not altogether ig-

nore it while evolving the new U.S. foreign policy, he
certainly de-

cided to operate it with

a

low profile.

Nixon was rather anxious to de-

velop better understanding and detente with the two communist
major
powers: the U.S.S.R. and China.
A significant development in U.S.

policy with regard to the sub-

continent took place when an unexpected assignment was given to Yahya
Khan (then the President of Pakistan) by Nixon to act as a middleman be-

tween Washington and Peking in the context of Nixon's new China policy.
Yahya did this job with utmost secrecy and responsibility and his services were greatly appreciated by both countries.

policy gave Pakistan

in the

a

Nixon's new China

good opportunity (which at that time was involved

^For the important factors in changing American foreign policy
subcontinent during that period, see Choudhury, Chapter 6.
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in the Bangladesh crisis) of
renewing better relations with the
United

States, particularly with

a

sympathetic President at the White House.

The better relationship was dramatized
by the U.S. government's deci-

sion to lift the embargo on U.S.
military equipment to both India and

Pakistan, which had been banned since the
Indo-Paki stan War of 1965.
No doubt, Pakistan was pleased with
this decision.

It had been

the main

loser from the U.S. embargo since India
continued to get massive military supplies from the Soviet Union, thereby
causing

Pakistan

s

security.

grave threat to

During the Bangladesh crisis, Indo-U.S. relations

were correct but not entirely cordial.
personal

a

India was suspicious of Nixon's

inclinations towards Pakistan.^
Nixon's policy towards the subcontinent in 1971-72 raised many

angry voices both inside and outside the United States.

The world

press had flashed atrocities of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan,

and the Nixon administration was charged with siding with the military

junta in Pakistan.

A closer analysis of the U.S.

role during the cri-

sis in Bangladesh reveals that President Nixon did not condone the

atrocities of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, and he did not approve
of India's grand and well planned strategy to dismember Pakistan with

Russia's diplomatic and military help.

Nixon tried to encourage

a

political settlement between the East and West wings of Pakistan, but
had no success in that.

As regards

India's role, the Nixon administra-

tion branded India "as an aggressor in the war."

^Choudhury, pp. 59-101.
9

The New York Times, December 8, 1971.

9
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After the secession of Bangladesh, Pakistan
was desperate to
preserve her territorial

integrity in the context of separatist ten-

dencies in the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP) and Baluchistan, which

appeared to have the Soviet Union's blessings.

Washington for "protection."

It had

Pakistan looked towards

already revived its interest in

CENTO, a reversal of Bhutto's earlier demands
of withdrawal from SEATO^^

and CENTO.
The United States still seemed to be interested in the
main-

tenance of Pakistan's territorial
to see a further

Indian moves.

Washington would not like

dismemberment of Pakistan by the combined Soviet and

But one thing is certain: the heyday of U.S. -Pakistan

relationships of the mid-1950s
is

integrity.

is

over for good.

The new relationship

likely to be merely pragmatic and based on realities in South Asia.

Besides, after the ouster of Mr. Bhutto by
once again is facing

a

a

military general, Pakistan

difficult internal crisis.

The Carter administra-

tion's attitude has been quite cold--to the extent of ignoring Pakistan.

Carter made

a

tour of Asia and Africa in the winter of 1978.

He visited

India, and showed an interest in the new government led by Morarji
Desai

(installed after the defeat of Indira Gandhi and Congress), but

did not visit Pakistan.

Relations of Soviet Russia with India and Pakistan

The Russians often accuse the so-called "imperialist powers,"
and recently China, of exploiting regional

tensions to advance their na-

^^Pakistan has withdrawn from SEATO, because after its loss of
the East wing, Pakistan's membership in SEATO would be untenable.

2
3
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tional

interest.

An analysis of the Soviet's
policy and actions towards

the subcontinent will, however,
show that the Russians, more than
any

other power, sought to utilize the
tensions between India and Pakistan
in achieving their objectives

in South Asia.

India's struggle for power and the
Muslim demand for a separate

state based on religion, was denounced
and condemned by Russia, "as

a

set of new imperialist devices to retain
British political, economic

and strategic influence in South Asia."^^

Throughout the Stalin era,

Russian comments on India and Pakistan were
harsh and their attitude

remained hostile.

Through that early period Soviet Russia showed no in-

clination to establish any friendly relations with India
or Pakistan.
But Pandit Nehru, being

a

great admirer of the social welfare and eco-

nomic development policies of Russia, had felt the necessity
of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union,
"we shall

a

neighbor, with whom, he said,

have to undertake many common tasks and have much to do."^^

Stalin, like Dulles, did not appreciate Nehru's non-alignment,

because he saw the world as sharply divided into two camps and thought
there was no room for the middle-of-the-roaders.

Nehru's first trip to

the United States in 1949, at the invitation of President Truman, had

drawn further Soviet criticism, and most of his speeches brought harsh

comments from the Soviet press.

^^Choudhury,

p.

He was called an "American Stooge.

7.

1

In a speech of Nehru in 1946, as the Minister of External Affairs of the Interim Government.
Cited by Choudhury, p. 10.
1

For Soviet Russia's hard attitude towards India and Pakistan
see Bhabani Sen Gupta, The Fulcrum of Asia: Rela tions among China, India, Pakistan, and the USSR (New York: Pegasus,
1970), pp. 41-52.
in the early 1950s,

.
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The Soviet Union, by sensing
Pakistan's discomfort with the Western

power

wooing of Nehru, tried to take advantage
of Pakistan's frus-

s

tration.

An invitation to visit Russia was
sent to Pakistan's Prime

Minister Liaquat

A1

Khan in 1949.

i

At that stage, Pakistan could not

be influenced by the Soviet Union,
because it desperately needed eco-

nomic and military assistance, neither of
which the Soviet Union was
in a position to supply.

Thus, Pakistan turned down Stalin's invita-

tion and became more friendly with the United
States in the mid-1950s.
The Kremlin leaders recognized that the best way
to penalize Pakistan
was to support her adversary, India.

During the Korean War, India played her first major role in
international affairs, and her policy was found favorable to Russia.

Nehru's speeches and statements gave the impression that India agreed

more with the Soviet Union than with the United States on matters related to the Korean War.

Peace Treaty became
bloc.

a

On another occasion, when the Japanese

controversial matter, India sided with the Soviet

Nehru's open criticism of the policies of the West began to gain

Stalin's appreciation.

Relations between India and the U.S.S.R. showed

some improvement; simultaneously this was the end of Moscow's softer

policy towards Pakistan (manifested by the earlier invitation to
Liaquat)

Nehru's condemnation of the Western military pacts in the Third
World brought praises from the Soviet press, and Stalin's successors

valued his independent foreign policy.
14

Choudhury, pp. 9-18.

They tilted towards the Indian
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government and took advantage of the tensions
between India and Pakistan.

They saw that antipathy to Pakistan was the pivot
of Indian

foreign policy.
The whole decade of 1950 to 1960 and onwards is remarkable
in

Indo-Soviet relationships.

Moscow and New Delhi entered into numerous

trade agreements from 1953 to 1959 which not only improved their
rela-

tionship, but also enhanced the economic development of India.

Soviet

Russia helped India in construction and development of heavy industry.

Between 1957 and 1961 the U.S.S.R. extended credit to India totaling
$670 million.

At the same time, India obtained large amounts of

economic assistance from both the United States and other Western countries

.

On political

other's position.

issues, India and the Soviet Union supported each

With respect to the Russian atrocities in Hungary,

India was not at all vocal as compared to her severe condemnation of the

Anglo-French-Israel

action in Egypt.

i

India was the only non-communist

country which voted with the Soviet bloc against
ing for free elections in Hungary.

a

U.N.

resolution call-

India's support for the U.S.S.R. was

compensated by Soviet support of India's position on the Kashmir issue.
During 1954-1962,

ttie

Soviet Union dropped its neutrality on the Kashmir

issue and openly supported India.
to

It not only gave unequivocal

support

India on the matter, but also went to the extent of exercising its

veto when the U.N. Security Council

displeasing to India.
15

Ibid

.

,

pp.

16-24.

resolutions regarding Kashmir were
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Soviet policy towards

I

ndia and Pakistan in the 1960s

Smo-Indian War of 1962, Soviet Russia began
trends" in Pakistan's policy.

.

After the

to take note of "new

Pakistan had shown its displeasure with

the American decision to supply arms
to India.

Along with that, the

Soviet Union also watched with concern
Pakistan's growing friendship
and closer links with China.

Pakistan

s

With the twin objectives to exploit

dissatisfaction with the United States and prevent the
grow-

ing relationship between China and
Pakistan, the Soviet Union began

new phase of its policy towards the subcontinent.

tinued the special

a

The new policy con-

relationship with India but attempts were now made

to cultivate better relationships with Pakistan.

As a result of Russia's new policy,

gan on ambassadorial

a

and then higher official

series of dialogues belevels.

During these

dialogues it was clear that the Soviet Union wanted to discuss secondary issues like

a

cultural agreement and trade, whereas Pakistan was

eager to discuss the more important issues, such as Soviet support of
India on Kashmir, Afghanistan's stand on "Pakhtoonistan" and Soviet

arms supplies to India which were causing great anxieties in Pakistan.

During President /\yub's visit to the U.S.S.R. in April 1965,

Moscow appeared to press Pakistan to withdraw from the Western sponsored pacts, particularly CENTO, and to close the U.S. communication cen-

ter at Bedaber base.
on Kashmir

and

Pakistan urged Moscow to modify the Soviet stand

to reduce arms supplies to India.

Neither side showed

any flexibility in their respective positions, however.

Keeping aside

^^Ibid., pp. 33-44.
See also, S.M. Burke, Pakistan's Foreign
Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1973).
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these important political
tural

is sues,

agreement in June 1964

,

a

Pakistan had already signed

civil

a

cul-

aviation agreement in 1963, and

a

barter trade agreement in 1963.
Since Ayub“s first state visit
to the U.S.S.R., the Soviet-

Pakistan relationship had been
relaxed considerably though no
major
step was taken by either side
on important political issues
affecting
the relationship.
The Soviet Union began to maintain
a posture of

neutrality in the Indo-Paki stan dispute.

It,

however, did not take any

positive step in that direction which
would seriously jeopardize its
relations with India.

This softness in its attitude was shown
only

to weaken Pakistan's old ties
with the United States and those emerging

with China.

That

is

how the Soviet Union maintained

a

facade of neu-

trality in Indo-Paki Stan affairs.

Whatever the motives behind Soviet policy, it was
able to bring
some changes in Pakistan's policy.

Its first success was seen in 1965,

when after the Indo-Paki stan War in September 1965,
Ayub, despite the

warnings of Pakistan

s

ally China, accepted the Soviet role of media-

tion at the Tashkent Conference in 1966.

This conference could achieve

very little, if anything at all, to improve Indo-Pakistan relations.
Yet, for the Soviet Union, it was

a

great diplomatic achievement as it

played, for the first time, the role of
fl ict

i

a

peacemaker in

a

major con-

Asian affai rs.

n

After the 1965 War, the military balance of power was changing
fast to the detriment of Pakistan and favorably for India because the
17

Gupta, pp.

141-240.

8
9

.
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United States, on which Pakistan
depended totally for miiitary
supplies. put an embargo on military
supplies for both India and
Pakistan.
The U.S. embargo did not hit
India as hard as it did
Pakistan, because
the Soviet Union continued to
give massive military aid to India.

Pakistan got military supplies from
China, but they were no match
for
the Russian weapons pouring into
India.
Hence Pakistan also tried to
get Soviet arms, of which it
received a modest amount after agreeing
to

close down the U.S. conimuni cation
center at Bedaber.
The Indian reaction to the Soviet's
decision to supply arms to

Pakistan was predictable.
ter

a

However, Kosygin's visit to New Delhi, af-

visit to Pakistan, convinced Mrs. Gandhi
that the arms sales to

Pakistan neither harmed India's vital national
its ties with Moscow.

interests nor vitiated

India officially protested the arms sales,
but

it seemed to accept the Soviet assurances

After the arms sales, Russian pressures were further
intensified, when Pakistan was "advised" to join Kosygin's
plan for

a

regional

economic grouping, comprising Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan
and
the Soviet Union, and Brezhnev's scheme of an Asian Collective
Security

arrangement.

19

Pakistan saw that the Russian motives behind these schemes of
regional cooperation against "imperialist" aggression and "neo-

colonialism" were to contain Chinese influence in the area, and also to

jeopardize its friendship with China on whom it relied heavily in case
1

man

,

"Mrs. Gandhi's Protest Against Russian Arms Sales," The StatesJuly 10, 1968.
1

Choudhury, pp. 63-68; also Anwar

H.

Syed, pp. 48-51.
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of a threat from India.

proposals.

It

Accordingly, it rejected these various
Russian

refused to pay the heavy political
price for the Russian

arms, uncertain in quantity and
poor in quality.

Pakistan’s rejection

of the new Soviet proposals in Asia
against China put an end to the

short-lived period of so-called friendly
relations between Moscow and
Islamabad (1965-70).

Sgvietj^e^fat^^

and Pakistan in the 1970s

By refusing to

.

comply with the crude Russian pressures,
Pakistan had to pay
price.

a

heavy

Soviet Russia's relations with India grew stronger
day by day.

By signing the 20-year treaty of peace, friendship,
and cooperation in

August 1971 with India, the Soviet Union gave almost
New Delhi.

ther

,

20

a

blank check to

Soviet good will for Pakistan had now evaporated.

Pakistan's role in arranging the

Si

Fur-

no-American dialogue was

greatly resented in Moscow.
This was the background of the Soviet attitude to Pakistan at

the beginning of the civil war in East Pakistan in 1971.

The Soviet

support for the Bangladesh movement could only be explained in terms of
these developments in the Pakistani -Soviet relationship in the preceding two years,

1969-70.

Pakistan's secession.

Soviet hostility continued even after East

After becoming President, Mr. Bhutto visited

Moscow in 1972, but the relationship did not improve much.
cal

The politi-

unrest in the NWFP and Baluchistan provinces was greatly due to

Soviet encouragement.
20

The seizure of Soviet arms smuggled into Pakis-

The text of this agreement is in the Kessing's Contemporary
Archi yes (London), (August 21-28, 1971), p. 24773.
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tan through the Iraqi

Embassy in Islamabad, the coup
in Afghanistan

and President baud's^' threats to
revive the old issue of "Pakhtoonistan" were interpreted ,n Pakistan
as indications of continued
Soviet

pressure to bring Pakistan into the
Asian Collective Security System.
Relati ons of China with Indi a and
Pakistan

The other great power that has been
interested in the recent

past in the affairs of the subcontinent

is

China.

After the protracted

wars with foreign powers, Mao Tse-tung's
China emerged as

a

united na-

tion, which was to play an important role
in Asian affairs.

China was

considered by many Asians as

a

great symbol of Asian nationalism.

Its

emergence was enthusiastically greeted by India, because
working together they could form

a

strong force in the area.

The period from 1949 to 1959 was an era of friendship
and co-

operation between the two large countries of Asia: India and China.
India was the second non-communist country after Burma to recognize
the People

s

Republic of China.

After the exchange of ambassadors,

relations between the two improved

a

great deal.

On the other hand,

China's relations with Pakistan were not as warm, one reason being
that Pakistan had shown no special enthusiasm about the new China.

Though the two countries were not close to each other, there was not
any hostility between them, either.

Diplomatic missions had been ex-

21

President Daud has been killed in another coup.
proclaimed martial law in Afghanistan on April 28, 1978.
22

The military

For Sino-Indian relations in early 1950, see Gupta, pp. 93-108.
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changed and other links were established.^^
came to

a

When Indo-Paki stan trade

complete stop in 1949, Pakistan in its
search for new markets

sold jute and cotton to China in return
for coal under
ment.

a

barter agree-

China, on its part, hoped to cultivate
relations with the Muslim

countries of the Middle East through Pakistan.

Cjiina' s

relations with India and Pakistan up to 1959

period of

a

.

This was the

decade of extremely intimate relationship in Sino-Indian

relations.

Some complications arose during that period, but those
were

solved with

a

spirit of good will and friendship.

The first major com-

plicating factor in their relations arose over Tibet, whose international status was soiriewhat ambivalent.

China, viewing Tibet as part of

its own territory, sought to end its autonomy and integrate
it with the

rest of the country by force.

India was dismayed by China's use of

force in Tibet but lacked the military strength to challenge China.

Nehru could have opposed China by accepting military support from the

Western powers, but at that time he was also interested in establishing his policy of non-alignment.

Sino-Indian relations survived Tibet.

The dispute was solved

by their signing the Tibet Agreement on April 24, 1954, on the basis

of "Panch Sheel"--five principles of peaceful coexistence.

^^Choudhury, pp.
24
^Ibid.
25

,

p.

25

Moreover,

159-164.

153.

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are as follows: (1)
respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2)
mutual non-aggression; (3) noninterference in each other's internal
affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence.
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India vigorously championed the
cause of China during the Korean
War.
This period marks strong expressions
of friendship, the most popular

slogan in India during this period
being "Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai''-the
Indians and Chinese are brothers.

Leaders of both countries exchanged

visits and received an enthusiastic
welcome from the people of the host
country.

India and China worked together in the
political

sphere.

India and several other countries
sponsored the Afro-Asian Conference
in

1955 at Bandug where Chou-en-lai demonstrated
his diplomatic skills

and statesmanship in dealing with

countries.

26

a

large number of Asian and African

Towards the end of the 1950s, Sino-Indian
friendship ex-

perienced strain.

Chinese maps included the territory in the Himalayas

which India claimed as its own.

Meanwhile China's relations with Pakistan remained cool, but
correct.

Pakistan's entry into SEATO was regretted by China but it

was not made

a

special propaganda issue by the Chinese leaders, who

showed considerable restraint in dealing with Pakistan at the height
of its association with the West.

Unlike the Soviet Union and the

Eastern European countries, China refused to regard Kashmir as "an integral part of India."

In

1960, during the meetings of the Chinese

and Indian officials regarding boundary demarcations, when the Indians
tried to include in the talks the border between Pakistan and Indianheld Kashmir, China refused to discuss this part of the boundary.

Pakistan reacted favorably to China's decision and sent

^^Choudhury, pp.
^^See Anwar

H.

150-159.

Syed, pp. 54-60.

a

diplomatic

70

note to the Chinese government suggesting

a

boundary agreement between

the two countries.

Mo tions

ULih^Jg^.

The 1960s brought the mistrust and
suspicion

in Sino-Indian relations to the
surface, and the golden era of their

friendship came to an end in early 1960.
in 1959 when

Their relations deteriorated

incidents occurred along their Himalayan
borders--one in

the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and
the other in the Ladakh area
of northeast Kashmir.

Other factors, which produced

a

drift between

these two countries, included President Kennedy's
new policy towards
South Asia, which regarded India as

a

counterpoise to China.

As

India

turned away from China, Pakistan turned towards it.
In

late 1962, India and China had

a

little war in the Himalaya

mountains.

The initiative was taken by India when it attacked China's
28
border posts.
The massive counterattack launched by the Chinese

overpowered the Indian forces.
setback since independence.

India suffered its greatest military

China, by announcing

a

unilateral cease-

fire, left India along with the rest of the world bewildered, but one

thing was then clear: China had proved its superior power.
The Sino-Indian war put an end to the "two thousand years of

friendship"

29

and had a great impact on the South Asian triangle.

brought China's differences with the Soviet Union to the surface.

It

Dis-

appointed with the United States' attitude, Pakistan started its policy
28

The grand designs of Indian expansion have been discussed in
detail by Choudhury, chapter 8.
29

For detailed discussions on the factors why China chose confrontation with India, see Gupta, pp. 166-175.
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of bilateral isrn-which not only
resulted in closer links with China,
but also normalized its relations
with the U.S.S.R.

Another repercus-

sion of the Sino-Indian war was the
strengthening of India against Pakis
tan.

After the death of Nehru, Prime Minister
Shastri found his country

weak, and took steps to consolidate its
position in Kashmir and to reno-

vate its armed forces.
The 1960s brought Pakistan and China, two
countries with com-

pletely divergent social, economic, and political
orders, closer.

India

considered these new Chinese diplomatic moves towards
Pakistan as antipathy to India.

China claimed to base its relationship with Pakistan

in the 1960s on the five principles of coexistence,
which guided its

relations with India in the 1950s; while Pakistan's interpretation
was

referred to as mutual national interests.

As pointed out earlier,

Pakistan in its quest for security turned to new friends and new allies
in the changed circumstances

in the 1960s.

Of all major powers, China

seemed more sympathetic to Pakistan's anxiety over India, and this provided the big incentive to Pakistan's inclination towards Peking.

The boundary pact between China and Pakistan was the first major
step in the Si no-Paki stan friendship which has grown steadily for the
last fifteen years.

In

1959, President Ayub had already shown his will-

ingness to approach China for a peaceful settlement of the boundary between the two countries.

The ceasefire line in Kashmir in 1948 re-

sulted in entrusting Pakistan the responsibility of defense of the areas

contiguous to China's province of Sinkiang from the Karakoram pass in

^^Ibid., pp.

193-197.
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the northeast to the furthest
point in the northwest.

The border region

comprises two distinct areas. Baltistan
and Hunza, and in this region
lies one of the greatest mountain
complexes, the Karakoram range of

high mountains, deep valleys, and
turbulent rivers.

No boundary line

had ever been shown in the sector west
of the Karakoram pass on any

Pakistani map.
On Pakistan's

initiative, both countries agreed to have talks

on the matter to demarcate the boundaries.

Negotiations started in Sep-

tember 1962 between the foreign ministers and the
boundary agreement was
finally signed on March 2, 1963.^^

According to the agreement, China

actually ceded some 750 square miles of territory.

In

doing so, China's

main objective was to demonstrate its willingness to settle
the boundaries in a peaceful manner with its neighbors, such as Afghanistan,
Burma, Mongolia, and Nepal.
as annoyance to New Delhi.

This was
It was

a

a

source of embarrassment as well

triumph for China, particularly

among the Afro-Asian countries.
As for international

the Indo-Paki Stan

i

relations.

implications, the agreement had worsened
In

not so much because of the actual

Washington, the agreement was resented
line of demarcation or its contents but

for the new trends in Pakistan's foreign policy leaning towards Peking.

Pakistan's foreign policy began to move more to the pleasure of Peking
resulting in annoyance and displeasure by the Johnson administration

in

Washington, worries in New Delhi, and uneasiness in Moscow.
A series of agreements between China and Pakistan followed the

^^See Anwar

H.

Syed, pp. 81-85.
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signing of the border agreement.

More significant, however,
were the

political, diplomatic, and military
cooperation and dialogues.

Between

1963 and 1966 there were a number
of exchange visits between top
Chinese

and Pakistani

There was

a

leaders culminating in Ayub's state
visit in March 1965.

wide range of discussions in

a

much more relaxed and friend-

lier atmosphere than what Ayub had in
Moscow in April

1965.

Mao and

other Chinese leaders assured Pakistan
of China's full support in the
event of any external aggression.
During the Indo-Paki stan War of 1965, China
gave open and unequivocal

support to Pakistan.

Between Septemberl6, when China issued

an ultimatum to India, 32 and the Chinese troops
began to move along the

Sikkim border, and September 22, when Pakistan accepted
the ceasefire
resolution, the world remained suspended by the crucial question
of

whether the war would escalate into

a

wider, longer and graver conflict

between India, China and Pakistan with the potential involvement of the
two super powers directly or indirectly.
By this time, due to the pressure both from the U.S. and from

the U.S.S.R., President Ayub agreed to accept the ceasefire.

The

Chinese leaders also showed their statesmanship and understanding of
Pakistan's difficulties.

They were quite ready to come to Pakistan's

rescue and agreed to provide any assistance Pakistan needed at that
time.

While the Chinese appreciated Pakistan's difficulties and seemed

to recognize that Pakistan had no option but to accept the ceasefire,

they were certainly not happy to see the role of the Soviet Union as
32

For factors behind China's ultimatum and the happenings on the
international scene during that period, see Gupta, pp. 212-218.
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peacemaker in South Asia at the Tashkent
Conference.

When Liu Shao-Chi

came to Pakistan in March 1966, Ayub
had to make great efforts to re-

assure the Chinese leaders about the
Tashkent Declaration.^^

After the War of 1965, Ayub looked toward
China for immediate
help in

a

fast deteriorating situation for Pakistan's
security and de-

fense problems.

China assured Pakistan of all types of
help in the case

of another war with India.

In

the meantime, China began to give Pakis-

tan the much-needed military supplies.

Pakistan received substantial

military aid after 1965; in fact, China proved to be
the principal arms
supplier to Pakistan in the years 1965-70.^^
Pakistan's moves in the direction of the Soviet Union
during

President Ayub's visit to Moscow in 1967 and Kosygin's visit
to Pakistan in early 1968, culminating in the Russian decision
to give Pakistan

some military supplies,

raised suspicions in Peking.

Ayub was also

disturbed by the news of the internal upheaval caused by the Cultural
Revolution in China.

He probably thought that a change of leadership

in China might affect his country's special

links with it.

China's

relations with Pakistan, however, remained unchanged during the Cultural

Revolution.

There was apparently no sign of

attitude towards Pakistan.

a

crack in China's

But before the fall of Ayub in 1969, China

seemed to have some "second thoughts" on Pakistan.

^^Cited by Choudhury, pp. 189-191.
34

For economic and military assistance from China to Pakistan,
see Syed, pp. 139-144.

^^Russia sold MIG-21 and MIG-23 fighters.
ply was quite modest in quantity.

The Soviet arms sup-
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Ch.ina's

relations with India and Pakistan in
the 1970s

When Vahya Khan

.

became President in March 1969, Pakistan
was involved in serious internal

problems.

During this period Pakistan had hardly
any foreign policy

But then came the unexpected but
most significant assignment for Vahya,
to act as a

Pakistan

a

"messenger" between Washington and Peking.

This gave

good opportunity to further develop better
relations with

China and also with the U.S. under Nixon.
In

this situation, Yahya Khan visited China in
November 1970 and

had lengthy and exclusive talks with Chou En-lai
and also

with Chairman Mao.

a

meeting

The discussions were not confined to China-Pakistan

relations but significantly

a

good part of the dialogue was spent on

Sino-American relations in which Yahya had been playing

a

role.

During that time, China and Pakistan agreed to build the first
road linking the two countries, an all-weather route, three miles high,

through the Himalayas.

It

follows the trace of an ancient mule track,

known as the "Silk Road" more than 1,000 years ago.^^

The new road is

regarded as having far more political than military or economic significance.

India, however, was concerned over its construction.

Though

the road has no significant potential of being used as an "invasion

route," this is the only road between the two countries sharing

boundary in Kashmir.

It

a

common

runs from remote Kashgar to the Mintaka Pass,

in Sinkiang Province of China,

15,450 feet above the sea level; on the

Pakistani side it runs 80 miles down to Gilgit in Pakistani -held Kash-

^^See Choudhury, pp.
^^Syed, pp.

134-139.

140-145.
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mir.

The road was ceremoniously
inaugurated in February 1971 and re-

ferred to as the "Highway of Friendship,"
Yahya Khan's visit contributed to
the two countries,

better understanding between

China promised substantial economic aid
to Pakistan

for her fourth five-year plan.

discussed,

a

Military assistance from China was also

Pakistan’s open support at the U,N, for
China's entry in

October 1970 was greatly appreciated.
But it was

a

period of great change and uncertainty in Pakistan.

China, like any other country, could see the
impending crisis in Pakistan.

The ruling army junta's unwise handling of the
situation in the

East wing as well as the uncompromising attitudes of
the two principal

leaders of East and West Pakistan, Mujib and Bhutto, had
added to that

confused situation.
sympathy.

In

China was watching the situation with concern and

such an uncertain situation, China seemed supportive of

Pakistan's well being.

When the tragic happenings over the crisis in

East Pakistan began, China was caught in
port

a

friendly military regime or

a

a

dilernma:^^ whether to sup-

popular movement.

As a major

power, China could not watch with equanimity the disintegration of

Pakistan, its closest ally in South Asia, and the birth of

a

new coun-

try which was destined to be friendly to New Delhi and Moscow, both

having

hostile attitude toward China.

a

When the trouble finally started in East Pakistan in March
1971, the Chinese press and government did not make any hasty comment.

The first reaction was expressed in the People's Daily on April 11,
OO

For the Chinese role during the Bangladesh crisis, see
Choudhury, pp. 210-214.
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1971.

It

neither supported Pakistan’s military
action nor attacked

the Bengali movement in East Pakistan.

Its main attack was against

"open interference in the internal
matters of Pakistan by the Indian

Government."

The Russian rcle, particularly Podgorny's
letter to Yahya,

was also criticized as an

"i

nterference" in Pakistan's internal affairs.

China, like the United States, was very careful
of not getting

involved in the crisis.

supporting

a

The Chinese did not relish the prospect of

military regime of West Pakistan against the elected repre-

sentatives of East Pakistan.

China had always supported liberation move-

ments all over the world and it could not suddenly give up that
role for
the ruling elite of West Pakistan.

the prospect of

a

At the same time, it could not see

major diplomatic triumph of the Soviet Union and

India in South Asia where she had an important role to play.

These

diplomatic realities in South Asia, particularly Sino-Soviet rivalry
in the area,

put it in an awkward position.

Under these circumstances, China stood with Pakistan in those

difficult times, but it was unhappy over the military atrocities
East Pakistan.

in

When Bhutto visited Peking in November 1971 as Yahya's

special emissary, China publically demanded that

should be found for East Bengal.

a

"rational solution"

As regards the Chinese help and co-

operation in the case of war with India, the Chinese left Bhutto with
no doubt that Pakistan should not expect any such help of intervention
as China had promised and provided during the 1965 War.
a

Pakistan got

"declaration of support" from Peking, but China made no specific

commitments and assurances to Pakistan.
When the war finally broke out as

a

result of Indian military
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intervention, China supported Pakistan in the
Security Council but its
support was confined to words and its real anger was
expressed against
Russia and India.

China's role during the war revealed the bitter

rivalry between the two communist giants in South Asia.

It was bitter

over the success of Russian diplomatic gains in the area
but not over
the emergence of

a

Rej^ti ons in

1970s

t he

new nation in the subcontinent.

continues to maintain

.

a

In

the 1970s as in the last 15 years, Pakistan

special

relationship with China.

After becom-

ing President, the first great power Bhutto visited was China.

Peking

reaffirmed its friendship and support to Pakistan in the joint com-

munique issued after Bhutto's visit--China condemned "India's naked
aggression" and reiterated its "firm support to the Pakistan government
and people in their just struggle to preserve their state sovereignty

and territorial

integrity against outside aggression."

The close rela-

tions of China and Pakistan are likely to be continued as the relation-

ship is based on mutual advantages and identity of interests in the affairs of the subcontinent.

Before Bhutto's ouster by the military re-

gime in July 1977, he visited China

a

couple of times, and every time

the joint communiques indicated "opening of new vigorous phases" in bilateral

ties.

China also supplied Pakistan with military equipment.

China's total military aid is said to be equal to the sum of U.S. arms

provided to Pakistan during the period 1954-1965.

After Bangladesh's emergence, Sino-Indian relations have also
taken

a

new turn.

This was confirmed when

a

deacde after the India-

China War, China offered to reestablish full diplomatic relations with
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India in 1973, as noted by Indian Deputy
Foreign Minister S.P. Singh
39
in Parliament.
This Chinese move was also appreciated
by India and

indications were found that India would also
respond to these "gestures
of realism."

In

this regard India has preferred

a

step by step approach

during the last five years and the atmosphere has
been quite favorable
to the normalization of relations between
the two countries.

February 1978,
New Delhi.

a

In early

non-official good will delegation from China visited

This indicated that China was interested in initiating the

process of Sino-Indian normalization.

Before that

a

Chinese trade team

had already visited India to explore the possibilities of
trade between

the two countries.

This trip was considered as

a

positive new sign of

improving Sino-Indian relations.
On the other hand, it is clear also that India is not likely
to move toward friendly relations with Peking if this would endanger
its relationship with Moscow, and Peking will

probably not seek New

Delhi's friendship at the expense of that with Islamabad.

Analysis of the Attitude and Interests of the
Big Powers in the Region

The critical factor in the international politics of South Asia
has been the power balance and the general

and Pakistan.

In

relationship between India

1971, Pakistan broke in half and with that the power

balance in the subcontinent tilted sharply in favor of India, which en39

40
41

The Guardian

,

August 10, 1973.

The Hindu-International
Ibid.

,

February 18, 1978,

.
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joyed comparative political stability and superior national
power.

Pakistan's capacity to challenge and attempt to reverse the
South Asian
status quo with the military and political support from the United
States and China has been reduced greatly after the events of 1970-71.
The American decision to restore arms aid and other supplies in
February
1975 had very little to do with its Indo-Paki stan policy.

It is rather

attributed to American approaches towards China and its strategic position in the oil-rich Persian Gulf.

The effect of such American support

for Pakistan on Indo-Paki stani relations remains

a

moot question.

Ameri-

can policies towards South Asia in the post-1971 period have been of

relatively low profile.

Now the American strategies primarily are re-

lated to other regions, e.g., the Middle East, China or the Indian

Ocean

Washington has also realized that it cannot curtail Soviet influence in South Asia by pitting

a

hostile Pakistan against India.

Such

an American strategy would only result, as it had done in the past, in

driving India further towards the Soviet Union in an attempt to restore
any Indo-Pakistani balance upset by American actions.

Therefore, in the final analysis, while American policy towards

Pakistan would in part be shaped by the latter's proximity to the oilrich Gulf and its capacity to enhance American interests in that

strategic region, this American interest in Pakistan

is

bound to be

limited by consideration of the adverse effects it might have on American interests in India and the rest of Asia.

In

the light of these

events, one can safely assume that the U.S. would not be so committed
have
on Pakistan's behalf as to encourage that country once again to
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a

confrontationist attitude towards India.
China has been the main supplier of arms
to Pakistan after

1971.
a

addition to that, its political support to Islamabad

In

secret.

not

is

But China would also be cautious in encouraging
Pakistan's

anti-Indian sentiments beyond

a

certain limit, because this would only

push India further into the Soviet "orbit."

This would be counterpro-

ductive as far as China's own long-term interests are
concerned.

Soviet

influence in the contiguous state of Afghanistan, which supports
Pathan
and Balochi autonomists, continues to be high and China would, therefore, be apprehensive of the fact that such

a

dismemberment of Pakistan

would ensure for the Soviet Union an outlet to the Arabian Sea.

This

would result in increasing Soviet naval strategies in the Indian Ocean
region.

Therefore, on this count alone, China is bound to have

stake in Pakistan's territorial
stability.

a

vital

integrity as well as its political

For this it would seem essential for Peking that Indo-

Pakistani tensions be kept within limits, especially since China's

capacity to come to the aid of Pakistan physically

very much limited.

is

As far as the third major power, the U.S.S.R.,
it has,

since the mid-1950s, traditionally adopted

It has no reason to prevent the emergence of good

India and Pakistan.

In

a

is

concerned,

pro-Indian stance.

relations between

fact, Moscow would welcome the idea since it

may help to wean away Pakistan from China and the United States.

CHAPTER

IV

BEFORE SIMLA

Pakistan People's Party Comes Into Power

Nineteen seventy-one was the worst year in the history
of
Pakistan as it not only suffered defeat in

a

war with India but this

Muslim nation, carved out of the Indian subcontinent under
the leadership of Mohammad A1

i

Jinnah and his Muslim League, lost its credibil-

ity by the loss of the Eastern wing.
It lost

In

1971, Pakistan was

a

shambles.

approximately 54 percent of its population, and economically

it was shattered.

Ninety-three thousand of its soldiers, compelled to

surrender, were now in the hands of the enemy, whereas large tracts of
its land were in Indian possession.

The first political effect of losing the 1971 War to India
was the change of government in Pakistan.

Being politically dis-

credited by its excesses in East Bengal and its defeat, the Army could
not stay longer in power in that critical situation.

majority party leader

in

the West wing, was the only choice and he

assumed power on December 20, 1971.
tial

removal

Bhutto, the

He remained vulnerable to poten-

by the Army, but the prevailing political climate made

this unlikely (at that time) as long as he did not permit

a

further

breakup of the country following the loss of the East.^

long.

Hhe military could not keep away from coming into power for
Bhutto was ousted through a military coup on July 5, 1977, on
82
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Bhutto inherited

demoralized and defeated country:

a

without any sense of direction, purpose,
or destiny.

a

nation

He had before

him the immediate task of putting the
scattered pieces together, raising the lost morale, stabilizing the
shattered economy, and tackling

the most difficult problems of recovering
Pakistan's soldiers and ter-

ritory from India.
form these tasks in

Being an able and energetic man, he set
out to pera

most remarkable fashion.

A word on his political

background and experience should be appropriate.

Formation of Peopl e's Party
as the minister for natural

of foreign minister.

Zulfiqar

.

i

Bhutto joined Ayub's regime

resources, but was later given the portfolio

He was a prominent member of Ayub's cabinet, and

enjoyed his confidence and favor.
cal

A1

scene of Pakistan as

He gradually appeared on the politi-

brilliant foreign minister.

a

He is often

credited with having played

a

relations.

departure from an unpopular pro-Western

This move was

a

major role in refashioning China-Pakistan

orientation in Pakistani foreign policy.

A graduate of Berkeley and

Oxford, Bhutto has an unchallenged gift of oration and rhetoric, which

brought him recognition not only at home but abroad as well.

As foreign

minister of Pakistan, due to the anti-India sentiments, he became
symbol of resurgent nationalism.

a

His youth and dynamism helped him

to enhance his charismatic appeal.

During his tenure as foreign minister, Bhutto supported Ayub's
political system whole-heartedly, and strongly supported Ayub's candi-

the pretext of "saving the country" from the chaos resulting after the
alleged rigging of the national elections held in March 1977, by the
Mr. Bhutto is facing a death sentence now.
ruling party.
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dacy during the 1965 Presidential elections.^

It

is

worth mentioning

tnat in spite of that close association with
Ayub Khan, he was able to

maintain his own identity.

It was due to his

personality and flam-

boyance that he was later able to mobilize
public opposition so suc-

cessfully against Ayub Khan.
The Tashkent Declaration brought up the disagreement
and di-

vergence between Ayub and Bhutto over foreign policy
matters.

Meeting

under Soviet auspices (opposed by Bhutto) at Tashkent
in January 1966,
India and Pakistan agreed in effect to a return to the
status quo ante

beljum.

Pakistan gained neither

.

a

plebiscite in Kashmir nor anything

else, far from strengthening his political position, Ayub had
impaired
it.

The events which took place after the Tashkent Declaration

demonstrated clearly to Bhutto that the Ayub era was in its last
days.

Bhutto let it be known that he had been opposed to the accord

made at Tashkent and this persuaded Ayub Khan to get rid of his foreign
•

•

minister.

4

After leaving the government, Bhutto considered whether to

join already established parties or to form

a

"forward bloc" within the

ruling party (Ayub's Convention Muslim League).
could not materialize, as Ayub Khan had

a

But the latter step

very strong hold on the party,

2

After leaving the government in 1966, Bhutto denounced Ayub's
rule as "a dictatorship under the label of democracy."
3

The Tashkent Declaration is discussed in Chapter IV.

^Bhutto was relieved of his responsibilities as the foreign
minister on November 30, 1966. Bhutto claimed later that he had offered his resignation on three occasions following the Tashkent
Declaration, but was told not to desert Pakistan at the time of a
serious crisis.
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and other members would not
cooperate with Bhutto for fear of
dis-

pleasing Ayub, who would have considered
this move as
him.

a

revolt against

His alignment with other parties
did not seem feasible as they

were "reactionaries" in their outlook.

They offered very little to

the people in the face of rapidly
changing circumstances.

"They con-

tinued to cling to abstraction of ideology
and persisted in invoking
Islam as the only panacea for all

ills."^

In this

situation, Bhutto

did not want himself to be identified
with any of these political parties.

Besides, during his tenure in the cabinet as
foreign minister,

he had criticized the opposition parties
quite often, which made co-

operation with them difficult.
aware of

a

Along with these facts, Bhutto was

new change which was arising among people, especially
the

young generation, in response to exploitation and economic
disparities.

He wanted to make this upcoming generation as his
power base,

by making himself the champion of their cause.

any change which could be brought about by

a

The time was ripe for

different approach.

der these circumstances, Bhutto decided to form

a

party of his own.

To judge the people's mood, he traveled all over the country.
a

Un-

positive response especially from students and labor.

He got

During his

tour of the different parts of Pakistan he came out with open and
harsh criticism of Ayub Khan.

In the

meantime, he had found

a

base

among lower-income groups, and as his followers grew in number, he
5

Anwar H. Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and
Two," in Pakistan: The Long View ed. Ziring, Braibanti and 'Wriggins
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977), p. 76.
,

^Meenakshi Gopinath, Pakistan in Transition: Political Devel opment and the Rise of Pakistan People's Party (Delhi: Manoher, 1975),
p.

22.

"

.
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decided to fonn

a

party of his own.

The announcement was made at
Lahore, on December 1, 1967.

Ideology was described in four
slogans---'lslam

is

its

our Faith," "Democ-

racy is our Polity," "Socialism is
our Economy," and "All Power to
the
People."^
In the autumn of 1968, Bhutto
began giving effective political

leadership to an anti-Ayub movement centering
on student demon-

strations, strikes, and other forms of
disorder in the cities of West
Pakistan.

The main purpose of this movement was to
prevent Ayub's

re-election as President in 1970.
started in October 1968 when students began agitating

It all

for educational reforms, demanding the repeal of the
university ordi-

nance,

g

the reduction in tuition fees and changes in the
examination

system.

Their agitation, which began with sporadic strikes at Karachi

University, was at first peaceful but became increasingly violent
as
it merged with Bhutto's propaganda campaign against the
regime.

He

was touring West Pakistan at that time and was delivering many harsh

speeches
Mr.

Bhutto was arrested under the emergency regulations on

November 13, 1968 on
arrest came as

a

a

charge of inciting the students to riot.

His

blessing for the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) as it

enhanced the status and popularity of the party.

It

also helped in

^For the details on the formation of the PPP, see Dilip Mukerjee, Z.A. Bhutto: The Quest for Power (Delhi: Vikas, 1972); Gopinath,
Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and the Rise of Pakistan
People's Party and Syed, "The Pakistan People's Party: Phases One and
Two
;

.

g

The university ordinance restricted student political activity
and provided for the forfeiture of their degrees by graduates accused
of subversive activities.
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establishing Bhutto as

a

dedicated crusader against the
General. ^

The

reaction against Mr. Bhutto's arrest
was intense, and riots occurred
in many cities of West Pakistan.

Along with West Pakistan, rioting
and mass strikes also started
in the East wing, where the
demand basically
was for regional autonomy.

Strikes in East Pakistan were more
violent and more widespread and resulted in a virtual breakdown of all
authority.

After his release, Mr. Bhutto speeded the
task of the removal
of Ayub Khan by addressing public
meetings.

Under the PPP's flag vari-

ous rallies and processions were
organized.

In

fact, PPP was the only

party which observed the "Tashkent Day," in
all the important cities of
Pakistan.
In

comparison to other political parties, the PPP proved
to be

more successful as it got popular support in the
shortest period of
time.

Its

leader, Z.A. Bhutto, was more effective and much more
popu-

lar with the masses, as he not only had the charisma, but
he was able
to communicate with the masses by coming down to their level

using their language, the language
stand.

a

and by

common person could easily under-

^ ^

Several social realities contributed to Ayub's fall.
tan's allegedly remarkable economic growth under his political
9

Mr.

Pakisleader-

Bhutto was released on February 17, 1969.

^*Vashkent Day was celebrated on January 11, 1970, by PPP as reported in The Dawn January 12, 1970.
It was an opportune move by the
PPP to exploit the anti -Tashkent feelings in the West.
,

11

Syed, pp.

74-75.
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Ship was based on

only to

a

a

capitalist economic system
which brought benefits

limited number of families’^ and
firms, which grew dispropor-

tionately rich.

This obviously created
discontent among the poor and

middle classes of Pakistan.

After the 1965 War with India,
this dis-

content and growing disenchantment
was manifested in the form
of
student demonstrations which
gained momentum when Bhutto's PPP
emerged
and presented itself as the
champion of their cause.

Under these mounting pressures, Ayub
explored the possibilities of his remaining in power,
but being discouraged with the
existing uncontrollable situation,
he tried to pacify the people by showing

his consent to a restoration of
pari iamentary government and announced

that he would not be

a

candidate for the Presidency in 1970.^^

Despite

this decision, which came on February
21, 1969, violence continued in
East^"^ and West Pakistan.

Faced with this breakdown of law and order in
many parts of
the country. President Ayub Khan announced his
resignation on March
25,

1969.

Martial

difficulty.

law was proclaimed and order was restored without

General

Yahya Khan (the Commander-in-Chief of the Army),

who had been appointed Chief Martial Law Admini strator

,

assumed the

These 22 rich families of Pakistan were frequently mentioned
by Bhutto in speeches during his election campaign; unsuccessful
actions

were taken against them when Bhutto came into power in 1971.
1

17,

3

^or the events during these days, see The Dawn, February 1,

21, and 26, and March 13,
14

.

.

.

1969.

The situation in East Pakistan was more violent.
Students in
Dacca got virtual control of the situation.
On March 3, they demanded
the resignation of 40,000 Basic Democrats, who formed the electoral college.
Two Basic Democrat members were killed in the process, and
harassment continued during these days.

8

.

8
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Presidency on March 31, with the
explanation that it was necessary to
assume the office of Head of State
until a new Constitution was
15

framed

I!ie elect ion s of 1970 and emergenc e of the PPP as
a ma.iority party in

^

West w 1

n9

Circumstances under which the first general
elections

.

were held on December 7, 1970, brought
Mujibur Rahman and Bhutto to the

forefront of Pakistani politics.
the National Assembly, all
62 from the Punjab,

The Awami League swept 151 seats in

from East Pakistan, and the PPP got

18 from Sind, and

1

from NWFP.

81

seats,

The PPP did not con-

test any seats in East Pakistan, and had little
success in NWFP and

Baluchistan.^^

Its

victory in the Punjab and Sind was attributed to

its combination of economic radicalism, anti-Indian
nationalism,^^ and
Mr.

Bhutto

s

dynamic personality that was appealing especially to

younger voters.

1

The election returns proved most of the pre-election predic1

April

5

1,
1

g

"Yahya Khan's Broadcast on March 31," reported in The Dawn,
1969.

The PPP got one seat from Baluchistan and one from NWFP.

^^In his election campaign, he advocated nationalization of
banking and basic industries, including gas, natural resources, shipping, paper and cement; limitation of land holdings; distribution of
state lands to landless peasants.
In foreign policy, he advocated
withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO.
His policy differed in two fundamental respects from that of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman: he supported the establishment of a strong central government, and demanded the intensification of the confrontation with India over the Kashmir question,
calling for "a 1,000 year war" if necessary.
1

Bhutto described himself as "a democratic socialist who believes in socialism on the Willy Brandt or British pattern." The Dawn
December 12, 1970.

,

.
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t1ons wrong, ^9

attributed to various
reasons.

The PPP obviously benefited
from the various factions which
appeared within the rightist elements
like the Muslim League and
religious parties during the election
campaign.
These parties found it
difficult to cooperate with each
other, thus their internal
conflicts
weakened their positions and strengthened
the PPP position.
Factions
were found even in the leftist NAP
between Mali Khan and Achaktai

groups

While these parties were busy confronting
their internal problems, Bhuttos*

supporters increased day by day, since the
PPP pre-

sented itself as refreshingly different
from the rightist parties.

Some

of the independent candidates received
support from the PPP in consti-

tuencies where it was not strong enough to
put up its own candidate.
Such candidates joined the PPP after the election.

Yahya Khan resigns and Bhutto becomes President

.

The unconditional

surrender of the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan on December
16, 1971
and President Yahya Khan's acceptance on the following day of
the
Indian offer of a ceasefire on the Western front aroused intense
anger

and bitterness in West Pakistan.

The shock caused by the disaster in

19

Werner Adam, writing in the Far Eastern Economic Review , Hong
Kong, December 5, 1970, predicted that only 15 to 20 percent of Bhutto's
117 candidates would win in the Western wing.
20

For the detailed discussion on the causes of failure of the
rightist parties and their wrong strategy in the election campaign,
see Gopinath, pp. 103-110, and Mukerjee, pp. 67-98.
21

In Sind, for Sukkur constituency A1 i Hasan Mangi contested
Independent candidate, but had full support from the PPP; he announced to join the PPP right after he won the National Assembly seat.

as an

9]

East Pakistan was all the
greater because official
statements on the
progress of the war had completely
concealed the true situation
there.
In consequence, when
Pakistan's defeat could no longer
be concealed.
the press and politicians
united in demanding President
Yahya Khan's
resignation

Demonstrations against the military
regime began
towns on December 18.

in the main

The most violent one was in
Peshawar, where

crowd attempted to burn down
President Yahya Khan's house.
Lahore, several thousand people
took part in

a

a

In

procession, shouting

such slogans as "Quit or be Shot,"
and in Rawalpindi civil servants

paraded with placards saying, "We demand

civilian government.

a

full

account" and "Give us

The demonstrations continued until

20, when they threatened to degenerate
into riots.
a

general

In

December

Karachi, where

strike was declared, demonstrators stormed
the Soviet Air-

lines office, and set fire to liquor stores
in both Karachi and Islamabad as a protest against the alleged drunkenness
of the ruling mili-

tary junta.

President Yahya Khan
scure.

s

position during this period remained ob-

He made his last broadcast in the evening of December
16, when

he declared that the war on the Western front would
continue, and did

not himself broadcast the statement announcing the ceasefire.
22

He is-

A statement issued on December 18 by the United Coalition
Party, and Asghar Khan's statement on December 19.
In The Dawn,
December 19 and 20, 1971.

23
24

The Dawn

,

December 19, 1971.

Ibid., December 19 and 20, 1971.

.

sued a statement in the
evening of December 17.
outlining the new

constitution which he had promised
to publish before December
20, but
it was withdrawn without
explanation.^^
It was

officially announed on December
18 that Mr. Bhutto

had been asked to return
from New York immediately,
arrival

"Power will be transferred to

be formed under the new
Constitution."

a

and that on his

representative government to
On December 19 came the an-

nouncement of President Yahya Khan's
"decision" to resign his office
as

soon as he had handed over the
government to the representatives

of the people.
Mr.

Bhutto arrived in Rawalpindi on the
morning of December

20 and drove immediately to the
President's house amid the cheers of

thousands of his supporters.

About two hours later it was announced

that he had been sworn in as President and
Chief Martial Law Administrator.
In a

On the same day, December 20, Bhutto
addressed the nation.

broadcast lasting nearly an hour he promised revenge
for Pakis-

tan's "temporary humiliation," and also pledged
himself to restore

democracy and to introduce political and social reforms.^^
Zulfiqar
choice to head

a

A1

i

Bhutto became the military establishment's

new government.

For the time being, at least, the

The Constitution was largely concerned with provisions for
autonomy for East Pakistan and was therefore already out of date.
26

Mr. Bhutto was representing Pakistan in the U.M. General Assembly as the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister appointed by
Yahya Khan during the crisis situation in East Pakistan.

27

December

"President Bhutto's Broadcast to the Nation, in The Dawn,
21

,

1
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military had had its fill of
politics.

Bhutto had demonstrated that

he was the outstanding
politician of West Pakistan and
the leader of
its majority party.
He had also cultivated
strong ties with the

military elite.

It was,

therefore, no surprise that the
military

turned to him to lead the country
in the aftermath of its
worst defeat
Bhutto had before him the enormous
tasks of stabilizing the
internal political situation,
salvaging

storing

a

battered economy, and re-

a

sense of confidence and purpose
to people whose morale had

been severely shaken.

In

addition, on the Western front Pakistani

territory was under India's possession
and 93,000 of her soldiers
were in India as POWs.

The security of what remained of the
country had

to be safeguarded, and its badly
tarnished image renovated.

To all

these problems, Bhutto applied himself
with enormous personal energy.
By frequent dramatic public appearances,
he rallied popular

support for his leadership and programs.

The most important political

decision which he took by getting the consent of the
people at

a

pub-

lic meeting was the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
It had been Bhutto's style seemingly to dramatize
the demands

and desires of the Pakistani nation.

He always wanted it to appear as

President Bhutto announced his decision to release him at a
public meeting in Karachi's Nishter Park on January 3, 1972.
Bhutto's
decision was hailed by The Dawn in an editorial entitled "Great Expectations," January 5, 1972. Mujib's unconditional release was widely
acclaimed by Wali Khan (President, NAP), Ajmal Khetak (NAP Joint
Secretary), Mulani Mufti Mahmuod (General Secretary, J.U.I.), Bizanjo
(Baluchistan NAP), Akbar Bugti, Sardar Shaukat Hayat (President, Punjab
Muslim League).
In addition, the Guardian
the Daily Telegraph
the
Daily Mai 1 wrote editorials, praising Bhutto for his wise move. U.S.
Department of State termed the release of Sheikh Mujib an act of
statesmanship.
,

,
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if he was only carrying
out the dictates of his people.

Some form of
public sanction was sought prior
to virtually all delicate
negotiations.

This had been particularly true
in relations with India and
Bangladesh.
Bhutto used his intelligence and
popularity to good ad-

vantage in dealing with Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi in the summer of
1972.

Xhe

Question o f the Pakistani Ter ritories
at the Western
Front and the Question of PQWs for
Bhutto

After becoming the President of Pakistan,
Bhutto's initial
foreign policy moves were designed to
revive morale at home as well as
to obtain external

acceptance and support before beginning the in-

evitably difficult negotiations with India.
accept the verdict of 1971 and adopted

He appeared genuinely to

relatively conciliatory line

a

toward India and Bangladesh, except for

a

of propaganda on the Kashmir question.

The Army itself had surren-

probably ritualistic revival

dered in East Pakistan, so there was not the question
of their not ac-

cepting the verdict.

By way of insurance, Bhutto was careful not to

antagonize the Army and public opinion by moving too rapidly toward
reconciliation with India.
Bhutto's past rhetoric and his traditional stand against com-

promising with India, was the biggest handicap in negotiating for
peace in the subcontinent.

The changed situation and tragic circum-

stances had compelled him to show some flexibility in his well-known

animosity towards India.

After assuming the responsibil ity he had two

major tasks in front of him: return of the POWs and getting back the

.
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territory in West Pakistan now
in Indian possession.
The families of the POWs
were getting impatient.

Punjab was
the most badly affected
area as the great number
of the army personnel
came from this province.
Feelings were conveyed by
arranging demon-

strations, and sending memoranda
to the government.
only the most important but
very touchy problem because
families in the Punjab were
affected by it.

That was not
a

great many

The spate of demonstra-

tions by relatives of POWs
greeted Bhutto as he went round the
country

after taking over as President.

It

is

possible that at that time these

demonstrations were engineered by his
political opponents.
mine his popularity, this was
their part.

a

To under-

very appropriate and timely move on

But these demonstrations cooled down
as time passed, and

also his threat to quit unless the
agitation stopped had some effect.
Some newspapers also came out with criticism
of these activities and
they wrote editorials about the sensitivity
of the matter.

The Pakis-

tan T imes said:

Those who are pressing the present regime to secure
instant
repatriation of POWs and civilians should not shut their
eyes
to the vital issues at stake.
No patriotic Pakistani would
want Mr. Bhutto to go cap in hand to New Delhi to
secure the
release of prisoners

Signing

a

peace with India was not the only problem facing

Bhutto, but the strings attached to it were worth considering too.
India insisted on Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh before any talks
29

POWs repatriation rally in Pindi; see the report in The Dawn,
February 5, 1972.
30

The Pakistan Times

,

February 10, 1972.
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could start.

Even the return of the
POWs was based on this
condition.
The question of Bangladesh
was a highly emotional
one in Pakistan.
It was the common
understanding among the masses
that the recognition of Bangladesh meant
the repudiation of the "Two
Nation Theory."
It was a very hard
fact to be accepted, as Pakistan
was founded on the
basis of this theory.
At the same time, most other
countries had al-

ready recognized Bangladesh,
thus pressuring Pakistan to
do the same.

Bhutto, though very much under
internal and external pressure
to seek peace with

refused to give in.

India in order to get the POWs back,
tenaciously
He personally was in favor of
recognizing Bangla-

desh but could not do so until
he was sure that public opinion
would

accept it.
Bhutto made many speeches all over the
country making people

understand the reality of the events, but
at the same time he pledged
that he would not compromise national
honor in the process.

The only

course to follow was to seek an accommodation
with India on the basis
of

a

"just and honorable settlement.

He prepared people gradually

for the move he was about to make, peace with
India.

At Lahore, at

a

big public rally, he made a plea for peace in
order to obtain the
31

M

"India's Terms for Talks," The Dawn January 14, 1972. Mrs.
Gandhi said while addressing a public meeting in New Delhi
that Pakistan should hold direct peace negotiations but she indicated
they must
be based on recognition of an independent Bangladesh.
Indian Foreign
Minister Swaran Singh told a rally in Jullundhar that India was ready
to resume diplomatic relations with Pakistan, provided President
Bhutto
adopted a realistic attitude towards the new realities of the subcontinent, including the emergence of an independent Bangladesh.
The Dawn,
January 3, 1972.
,

32

The address to the PPP workers at Larkana on January 7, 1972,
and the address to the National Assembly on April 14, 1972.

.
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peopl e

'

approval

s

But at the same time he
also said:

A strong Pakistan will
emerge.
Our nation has not been defeated.
I
shall not forget the words
of Tipu Sultan that nnp
day of a lion
s

kal

.

33

existence is worth

a

hundred years of

a

jac-

While Bhutto was facing the
pressure for and against the
peace
efforts, Mrs. Gandhi was also under

a

different sort of pressure.

A

decisive military victory had raised
expectations that India could at
last settle to its satisfaction
all disputes with Pakistan.
Both leaders
tried to guide public opinion
towards greater realism.

In the

beginning

little success was seen, as the
popular attitudes had so hardened over

years of political confrontation that
it was impossible to dampen mutual

hostility in the short run.
A change was felt among the masses
in Pakistan as the newspapers

carried editorials and articles in favor of
lished in p^n^ by Mazhar A1

i

a

detente.

An article pub-

Khan urged the need for normalization of

relations with India so that "the grim past can be
forgotten and we can
learn to live together on the basis of mutual help
and trust.

other well-known political observer, S.R. Ghouri

,

An-

argued that "even if

the idea of confederation was unacceptable, India and Pakistan
could

cooperate in the economic and political fields.
The leftist political
of peace with India.

leaders, especially of NAP, spoke in favor

Among those, Wali Khan's opinion is worth mention-

^^T he Daw n, April 21, 1972.
34
6,

1972:
35

Ibid., March 14, 1972; also, S.R. Ghouri 's article of January
India-Pakistan Conflict: International Dimensions."

"

Ibid.

,

March 3, 1972.
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ing.

B.K.

He,

1n an

Interview with

the

Tiwari, said that "India
has

subcontinent-U should make
towards peace."36

All

a

a

IndiarLjMress correspondent
significant role to play in
the

magnanimous and generous
contribution

these opposition leaders while
talking in favor

of the peace talks, asked
India to take the initiative
because, as they
said, "victory puts it in
a position to set the
pace."
36

March

Tiwari," The Indian Express

chapter

V

SHIFT IN POLICY
Mr.

Bhutto's Tradi tion a! Stand and
His New Stand
after 1971 Towards India

When Mr. Bhutto took over as
President he described the situation as a "total crisis."

Pakistan itself had been reduced
from one-

fifth of the size of India to
one-tenth.

population.
It

It

It had lost 54

percent of its

was no longer the "largest Islamic
power" in the world.

was a smaller Muslim country
than Bangladesh.

It had fewer

Muslims

than India had.

Bhutto had to pass through the hardest
experience of his country's history.

He was heir to partition, disintegration,
opportunism,

religiously cloistered outlooks of large parts
of the community, social
injustice and mounting economic problems.

Considering this situation,

it was not without some significance that
Mr.

frontation with India was no longer

Bhutto stated that con-

viable policy.

a

This statement

by Mr. Bhutto not only marks a change in his
policy of confrontation

with India, but also reveals an altered structural change in
geopolitical

relationship within the subcontinent.
Bhutto, for many years, had passionately advocated

vigorous confrontation against India.

^

a

policy of

He fell out with President Ayub

^See Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).
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Khan precisely on this point,
as he felt that Ayub had
thrown away
the initiative at Tashkent by
abandoning confrontation in
favor of

moderation.

He had been very consistent,
and argued that he stood for

confrontation because in his judgment
that was practical politics
terms of the military balance.

in

He believed Pakistan could
have walked

into Kashmir in 1962 when India
was engaged in hostilities with
China.
The balance was still in Pakistan's
favor in 1965.^ The events of 1971

resulted in

a

decisive military verdict in India's
favor.

pelled Bhutto to bring

a

This com-

change in his past ideas of confrontation

with India, as in the face of superior
military strength of India,

Pakistan could no longer hope for

a

successful military settlement.

He proved himself a realist before
the world when he adopted
a

realistic attitude with the changing reality
of the subcontinent.

By a study of the events, one reaches
the conclusions that Bhutto's

policy of abandonment of confrontation was based
on

sideration of the objective reality.
of land and

a

a

careful con-

Possession of the large tracts

big number of soldiers in Indian prison camps did
not

allow Pakistan any bargaining leverage.

It

was obvious that if steps

were not taken in proper directions, and also at proper times,
Pakistan might be pushed to the wall
an unequal

Bangladesh.

treaty.

and made to sign what it regarded as

Bhutto's attitude changed after the secession of

He not only accepted the reality, but also tried to make

people understand his point of view in this changed situation.

His

interviews with the foreign press and especially with the Indian

"Bhutto's Interview with the B.B.C.," published in The Dawn,
February 18, 1972.
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journalists are an example of
this marked change.
The strange thing in this
whole process was his new
stand on
the Kashmir problem.
His statements on Kashmir,
before signing the
Simla Agreement, and after
that, are contrary to
what he had been saymg in the past. About Jammu and Kashmir
he once argued that.
If a Muslim majority area
can remain a part of India
then
the raison d’etre of Pakistan
collapses
Pak s;an
continue unremittingly her struggle
for'the'right o^self
determination of this subject-people.
Pak^sCn is incom^
Kashmir both terri torial ly and
ideo-

^og\cciUy^

But after 1971, he came up with
new formulations on the subject:
he

seemed to delegate the responsibility
for determining the right of self

determination to Kashmiris themselves.^
tion about adopting the concept of

Pakistan.

a

He has even given an indica-

"soft-frontier" between India and

"We can make the ceasefire line a line
of peace.

people of Kashmir move between the two
countries freely.
lead to another.
It

.

.

Let the

One thing can

.

doesn't mean that Bhutto

is

abandoning Pakistan's claim on

Kashmir; he rather seems to try ways other than
war.

Three wars in the

region and all on Kashmir have proved unsuccessful in
solving the dispute, and now especially when the military balance is
not in favor of

Pakistan, Bhutto didn't want to continue with the old rhetoric
and the

policy of confrontation.

^Bhutto,
4

5

p.

It

wasn't Bhutto's own choice to change his

180.

See Dilip Mukerjee, p. 215.

"Interview with Kuldip Nayyar," cited by B.G. Verghese, in

An End to Confrontation (Bhutto's Pakistan)
1972), p. 78.

(Delhi:

S.

Chand & Co..
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policy. It was the dictate of
the events that compelled
him to do so.

Indian

and Pakistani

s

Uten^nJ^m^^

in Bhutto's attitude for
talks with

sibility as President of Pakistan.

Inclination was found

India soon after he assumed
responHe showed his willingness
to enter

into negotiations with India
"on the outstanding India-Pakistan
disputes
on the basis of justice and fair
play." He emphasized; "If the
Indian

government and its people want to live

a

peaceful and honorable life

we also want to do the same," and
"let us work towards the betterment
Of the lot of the common people in
both the countries."^

Realizing the need for both countries to
enter into negotiations with each other, Bhutto emphasized
that India should not insist
on any preconditions.^

could make

a

He said that the return of POWs to
Pakistan

good starting point for negotiations with India.
^

The

Indian response, however, came officially on
January 12 when the Indian

delegate, Mr. Samar Sen in

a

note to the U.N. Secretary General Wald-

heim, stated that India was prepared to hold
bilateral negotiations

with Pakistan on mutual troop withdrawals on the Western
and Kashmir
fronts.

The Indian troops would be withdrawn from Bangladesh only

when the governments of India and Bangladesh thought it desirable.

President Bhutto told

a

press conference on the same day that

there would be no point in discussing any settlement if India imposed
0

3,

Address to

a

public meeting at Nishtar Park, Karachi

,

1972
^

g

The Dawn

,

January 14, 1972.

Address to the people in Peshawar on January 15, 1972.

February
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preconditions on the withdrawal
of her troops from

'’East

or West Pakis

tan," or on the repatriation
of prisoners of war.^

After the exchange of

a

few statements from both
sides, show-

ing their inclination to
hold the negotiations,

India delivered an-

other note to the U.N. Secretary
General announcing that Indian
troops
would leave Bangladesh by March
25, 1972.
On February 14, Mr. Sen
said that India was prepared to
have direct talks with Pakistan
"at any
time, at any level, and without
preconditions." Before that, Moscow
had also shown its willingness
to "initiate Indo-Pakistan talks if

both countries so desired.
But this time, the two countries did
not seem so willing to

involve any third country on the pattern
of Tashkent.

broadcast

a

report, with reference to

a

All

India Radio

foreign correspondent, on

February 15, that India would give due
consideration to "any request"
from President Bhutto to hold talks with Mrs.
Gandhi.

But, it said

no request of this nature had been received
either directly from

Pakistan or through some third party.

Indian officials said also

that India wanted to release the Pakistani POWs, but could
not afford
to send home nearly 100,000 trained soldiers unless
Pakistan ended the

state of war with India.
The opening of negotiations was delayed by
9

a

number of factors.

"President Bhutto's Press Conference," The Dawn, January 13,

1972.
^^

The Dawn

,

January 15, 1972.

Report through Reuter, quoted by All
February 15, 1972.

India Radio (AIR),

53

"

.
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the most important of which
was Pakistan's refusal to
recognize Bangladesh.
The Pakistan government was
anxious to secure the release
of the
prisoners of war who had surrendered
in Bangladesh, but the
Indian

government maintained that as they
had surrendered jointly to the
Indian Army and the Mukti Bahini,
Bangladesh must take part in any negotiations on this question.

President Bhutto appealed to India to
release the POWs without
linking them to the other issues between
the two countriesj^ and

showed his consent to negotiations, saying
that he was looking forward
to negotiations with the Indian
government and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman repeatedly rejected
the offer of talks with

Bhutto unless Pakistan first recognized Bangladesh
The Indian offer to hold talks came on February
19, when

a

formal offer was made by Indian representati ves at
the U.N. through

the U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Waldheim.

India offered to conduct

direct talks with Pakistan, "at any time, at any level, and
without

preconditions" to ensure "durable peace and stability in the subcontinent.

1

Simultaneously, the same thing was repeated by Mr. D.P. Dhar,
Chairman of the political planning body of the External Affairs Minis-

Mrs
Gandhi, however, rejected this request on March 19 stating
that the question of the prisoners of war "is linked with our security."
.

1

14

President Bhutto's broadcast on March 3, 1972.
.

Sheikh Mujib's interview to UPI, on February 19, and his
statement on March 19, 1972.
^^See The Dawn

,

February 20, 1972.
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try in Prague and Paris, where
he was visitingJ^

Bhutto welcomed the Indian offer
of talks but at the same time
he reiterated the need of
peace based on justice and
mutual respect.
He said,

"this country would never accept
a dictated peace that would

compromise its honor."'®
Finally, both countries agreed on

between them.

In

a

a

summit level meeting

letter dated April 7, Mrs. Gandhi
suggested an

emissaries level meeting to prepare the
ground for the summit level
meeting.
on April

Bhutto agreed to the summit meeting in
10,

1972.

reply to Mrs. Gandhi

a

His reply was welcomed in New Delhi
with the ex-

pectation of an emissary level meeting by the
end of April.

Preliminary mo ve s for Indi a-Paki stan summit
meeting

.

India and Pakistan

were in direct touch with each other through
diplomatic channels.
change of notes went on through the Swiss Embassy
and finally

a

Ex-

deci-

sion was reached for the talks between special emissaries
of the two

governments to be opened on April 26 at Murree,

hill

a

station about

twenty miles north of Rawalpindi.
Bhutto indicated that the problem Pakistan especially wanted
to take up at the Murree talks was that of the prisoners of war,
and

that he was prepared to send back the Indian prisoners "even if India

^^Mr. D.P. Dhar said in Prague that India wanted lasting peace
with Pakistan.
In Paris, he said, "The Indian government would welcome
President Bhutto with an open mind and open arms." In The Dawn, February 22 and 23, 1972.

^^"Bhutto's Interview to AFP," in The Dawn

,

February 23, 1972.

^^"Bhutto's Speech in Lahore," in The Dawn, March 20, 1972.

9

,
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does not do the same."^^

These talks were carried out
successfully without any inter-

ruption or deadlock.
It was

embarking on

Pakistan.

India felt the need to consult
Bangladesh as
a

very important mission of its
relations with

Before coming to Pakistan, Mr. D.P.
Dhar flew to Dacca for

talks with Mujib with

a

message from Mrs. Gandhi.

The talks were opened on April 26.
led by Mr.

The Indian delegation was

Dhar, Chairman of the policy planning
committee of the Ex-

ternal Affairs Ministry, and the Pakistani
delegation by Mr. Aziz

Ahmed, secretary general of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs.

Talks

continued until April 27 and the joint statement
was issued on April
30.

President Bhutto was consulted at one point when
Mr. Ahmed, dis-

agreeing with Mr. Dhar, returned to Rawalpindi for
consultations.

It

was believed that Aziz Ahmed had been unwilling to
accept an Indian

proposal that Kashmir should be included in the agenda for
the summit
talks, but was overruled by President Bhutto.

Mr.

Dhar also had

a

separate meeting with Mr. Bhutto.
The joint statement announced agreement on the modalities of
a

meeting between President Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi which was to be held

in New Delhi

towards the end of May or at the beginning of June, and
O

defined the subjects to be discussed.

1

To create a better situation

for the coming summit meeting, India and Pakistan decided to stop the

1

Bhutto's sworn-in speech as President under the interim constitution on April 21, 1972.
20
21

The Dawn

,

April 20, 1972.

Text of the Joint Statement," in The Dawn

May 1, 1972.
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propaganda campaign against each other.

India acted on that before

the Murree talks started, and
Pakistan was informed about its
decision
on May 22.
The proposal went into effect
on May 25.

By April, Bhutto was in a strong

enough position to respond affirmatively
to Mrs. Gandhi's suggestion of
summit talks to settle outstanding
problems in the subcontinent.
Moreover, he was under heavy pressure to
secure the return of border ter-

ritories held by Indian forces and the
release of 93,000 Pakistani

prisoners of war.

Mrs.

Gandhi was reluctant to release these
POWs as

she did not want to add to the strength
of Pakistan forces until

India

had reason to believe that the two countries
would live in peace.

After assuming the office. President Bhutto effectively
employed personal diplomacy as an instrument of foreign
policy and succeeded in winning an overwhelming political and diplomatic
support

from the countries of the Middle East for Pakistan's stand
on the

unresolved issues emanating from the War of December 1971.
1972, Mr. Bhutto visited eight countries of the region.

In

January

The support-

ing statements from these countries at that moment of despair not
only

helped in raising the morale of the nation, but also indicated the new
trends in Pakistan's foreign policy after the secession of East Pakistan

.

After reaching an agreement at Murree for the talks with Mrs.
Gandhi

in June, Mr.

Bhutto again set off for the whirlwind tour of the

remaining Muslim states of the Middle East and Africa to complete his

108

personal mission to the fraternal
Muslim states west of
Pakistan.
Purpose Of this tour was mainly
to bring diplomatic
pressure to bear on
India to adopt a reasonable
attitude in the matter of
Pakistani POWs.

Another objective was to bring

a

message home that after the
tragic

events of the 1971 War, Pakistan
was not left alone in the
international arena.
President Bhutto visited fourteen
countries from May 29
to June 10.^^
Talks were delayed, as both Mr. Bhutto
and Mrs. Gandhi made

number of visits to foreign countries.

a

With the consent of both

countries, it was agreed that the talks
would open on June 28 in New
Delhi.
In

the meantime, most of the joint communiques
issued after

President Bhutto's talks with the leaders of
the countries he visited

expressed full support for Pakistan's demands for
the repatriation of
the POWs and the withdrawal of Indian and
Pakistani troops in Kashmir
to the position which they occupied before
December 1971.

Those is-

sued in Lebanon, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, however, merely
expressed the

hope that President Bhutto's meeting with Mrs. Gandhi would
prove
22

Bhutto's announcement of May 7, 1972.

23

Countries visited were the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait
(May 29), Iraq (May 30), Lebanon (May 30-31), Jordan (May 31 -June
1),
Saudi Arabia (June 1-3), Somalia and Ethiopia (June 3), Sudan (June
4),
Nigeria (June 4-5), Guinea (June 5), Mauritania (June 6), Turkey (June
6-8), and Iran (June 8-10).
24

Mrs. Gandhi, who was occupied with the pari iamentary session
the end of May, was due to leave on June 13 for a twelve-day visit
to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Sweden.

until

25

Venue of the talks was changed later on from Delhi to Simla
because of a heat wave in the Indian capital.
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fruitful.

Unlike the communiques issued
during President Bhutto's

previous tour, none of them
referred to the future
relations between
Pakistan and Bangladesh.
On the home front, Bhutto
had numerous meetings with
people

from all walks of life.

By doing so. Bhutto gave
them the sense of

participating in decision making in
the matter of talks with
India.
During these meetings, Bhutto
reiterated his pledge to go by
the nation's will at the Simla summit.

backing from the masses.

Due to these gestures, Bhutto
got

Opposition parties did not try to under-

mine his efforts, as the atmosphere
in the country was one of
all-out
support for him.
Mali Khan assured his full support
to Bhutto on the
forthcoming summit.^®
A few good will
111

will

gestures were shown for India, to remove
the

before entering into

a

dialogue.

Bhutto announced the re-

patriation of those Indians who had been captured
during the war.

Anti-India propaganda was completely stopped
especially on Pakistan
radio and TV.
On the eve of leaving for Simla, Bhutto addressed
the nation

on radio and television.

He said Pakistan was prepared to resume

diplomatic relations with India, reopen communications, and resume
air services.

He again showed his desire for talks with Sheikh Mujibur

26

Bhutto's Address to
June 24, 1972.
27

20,

a

Bhutto's mission backed by the masses, see The Dawn, June

1972.

28

gathering of lawyers, in The Dawn,

Ibid., June 28, 1972.

.

no
Rahman, explaining that India
had no "locus standi"
in the matter of
relations between West Pakistan
and "Muslim Bengal." and
there could
be no talks on that subject
on Indian soil. 29

By using the term "Mus-

lim Bengal" instead of
"Bangladesh" or "East Pakistan"
President

Bhutto avoided either recognizing
or denying the independence of
Bangladesh, while emphasizing its
Muslim character.
In

the same broadcast, Bhutto
summarized the thorough prepara-

tions he had made for the summit,

a

good illustration of his style of

democracy
the

last two weeks I have talked to
leaders in every field
to elected representatives,
politicians of every shade of
In

opinion, Ulama, intellectuals, editors
and journalists, lawyers, teachers, students, and laborers.
I
have also met the
comnianders of our armed forces.
For the first time in the
history of Pakistan, representati ves of
all sections have
been involved in matters of vital
national concern at the
highest level ... .30

The Simla Meeting: Demands and Expectations
of India
and Pakistan in the Simla Summit

Talks with India at Simla were not expected to be easy.

Pakis-

tan, being a defeated country, was in a relatively
weak position.

In

the 1971 War India had decisively demonstrated its military
superiority

and had all the important cards in hand, most important being
Pakistani

territory and the prisoners of war.

From among the big powers, India

had all-out support by the Soviet Union, whereas Pakistan's allies,

China and the U.S., had carefully stopped short of decisive support.
29
T he

Dawn

,

"President Bhutto's Broadcast to the Nation on June 28," in
June 29, 1972.

in
United Nations, Pakistan
got widespread support
during the
crisis, which annoyed India
but did not affect its
decisions.
Being in
on Pakistan.

It

a

stronger position, India
tried to exert pressure

was In

a

position to negotiate as the
military victor.

Though Mrs. Gandhi insisted
that she would not talk
with Pakistan from
a position of strength,^!
that did not change the
prevailing situation.
India's victory over Pakistan
had resulted in the improvement
of Us internal political
atmosphere.
It brought a sense of
confidence
to the Indian nation.
Mrs. Gandhi's position was
again strengthened
with the Congress' overwhelming
success in the state elections in
March.

Third, and the most important
consideration, was the Soviet

military and diplomatic backing-whose
bitter fruit Pakistan had tasted
in the recent past.

Pakistan, on the other hand, was not
free from internal dissensions.

Though Bhutto enjoyed the support and
confidence of the

masses, labor unrest and language tensions
threatened domestic peace.
Past experience of wars with India proved
that they solved no problems, especially the Kashmir problem.

Besides there wasn't much choice

left for Pakistan in settling the matter.

There was some evidence

that the Soviet Union was trying to foment
separatism in Pakistani

Baluchistan.

Under these circumstances, Pakistan was compelled to
come

to terms with

India.

There is no denying the fact that the task for

President Bhutto in the days before the Simla accord was formidable
31.

'Mrs.

Gandhi's Press Conference in Prague," New York Times,

June 21,
I, 1972.
1
32,.

The Perils of Pakistan," Newsweek

,

April

10,

1972.
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and challenging, as the press, the
political parties, and pressure

groups were vocal

in their assertion that national

honor should not

be compromised at the forthcoming summit.

Considering the strong Indian position at the
negotiating table,
it was not beyond

of signing

a

expectations that India could come up with the idea

no-war pact.

This concept to outlaw the use of war, while

Indo-Pakistan disputes remained unresolved, had always
been opposed in
Pakistan.

From the very beginning, Bhutto had been rejecting any move

which suggested the no-war pact, and on many occasions he made
it

clear that "In Pakistan, no-war pact means surrender

But at the

.

same time, he did not rule out the possibility of considering

pact

a

if it contained a clause providing for the arbitration of disputes

which remained unresolved in bilateral negotiations.
Reduction in the armed force's size was another suggestion
that India might have brought up.

But Bhutto had no intentions of

alienating the armed forces by committing himself to
their size.

a

reduction in

An Indian suggestion along these lines would also be hard

to accept.

Kashmir was expected to be
Simla.

a

tough point of discussion at

Bhutto's stand on Kashmir used to be quite unbending.

But after

assuming office as the President, he made different formulations.

early 1972, he was determined not to talk on Kashmir with India.

^^"Bhutto Mounts the Plank," The Economist
34

,

April

In

He

15, 1972.

President Bhutto's speech at the university campus in Peshawar
See Th e Dawn
on January 15.
January 16, 1972; and also Bhutto's interview with Kuldip Nayyar, in The Statesman March 25, 1972.
,

,
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said,
We are prepared to resolve all
our bilateral differences
But
we cannot bargain state principles
for human flesh.
The right
of the people of Jammu and Kashmir
has
nni- been
ho
not
bestowed on them either by India or
Pakistan
It is
their inherent right which no one can
take away from them. 35
On another occasion, he said.

We have fought three wars on Kashmir;
we cannot forget the
Kashmir dispute.
Even if we forget the Kashmir dispute, the
people of Kashmir will not forget i t 36
.

This represented an important change,
for he was now saying that it was
up to the Kashmiris themselves to fight
for their right of self-deter-

mination if they wanted

a

different future.

Struggle for self determination cannot be inspired
from outside.
Like revolution it cannot be exported.
It has to be
an indigenous struggle.
If the people of Kashmir believe
that they have been deprived of the right of self determination, they will rise.
Their struggle will be basically theirs.
Outside support cannot solve their problems. 37

Turning to Indian perceptions regarding the problems of peace
making, the first point to note was the disinclination to deal with
them piecemeal.

Pakistan argued for

many issues in dispute.

a

step-by-step approach to the

India, which had favored the approach in the

past but had been rebuffed, now argued for

a

comprehensive and overall

settlement, covering both the long-standing disputes as well as those

arising out of the 1971 War.
This stand was understandable as India was worried and uncer35

President Bhutto's speech to the National Assembly, April 14,

1972.
36
15,

37
p.

Address to

a

public meeting in Lahore, see The Dawn, February

1972.

215.

Bhutto

s

interview with Dilip Mukerjee, cited in Mukerjee,

114

tain about Pakistan's intentions.

At the same time, she wanted to
get

advantage of her superior position in the
1971 War.
full

support from all the parties on this stand.

Mrs. Gandhi had

The extremist, Jan

Sangh party, in fact urged that there
should be no return to the pre-

war status quo unless all outstanding issues
were brought within the
sphere of overall settlement.^**

Though other parties did not share

this extreme opinion, all of them wanted
a final settlement so that

enduring peace could be established in the subcontinent.
India preferred to talk with Bhutto, who was coining
as an

elected representati ve of the people, to talking with
general.
India.

39

It

It

a

military

also welcomed the change in Bhutto's attitude towards

shared the view that Bhutto was emerging "as

a

more chas-

tened and more sober-minded politician than what he was in the old U.N.

days."

It was

suggested that India would lose nothing by taking

Bhutto at his word.

At that time, he was

India's best bet and India

did not want to let this opportunity slip from its hands.

Another

consideration that might have influenced India was the prevailing unfavorable international opinion against its intervention in East
Pakistan.

Adverse votes in the U.N. General Assembly indicated that

India was fast losing international support and that it must change
its course.

38

India

,

"Resolution of the Jan Sangh General Council," The Times of
May 8, 1972.
39

See Mukerjee,

^*^Frank Moraes'
p.

223.

p.

223.

editorial

in

Indian Express

,

cited in Mukerjee,
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It was

the first India-Paki stan dialogue at
the highest level

since the Tashkent meeting.

T he Simla Acc ord --text

^_mla agreements.

of the aqreement--compari son of the Tashkent
and

The summit conference between President Bhutto
and

Mrs. Gandhi opened on June 28, 1972 in Simla.

end on July

1

,

The talks were due to

but were extended for one more day as no agreement
was

reached until July

1.

Bhutto and Gandhi were present in Simla but,

to begin with, the talks were actually conducted by officials;
the

two delegations again being headed by Mr.

Dhar and Mr. Ahmed.

As ex-

pected, disagreement on many issues immediately arose as both countries

were holding opposite positions.
As already discussed,

India wanted to settle all

the prob-

lems in one package, so it proposed a treaty of friendship pledging the
two countries to abjure the use of force in settling disputes, to re-

frain from interference in each other's internal affairs, to desist

from seeking third-party intervention in the settlement of their differences, and to renounce military alliances directed against each
other.

41

Pakistan wished to concentrate on such immediate issues as the

release of prisoners of war, the disengagement of troops, and the re-

sumption of diplomatic relations.

It

objected to the Indian proposal

on the ground that it would involve permanent acceptance of the divi-

sion of Kashmir and the withdrawal of the Kashmir dispute from the

*^^See

the report on the negotiations in The Dawn

,

July

1

,

1972.
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United Nations.
The meeting lasted for five days.

the summit would end in failure.

At that time it appeared that

However, after much argumentation on

both sides, exchange of numerous drafts, and

a

last minute private meet-

ing between Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi, an agreement
was reached on July 2,
1972.

when

Both sides made eleventh hour concessions to produce
a

a

communique

declaration of their "agreement to disagree" was already being

drafted.
The agreement contained the main elements of the earlier Indian

drafts, but the wording was considerably modified to make it acceptable
to Pakistan.

In

particular, the clause referring to the ceasefire line

in Kashmir was rephrased to read:

"The line of control

resulting from

the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides

without prejudice to the recognized position of either side."

Text of the agreement

.

I. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan
are resolved that the two countries put an end to the conflict
and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations
and work for the promotion of friendly and harmonious relations
and the establishment of durable peace in the subcontinent, so
that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and
energies to the pressing task of advancing the welfare of
thei r people.
In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India
and the Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:
1.
That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the
United Nations shall govern the relations between the
two countries.

^^
"^

The Dawn

,

July 2, 1972.

The Economist

,

July 8, 1972.

^"^The text of the Simla

Agreement

is

in The Dawn

,

July 3, 1972.

,
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4.

5.

That the two countries are
resolved to settle their dif'^”<“^''^1 negotiations
or by any other
othf peaceful means mutually
agreed upon between them
Pending the final settlement of
anyTf tUe
problems between the two countries,
neither side shall
unilaterally alter the situation and
both shall prevent
e organization, assistance or
encouragement of any
acts detrimental to the maintenance
of peaceful and
harmonious relations.
reconciliation, good neighborliness and durable peace between
them is a commitment by
both countries to peaceful coexistence,
respect for each
0 her s territorial integrity
and sovereignty, and noninterference in each other's internal
affairs, on the
basis of equality and mutual benefit.
That the basic issues and causes of
conflict which have
edeviled the relations between the two
countries for
years shall be resolved by peaceful means,
mat they shall always respect each other's national
unity, territorial integrity or political
independence.

II.
Both Governments will take all steps within
their
power to prevent hostile propaganda directed
against each
other.
Both countries will encourage dissemination of such
information as would promote the development of friendly
relations between them.

III.
In order progressi vely to restore and normalize
relations between the two countries step by step, it was agreed
that:
1.
Steps shall be taken to resume communications--postal
telegraphic, sea, land, including border posts, and air
links including overflights.
2.
Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals of the other country.
3.
Trade and cooperation in economic and other agreed fields
will be resumed as far as possible.
4.
Exchanges in the fields of science and culture will be
promoted in this connection, delegations from the two
countries will meet from time to time to work out the
necessary details.
IV.
In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both Governments agreed that:
1.
In Jammu and Kashmir the line of control resulting from
the ceasefire of December 17, 1971, shall be respected
by both sides without prejudice to the recognized position of either side.
Neither side shall seek to alter it,
unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal
i nterpretations
Both sides further undertake to refrain
from the threat or use of force in violation of this line.
.

-

,
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THg Wlthcip^Wclls 01~ "Fn
chilli ^
^
commence upon the entry
into rorce
forrp nf
of th?I
this agreement? and shall be
completed
"'Mietea
within a period of 30 days
thereafter.

agreement will be subject to ratifir^tirm hw
k
both
countries in accordance with
their respective constUutional procedures and will come
into force with effect from
instruments of ratification are ex-

changed^
VI.

Both governments agree that
their respective heads
^ mutually convenient time
in the future
and thaf in^thP^^
meantime, representatives of the two
sides
will
I
^
further the modalities and arrangements
fnlth
for the establishment of durable
peace and normalization of
relations, including the questions
of repatriation of
prisoners of war and civilian internees,
a final settlement
Kashmir, and the resumption of diplomatic
relations"^^*^^

The Simla accord was hailed widely in
both countries and also
by the international
a

press.

On his return home from Simla, Bhutto got

warm welcome at the Islamabad and Lahore
airports.

He addressed the

people at the airports, and explained and defended
his policy in the
National Assembly specially convened, to get

favor of his policy.

.45

than a communique."

a

verdict from it in

Bhutto described the Simla agreement as "more
The Indian spokesman described it as "an agree-

ment of peace and cooperation."^^
In

Pakistan, the opposition parties had mixed reactions.

Sikandar, Mufti Mahmood, Sardar Attaullah Mengal
S.M.

,

Arbab

Mahmooddul Haq Usmani

Zaffar (former law minister in the center), Khan Abdul Samad Khan

Achakzai all welcomed the agreement, saying, "though the accord did not
fulfill

the aspirations of the people with regard to the repatriation

45
46

The Dawn
Ibid.

,

July 4, 1972.
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of ROWS it was

a

good beginning to end the
continuous confrontation.

Wali Khan welcomed the agreement
"on the whole under the
existing

circumstances,
The rightists on the opposition
benches rejected the accord

outright.

Mr. Hamid Sarfraz, chief organizer
of the Council

League criticized the accord, considering
it,

"a political

Muslim

victory of

India,

mg

and adding that Pakistan had lost
"everything at the negotiat49
table.
Malik Ghularn Jilani, Secretary General
of Tahrik

Istaqlal, said:

document' but

"What Mr.

Bhutto has signed in Simla was not

a

'peace

'surrender document' much worse than the one
signed

a

by General Niazi

in Dacca

last December.

The same reaction came from India's opposition
party, Jan
Sangh.

Its

leader, Atal Behari Vajpai, called it "an Indian
sellout.

But it was welcomed by the Lok Sabha.

All

parties endorsed the agree-

ment (except Jan Sangh) saying that it set "an example
for the other
areas in Asia to follow.
The same sentiments were shared by London, Washington, Moscow,

Peking, and by the U.N. General Secretary Kurt Waldheim.

Abdus Samad

Azad, Bangladesh's foreign minister, welcomed the agreement between
47
48

49
50
51

52

Ibid.

Ibid., July 6, 1972.
Ibid.

,

July 4, 1972.

,

July 5, 1972.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid, August 2,

1972.
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India and Pakistan as "a
success towards achieving
more success."”

Both Mrs. Gandhi and Mr.
Bhutto were accused by their
opponents Of having entered into
a secret agreement.
But both of them
denied this al legation.

Analysis of th ej\greement and Its
with the Tashkent Accord

son

The Simla agreement was signed
under the circumstances when

Pakistan was reduced in its size
after losing its East wing.

Ninety-

three thousand of its soldiers and
6,139 square miles of its territorin the Punjab and Sind were

in

India's hands.

Under these circum-

stances, Pakistan was without any
effective bargaining power.
had full control of the situation.

India

Keeping these things in view, Pakis

tan could not have achieved more than
what it got in Simla.

The agreement provided for
the border,

56

a

return to the status quo along

which meant that India exchanged for its smaller
terri-

tories under Pakistani possession with the extensive
Pakistani territories it had captured.
it had

India was more strict regarding the territory

captured in Kashmir.

Its major gain

in the talks was Pakistan's

acceptance of the line of control in Kashmir resulting from the cease^^Ibid.
54

A.B.

,

July 5, 1972.

Vajpai's speech in Lok Sabha.

55

Mrs. Gandhi's press conference on July 12.
speech in the National Assembly on July 10.
He said
no secret agreement with India, and no compromise on
tan had not given up the principle that the right of
tion belonged to Kashmiris.
56

Clause IV, article

1.

Bhutto's
there had been
principles; Pakisself determina-

Mr.

.
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fire on December 17, 1971

i„ the

.

matter of settling the disputes

with each other, India also got
Pakistan's acceptance to settle
the
differences bilateral ly.“ The
willingness was shown by both sides
to resume diplomatic relations
and also to enter into trade
and other

cultural activities.
The Tashkent and Simla agreements
were signed in entirely dif-

ferent circumstances.
tan, whereas in 1971

In

1965, the fighting was limited to West
Pakis-

the war engulfed both the wings and
resulted in

the separation of the Eastern wing.
the two meetings were different.

equal.

It

was not

a

Pakistani and Indian positions in

Pakistan met India at Tashkent as an

vanquished country in 1965.

Pakistan was holding

1,617 square miles of Indian territory as compared
to 446 square miles

of its own territory in Indian occupation.

President Ayub Khan was in

a

It was a united country.

favorable position to talk on equal terms

with his Indian counterpart.
The agreement at Tashkent was made possible because of the

Soviet efforts.

By doing so, Russia wanted to offset the growing

Chinese influence in the region.

But after Tashkent, there was

nificant change in the political situation in Asia.

a

sig-

The emergence of

Red China as a super power, and Pakistan's inclination towards her,

brought

a

change in Soviet policy.

This was also due to the fact that

Pakistan showed very little interest in the "Asian Security Scheme"

proposed by Russia.

This was quite a justification for Soviet Russia

^^Clause IV, article
^^Clause

I

,

article

2.
2
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to discard its earlier
neutral stance and establish
close relations

with India.
1y as wel

1

In a

brief span of five years

it

supported India material-

as politically.

Despite this reorientation in
Soviet policy.

Us

major objective remained the same: normalization
of Indo-Pak relations, a step
towards its security scheme.

Under these circumstances, the study
of the two agreements

becomes much easier.

Succeeding paragraphs contain an
analysis and

comparison of the similar provisions,
which more or less have the same
spirit.

Nprmaljzat^^

If

compare the two agreements, the prime

objective in their preambles to be found is
the normalization of relations between the two countries.

Both nations must strive hard for the

progress and welfare of their people.

The only difference one can make

out is in the organization of the phrases.

There was, however, the dif-

ference of approach in pursuance of matters to realize
this common purpose.

At Tashkent, Pakistan's stand was that since Kashmir
was the

basic cause of conflict, it should be settled first and the
relations
be normalized subsequently, whereas India wanted normalization
of the

relations first.

Clauses

V

and VI of the agreement called for the

restoration of diplomatic, economic, and trade relations whereas the
"matters of direct concern" were to be discussed "at the highest and

other levels" in the future.
The Simla accord was
both.

a

complete reversal of the attitudes of

Because of the changed position, Pakistan gave up its previous

.
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approach, whereas India,
considerinn
considering tho
the time opportune,
sought a package deal on Kashmir.
However it wac
nowever,
was d.i
Pakistan's view which gained
ground.
One thing common between
Tashkent
idbnKent and tho
the Simla agreement is
that the settlement of
basic Issues was left
for future negotiations
between the two countries.
This accord was described
as President
Bhutto's major accomplishment
in breaking Mrs. Gandhi's
resolve to wrap
up all outstanding issues
in package deals.
-h-i

,

•

•

i

In

short, both the agreements
were aimed at normalizing rela-

tions and restoring economic,
trade, communications, and
cultural exchanges

BjJ_ateral jsm.

Though the Tashkent declaration
was signed under the

Soviet Union's guidance, it did
not prevent Pakistan from raising
the

Kashmir issue in the U.N.
pact.

Pakistan made no such commitments under
the

Clause IX of the agreement calls for
the continued meetings of

both countries on "matters of direct
concern to both" whereas in Clause
II

of the Simla accord, both parties are
specifically committed to

settle their differences by peaceful means
through bilateral negotiations, or by any other peaceful means mutually
agreed upon by both
parties.

This clause of the treaty raised much apprehension
in Pakis-

tan regarding the position of the Kashmir dispute
in the U.N.

Even the

foreign press made comments that "Kashmir will cease to
be an international question. „61

59,

60
61

'One

Summit that Worked," T he Economist

Ibid.

See The Guardian

,

July 8, 1972

,

July 8, 1972.
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President Bhutto, while making the speech
in the National Assembly, defended the accord and explained
that it did not prevent Pakistan from bringing the Kashmir dispute
to the U.N.

disappointment in the capabilities of the U.N.

in

However, showing his

solving the Kashmir

dispute, he emphasized that it was in the best
interests of Pakistan
to have

foreign policy based on bilateralism and that we must
give

a

bilateralism

a

chance as far as relations between India and Pakistan
r

were concerned.

r\

^

Considering that the U.N. had failed to settle the matter, there
was perhaps no harm in exploring other possibilities.
E conomi

st commented,

But as The

"The acceptance of the Principle of Bilateralism

was one of the major concessions that Mrs. Gandhi won at Simla.
It

may be argued that as long as the Simla accord subsists,

Pakistan is prevented from raising the matter in the world body.
as Bhutto implied,

if bilateral

But

negotiations eventually fail, Pakistan

could declare that India was violating the "spirit" of Simla and take
the matter to the U.N.

if that course of action appeared to promise

more advantageous results.

64

It

should also be noted that the Simla

agreement does not require Pakistan to withdraw the case from the U.N.
It keeps

the matter dormant in the U.N. as long as bilateral negotia-

tions continue under the Simla accord.
r?
14.

President Bhutto's speech in the National Assembly on July
The text is in The Dawn July 15, 1972.
,

^^

64

I

The Economist

,

July 8, 1972.

The Dawn, July 15, 1972.
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T he principle of non-1 nte r ference

.

As happens

in the world,

all

bi-

lateral and multilateral agreements and the
principles of non-inter-

ference are always

ment

is

a

formal expression, unless some particular agree-

studied in the background of the existing conditions
and the

prevailing attitudes of the parties concerned.
with the Tashkent and Simla agreements.

The same is the case

Clause III of the Tashkent

declaration says that, "the relations between India and Pakistan
shall
be based on the principles of non-i nterference in the internal
affairs

of each other."

considered it

a

At Tashkent,

India's position on Kashmir was that it

part of its territory and hence its internal matter.

According to this clause India could interpret Pakistan's acts of assistance to the Kashmiri freedom fighters as interference in its internal matter.

Clause

I

of the declaration states, "Jammu and Kashmir

were discussed and the two sides put forth their respective positions."
At Simla,

India, after having achieved its aim of separating

East Pakistan, could conveniently agree to adhere to the principle of

non-interference and respect for what was left of Pakistan's territory.
As far as the question of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, Pakistan

did better in some ways, and worse in others, at Simla.

India recog-

nized that part of Kashmir was under Pakistani control and undertook not
to do anything to change that situation.
a

It also

agreed that there was

dispute regarding Kashmir which needed to be settled.

On the other

hand, it took some more of the Pakistan side of Kashmir and kept it;
it did not return to the old ceasfire line.

A final

settlement of the

dispute was left to future negotiations at both Tashkent and Simla,
though the reference to Kashmir at Tashkent was left somewhat vague.

.
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In

Tashkent, as well as in the Simla
agreement,

force as

a

Clause

of the Tashkent declaration laid down
that the parties "re-

I

means of settling disputes was renounced
by the signatories.

affirm their obligation under the charter, not
to have recourse to force
and to settle their disputes through peaceful
means."

cord, Clause VI mentions that in accordance with

tlie

In

the Simla ac-

charter of the

United Nations they will refrain from the threat
or use of force against
the territorial

integrity or political

independence of each other.

Both these agreements were described as "no war pacts"
and sub-

jected to strong criticism.
Shastri

At Tashkent, the Indian Prime Minister, Mr.

emphasized that the need for

,

a

no-war agreement was urgent.

Later, India gave its own interpretation of the clause, but Pakistan

firmly rejected India's

Return of the POWs

.

i

nterpretation

At Tashkent, Clause VII of the declaration dealt

with the release of the POWs.

prisoners of war was not

a

In

that meeting repatriation of the

problem.

Release of the POWs was

a

side

issue which was resolved by the agreement between the two parties.

About 1,000 POWs held by both sides were released by the end of January
66
1966 .^^
At Simla the situation was different.

The return of 93,000

POWs was one of the basic issues, the settlement of which was left to
a

future summit.
India clearly violated the Geneva Conventions and the Security

Council Resolution of December 21, 1971 by delaying the repatriation of
66

See the report on the repatriation of the POWs in The Times
London, January 24, 1966.

,
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the POWs.

It

attached two conditions to their release.

First it

insisted that as Pakistan’s forces in the
eastern section had surren-

dered to the joint command of Indian and
Bangladeshi forces, the

"Bangladeshi" forces must approve before
anything could be done.
to that effect,

And

India reassured Sheikh Mujibur Rahman that
it will not

release the POWs until Pakistan had accepted the
reality of Bangladesh.
It was

generally believed that in addition to securing
Pakistan's recog-

nition of Bangladesh, it wanted to use the POWs as

Pakistan into making

a

a

means of pressuring

Kashmir settlement on its terms.

For this the

world press criticized India.

Repatriation of the POWs proved to be
Pakistan.

a

very hard task for

The view was held that the Simla agreement would soon fade

out and as there was no openness in the talks things would deteriorate.
The situation remained the same until the talks between the high offi-

cials of both countries finally started on July 24, 1973 at Rawalpindi.
"It took 19 days of hard and at times extremely difficult negotiations
at Rawalpindi and New Delhi

to work out this settlement," as Mr.

Aziz

Ahmed described it later.
This agreement came to be known as the Delhi agreement and had
the concurrence of the governments of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.
Its main features were that India agreed to repatriate to Pakistan all

except 195 POWs.

67

The date was to be fixed mutually by India and

Pakistan, as soon as arrangements for the transportation of these
^^

The Daily Telegraph

,

London, September 5, 1972.

^^The question of 195 POWs is discussed in Chapter VI.

.
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prisoners were made.

Simultaneously, repatriation was
also to begin,

of all Bengalis in Pakistan and
in Bangladesh.

a

substantial number of non-Bengalis

The most significant feature
of this agreement was "that

Bangladesh agreed in

a

spirit of reconciliation that the
195 POWs

would not be tried.
How did India agree to the solution of
the problem?

It was

partly the pressure of world opinion which
disapproved the use of
POWs as hostages.

There were also "economic liabilities, the
non-

aligned conference that was to come (India
and Bangladesh wanted to go
to the conference with clean hands),
and then the General Assembly's

session which was to take place in October.

elements involved in the situation.
dying

a

premature death.

There were

a

lot of

They saved the Simla accord from

Up to this moment Pakistan had resisted the

two pressure points of India and even the POWs were repatriated
without
its recognition of Bangladesh.

For that, Mr. Bhutto chose

a

very ap-

propriate moment, which was the Islamic summit held in February 1974 at
Lahore

Withdrawal of troops

.

In both the

Tashkent and Simla agreements, there

are provisions for the pull out of the troops, but with certain fundamental differences.

The Tashkent declaration calls for the withdrawal

of "armed personnel," while the Simla agreement calls for the pull out

of "India-Pakistan" forces.
tion, withdrawal
68
69
1973.

Under Clause

II

of the Tashkent declara-

to the position held prior to August 5,

"Aziz Ahmed's Press Conference," The Guardian

,

1965 was to

September 2, 1972.

Prime Minister Bhutto's interview with Newsweek, October 21,
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take place in all sectors
including Jammu and Kashmir.

The Simla agree

ment limited it to the international
borders of India and Pakistan.
The former fixed February
25, 1966 as a deadline for the
completion
of that task, whereas the latter
sets a limit of 30 days to commence
from the day of its ratification.
The reason for this difference
lies
in the situation that
prevailed at the time of the two agreements.

At

Tashkent, India by agreeding to mutual
withdrawal, was to move back

from territory across the 1949 ceasefire
line in Kashmir, which it had

earlier said

it

would not give up.

ialized before the set deadline.

Disengagement of the forces materIt can be said to be the

major

achievement of the Tashkent declaration for Pakistan.
Under the Simla accord, withdrawal was to take
place on the
India-Pakistan border excluding the ceasefire line in
Jammu and Kashmir
The reasons are quite clear: Pakistan's relatively
weak position at

Simla and the great differences of territorial gain and
loss of each

side in the 1965 and 1971 wars.

Without denying the possibility of

exaggeration from both sides, the fact remains that,

in the

1965 War,

Pakistan successfully resisted an Indian attack and in Kashmir it was
in a

fairly advantageous position.

versed.

It was

At Simla, the positions were re-

India that had made significant gains across the inter-

national border and ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir.
One month after the ratification of the agreement the army

commanders of the two countries met in August, 1973, to draw the new
dotted line between them in Kashmir.

According to that, each side

would keep what it had won in the December war, some 450 square miles
for the Pakistanis near Chamb.

But everywhere else, they will go back

130
to the border they crossed in
December.

The Indians were giving up more

than 5,000 square miles in Punjab
and Sind in exchange for some
70

square miles held by Pakistan.
No doubt, by agreeing to withdraw.
Mrs. Gandhi made a big con-

cession to Mr. Bhutto, but in return,
she won two major concessions,
a

promise to respect the new ceasefire line
and an agreement to settle

disputes bilaterally.

Mshmir-

Kashmir is the pivot to India-Pakistan relations,
obvious

from the fact that the war of December 1971 began
in East Pakistan but

ended in the West and in Kashmir.

Again in the effort to reach

post-

a

war settlement, it was primarily Kashmir rather than
"Bangladesh" which
proved to be the stumbling block.

While making comparison between the Tashkent and the Simla

agreements, Pakistan visibly gained nothing at Tashkent.

Clause

I

of

the Tashkent declaration stated "that Jammu and Kashmir was
discussed

and each of the sides put forth its respective positions."

This shows

that the discussion took place at Tashkent, that the declaration did
not recognize Jammu and Kashmir as

a

dispute (for these is no indica-

tion of it), and that the discussion ended without any agreement between
the two sides or any concessions from either side.

Pakistan stuck to

its position that Kashmir was a disputed area and India remained firm in
its stand that Kashmir was India's

internal problem and, therefore, non-

negoti able.

Despite all inferences and interpretations of the vague clause,
the fact remains that the agreement neither resolved the basic issues.
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nor did it make

a

start towards its settlement.

The non-recognition

of the existence of the Kashmir
problem in the clause, consolidated
India's position and enabled it
to interpret Pakistan's future
assis-

tance to the people of Kashmir as
interference in its internal affairs
On the other hand, Pakistan
made no commitment under the declaration.

At Simla the customary attitudes
of India and Pakistan to

peace settlement were completely reversed.
party, sought
its favor.

a

a

India, as the stronger

settlement of the Kashmir issue once and for
all in

It was

Pakistan who now demanded that the peripheral
is-

sues be taken up first and the Kashmir
problem left in cold storage.

Many questions were raised about the Simla
accord.
any undertaking by Pakistan regarding Kashmir?

Was there

Is
a

there

secret

agreement between President Bhutto and Mrs. Gandhi on
the fate of
Kashmir?

Mr.

Bhutto many times clearly explained his position and

repeatedly asserted that he had not entered into any secret deal
with
India.

Besides, secret agreements in

binding obligations on the parties.

a

democratic era seldom create

Both the leaders must have been

aware of this fact.
The Simla summit nearly ended in

a

deadlock on the Kashmir

issue.

The situation was saved when the two leaders succeeded in

finding

a

new language and

a

new outlook which enabled them to reach

an agreement highly abstract in character.

It

provides that in Jammu

and Kashmir the "line of control" resulting from the ceasefire on

December 17, 1971, shall be respected by both sides without prejudice
to the recognized positions of either side.
It

clearly emerges that the two sides agreed to disagree on
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Kashmir but resolved to work
on

a

permanent solution for the
problem.

By removing the issue
from international

agreed to

surveillance, the two parties

prolonged freezing of the entire
dispute.

a

By ruling out

war in the areas they expressed
their willingness to preserve
the
status quo, since no other course
was really open to Pakistan.
However. neither India nor Pakistan
formally abandoned their claims
to
Kashmir, which was declared to be
a disputed issue.
When It came to actual

implementation of the pact, neither

side was prepared to concede much.
that fact were advanced.

Hence varying interpretations of

India insisted that by agreeing to the
bi-

lateral approach, Pakistan had conceded
removal of the Kashmir dispute

from the international arena to reach
interference.

a

bilateral

settlement without

Pakistan interprets the clause in another
manner:

and when we have agreed to have bilateral
negotiations
with India it is on the basis of a principle
and of the United
Nations resolutions.
Therefore, when we agreed to enter into
ateral negoti ati ons we did not in any way
compromise our
position.
.

.

1

.

1

,

Differences over the role of the United Nations have found
practical

expression in the attitude of the two sides to the ceasefire line

and the military observers in Kashmir.

In

view of the new dispensa-

tion, the Indians claim that the U.N. observers here have no
role to

perform, especially when the two parties have agreed to respect the
line of control.

But the Indians have made no official

U.N. Secretary General

the removal

to withdraw the observers.

request to the

Any move to secure

of the observers would involve Security Council action and

^^President Bhutto's speech in the National Assembly on July 14,
1

972.
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with China

a

permanent member of the council,
supporting Pakistan's

stand on the ceasefire line, the
Indian government would prefer
not to
raise the issue.
India's insistance for the securing
of recognition
of the line of control in Kashmir
is significant to indicate
its motives.
This is that through usage the
line should acquire the status
of an international boundary.

Summing up the preceding analysis it
can be said that as with
the Tashkent declaration, the Simla
accord also puts off the basic

disputes for future negotiations.
Tashkent agreement was not
a

step towards

a

a

Insofar as Kashmir is concerned, the

step forward, whereas the Simla accord was

new direction.

Despite certain basic differences

both agreements contain about the same material
on peace and harmony
in the relations between the two countries.

Both envisage steps to

be taken to normalize relations and, most critical

the Kashmir dispute unsolved.

of all, both leave

CHAPTER

VI

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SIMLA AGREEMENT

mhdra wal

of Forces from Each Other’s
Territories and
--^^^j^^Cment of the Ceasefire Line in
KashmTr

Signing of the accord was just

a

small

step towards the comple-

tion of the most difficult task that
was yet to be dealt with.

The

agreement had no problem in getting approval
from the legislative assemblies of the two countries; it was approved
by the respective as-

semblies immediately by an overwhelming majority.^
Though the formalities involved in its ratification
were carried out quickly, some difficulties arose at the
time of its implemen-

tation.

Provisions regarding the withdrawal of forces, which were
to

be carried out within thirty days, could not be
implemented because of
a

sudden change in India

s

attitude.

Contrary to the Simla agreement,

India made the withdrawal of forces along the international border
con-

ditional upon agreement on the line of control

in Kashmir.

India's triumphant emergence from the war gave her an upper

hand over Pakistan.

Her territorial gains were more than what Pakistan

had occupied during the war.

By returning the 5,139 square miles of

the territory occupied in Sind and Punjab,

India was doing

a

favor to

Pakistan, who was giving up only 69 square miles of the Indian terri-

Pakistan's National Assembly gave its approval on July 15,
1972, whereas in India, Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha approved it on August
1
and 3, 1972.
Instruments of ratification were exchanged on August 4,
1972.
134
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tory.

Disparity was also greater in the
Kashmir sector, where India
was definitely in a better position
than Pakistan.
It was not unexpected that India, due to her superior
military position and strong

bargaining power, tried to take advantage
of the situation.
This was the appropriate time
for India to get the most out

of Pakistan, especially in Kashmir
where the question of the delineation of the ceasefire line was yet
to be settled.

The indication of

some possible delay came when Swaran
Singh articulated India's new
stand.

2

His statement was clear enough to
convey the real motives

of India, which was not ready to exchange
the captured territory along
the rest of the border of India and Pakistan
if no agreement could be

reached on delineation of the Kashmir ceasefire line.
India moved further and emphasized the removal of
U.N. ob-

servers.

According to it, they had no role to play, as the old cease-

fire line was "obliterated" in the December war.^

move in Indian policy.

This wasn't a new

Since long, India had been persistent in its

policy of declaring Kashmir an integral part of India: therefore non-

negotiable.

Removal of the U.N. observers would not only have

strengthened its position, but also would have thrown the Kashmir question into cold storage.

Pakistan refused to accept this condition.^
Simla agreement was just impossible to carry out.
2
3

It

seemed that the

There was no flexi-

Swaran Singh's address to the Parliament on August 5, 1972.
Swaran Singh's statements on August 26, 29, and September 3,

1972.

^"Mr. Bhutto's Statement," The Dawn

,

September 4, 1972,

^
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b1l1ty in the attitudes of the
two countries on the matter.
Efforts were, however, made to
settle the question by negotiations.

Commanders from both the countries
met to decide on the methods

and procedures for the delineation
of the line of control

in Kashmir.

This was just the beginning of their
protracted meetings, which re-

sulted in nothing.

Due to the failure of the commanders
in reaching

any agreement, the matter was brought
to the official level.

Talks be-

tween the Indian and Pakistani
representatives solved nothing.

The

situation remained the same--their joint
statement was nothing more
than the reaff i rmation of the Simla
agreement.^

When the talks were completely bogged down
and it was felt
that the commanders were unable to solve the
complicated question of

the delineation, the matter was taken up by the Chiefs
of Staff.

initiative was taken by Pakistan this time and
took place.

^

a

The

new series of meetings

Most of the work was completed during these talks, and

when it was expected that the maps and delineation proceedings
would
be signed, a dispute over

a

village called "Thakur Chak" arose unex-

pectedly.
The Pakistani side maintained that as the village was in Jammu

and had been held by the Pakistani forces at the ceasefire they should

retain control in accordance with the provision of the Simla agreement,
5

The first meeting between the two commanders took place on
August 10-12 and August 21-22, 1972.
"The Joint Statement," The Dawn

,

August 30, 1972.

^Pakistani and Indian Chiefs of Staff were General Tikka Khan
and General Manekshaw, respectively, who met from October 14-18, 1972.
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which said that both sides
were to respect the line
of control resulting from the ceasefire of
December
17,

1971

India came up with its own
interpretation of the clause and
contended that this clause
applied only to the line
separating Indianheld from Pakistani-held
Kashmir.
As Thakur Chak lay on
the border of
Jammu and Pakistan, it was
covered by the provision of
the agreement
that "Indian and Pakistani
forces shall be withdrawn
to their side of
the international border.^

Now the matter was more
political rather than strategic.

Pakis
tan hardened its attitude
towards accepting the decision
which India

arbitrarily wanted to impose on

it.

Pakistan, by sensing India's in-

terest in that small tract of land,
tried to bargain.

Pakistan was

ready to withdraw its claim to
Thakur Chak if it was adequately com-

pensated with territory elsewhere along
the line of control.^
of the delineation was almost
completed by this time.
ing to carry out the withdrawal

The work

India was will-

of the troops, proposing to settle the

Thakur Chak dispute later on, but Pakistan
refused the proposal.
Deadlock had to be broken somehow, as the talks
were not leading anywhere.

After

a

long exchange of correspondence between the

Chiefs of Staff, the decision was taken to meet
again.

The matter was

settled after long discussions and as later on declared
by both the

governments, the dispute was solved by the spirit of "give and
take."
Though Pakistan abandoned its claim to Thakur Chak, it was
interested
g

The Dawn

,

General Manekshaw's
November 3, 1972.

i

nterpretation of the clause

is

reported in

The foreign office spokesman's statement on November 2, 1972.

I
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in getting its own two
villages back.

Two main tactical features

dominating the Jhelum Valley
Road-Dhum and Dhirkot-were
received
1n exchange.
India described this exchange
as "a gesture of good
will."
whereas Pakistan called it
"the victory of principle."”
The agreement which was
reached in 122 days constituted
an important milestone in implementing
the Simla agreement.
The withdrawal
of Indian and Pakistani
troops from the territory on
either side of
the international border
began on December 13 and was
completed on

December 20, 1972.

R^urr^ofjhe

The most important and at the
same time very dif-

ficult problem faced by Pakistan
was related to the return of its

prisoners of war.

Pakistan as

a

defeated country had no bargaining

power to bring 93,000^^ of its soldiers
back.

From the beginning,

Pakistan persuaded India to repatriate
the POWs under the terms of the
Geneva Convention.
a

India, however, wished to use the prisoners
as

leverage in persuading Pakistan to formally
recognize Bangladesh.

But outwardly, it took the position that
it could not release the

prisoners without the consent of Bangladesh.

Pressure was mounting on Bhutto to get the POWs back,
as their
families started getting impatient.

Many committees were formed inside

^^Swaran Singh's speech in Lok Sabha

,

December 12, 1972.

^^Mr. Aziz Ahmed's press conference on December
12, 1972.
12

.

Indian Defense Minister, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, gave the number of
Pakistan POWs on April 14, 1972, as 75,323 and on May 2, as 91,634. The
latter figure included para-mi 1 i tary personnel and civilian internees.
The number declared by Pakistan was 637, all of them captured at the
Western front.

35
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the country which organized
demonstrations and sent delegations
to
see the President and foreign
dignataries.
Most of these demonstrations
were organized by the opposition
parties.
But there is little doubt
about the fact that the families
of POWs were genuinely worried,
as

there wasn't any surety about
their early return.

pathetic and had

a

India seemed unsym-

stubborn attitude towards the issue.

To resolve the issue, Pakistan
worked on mobilizing world

opinion in its favor to seek the return
of the POWs.

Bhutto sent mes-

sages to India through the U.N. stressing
that the repatriation of
POWs would have “an important bearing
on future relationships between
India and Pakistan.

The countries which had already recognized

Bangladesh were approached to use their influence
for the implementation of the U.N.

resolution calling for withdrawal of the Indian troops

and the exchange of POWs.^^
In

this matter, Pakistan got some support from the friendly

Muslim countries which had backed Pakistan's efforts on humanitarian
grounds.

1

The world really paid attention towards the matter when

the reports of killing of prisoners in the Indian camps reached the

outside world.

1

14

1

5

These tragic incidents increased the anxiety and con-

Bhutto's statement
The Dawn

,

is

in The Dawn

,

February 17, 1972.

February 17, 18, and 26, 1972.

15

Assurance to the Pakistani delegation to the Islami Conference
at Jeddah by Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt, in The Dawn , March 1, 1972.
^^The first incident occurred on March 7, when the security
guards opened fire on the POWs killing twelve of them.
The action was
repeated in the coming months and up until November 28, 1973, about 38
prisoners were shot dead, in different camps, on each occasion allegedly while attempting to escape.

8

R
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cern In Pakistan about their
safe return.

Delegations comprising of

ROWS'

relatives were sent all over the
world to appeal to the world news
media to bring this issue to their
country's attention so that they
should use their influence "in the
name of humanity." President
Bhutto
was not willing to submit to Indian
pressure in exchange for India's

release of the prisoners.

India would have to bear considerable
expense

in keeping 93,000 prisoners.

Bhutto seemed convinced that the POWs

were a diminishing asset for India
and he could therefore afford to
wait.

If repatriation did not take
place, he expected the interna-

tional agencies to intervene to bring
pressure on India.

Qf

'^ar

crimes

.

The question of the release of the POWs was

complicated by three factors: (1) while the Indian
Government was prepared to exchange the prisoners taken on the Western
front, Pakistan

pressed for the release of all prisoners;
(2) as the Pakistani forces
in East Pakistan had surrendered to a “joint"

Indian-Bangladesh com-

mand, India contended that the prisoners could not be released
without
the concurrence of Bangladesh, and insisted that Pakistan must
settle
the question through trilateral

negotiations after recognizing the new

state;^^ and (3) the Bangladesh government's intention to try
of the prisoners for alleged war crimes.

a

number

1

Statements regarding the trials of POWs came from the Bangladesh Law Minister, Dr.

Kamal

Hussain, who accused 195 Pakistani

^^Swaran Singh's speech in the U.N. General Assembly, October 7,
1972.
1

The number of those guilty of war crimes was initially set
at about 1,500, but later on the number was reduced to 195.
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prisoners of committing genocide,
crimes against humanity, murder,
rape and arson during the War
of 1971 in Bangladesh.'®
Pakistan

promptly expressed its opposition
to any trials on both
practical and
legal

grounds.

It

was declared that these trials
would unleash hostil e

forces in Pakistan, bringing possible
harm to the Bengalis present in
West Pakistan.
There would be demands for the trial
of many Bengalis
on charges of passing information
to the Indian and Bangladesh forces
on
during the war.

Pakistan brought the matter before the
International Court of
Justice.

On legal

grounds, Pakistan tried to convince the court that

whatever happened in 1971 was within the territory
of Pakistan, which
gave it exclusive jurisdiction in judging and
punishing any law-

breakers.

21

India objected to this action taken by Pakistan.

Accord-

ing to the Simla agreement, issues were to be
solved through bilateral

negotiations, without involving any third party.

Pakistan later on

requested the court to postpone further consideration, as negotiations
between India and Pakistan were expected to begin shortly.
Up until August 1973,

India and Bangladesh showed no flexibil-

The situation, however, changed as the economic burden of caring

ity.

for the prisoners began to be more and more irksome.
19
18,

Dr.

Kamal

Moreover, Pakis-

Hussain's press conference, in The Statesman, April

1973.

20

President Bhutto's interview with the New York Times, June

1,

1973.
21

Yahya Bakhtiar's statement before the court, in The Dawn
June 6 and 27, 1973.
22

,

The Pakistan government's letter to the court on July 11, 1973.
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tan gained support from the
world community because of
India's refusal
to act according to the
Geneva Conventions.
Pakistan had also demon-

strated that it not only could
afford to withhold the Bangladesh
recog
nuion, but that with the help of
China it could prevent Bangladesh's
entry into the United Nations.
The POWs were rapidly becoming
an ineffective bargaining lever
for India.

flexibility.

Realizing that India changed its
attitude and showed some
It

asked Mujib to cooperate in settling
the problem.

The deadlock was broken after

tween Swaran Singh and Aziz Ahmed.
24,

a

prolonged correspondence be-

Negotiations were started on July

1973, but no decision could be reached,
because Bangladesh wanted

to send all

of its non-Bengali population away to
Pakistan on the

ground that they were disloyal to the new
regime.
(known as Biharis) numbered about 680,000.

These non-Bengalis

Mujib stated that about

260,000 of them had opted for Pakistan as their
choice of future
nationality.

Pakistan was prepared to accept only West Pakistanis

who had been stranded in Bangladesh in 1971 and about
40,000 others
who were formally employed by the Pakistan government
or had strong

family

1

inks in Pakistan.

Hardening of Islamabad's attitude towards accepting Biharis
related to the fact that the Sindhi speaking population already had

grievances against the Urdu speaking Muslims, who had migrated from
India after the partition.

Great numbers of those refugees are set-

23

It was the first veto to be cast by the People's Republic of
China since its admission to the United Nations.

24

"Mujib's Statement," in The Statesman, March 9, 1973.
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tied in the province of Sind,
heavily concentrated in big
cities like

Karachi, Hyderabad,

Sukkur,

Nawabshah, and Mirpurkhas.

The Sindhis

felt threatened on economic grounds
and also found the Urdu-speaking

people's attitude towards the Sindhi
language chauvinistic.

The fear

was understandable then that these
new refugees, who speak Urdu, would

increase the number of unemployed, create
new social and linguistic
tensions, and create problems on the
national

level.

Talks were again held in Mew Delhi on
August 18, and after in-

tense negotiations for about ten days an
agreement was signed on August
1973.^^

28,

It

provided that:

1.

The prisoners of war and civilian internees
would be repatriated as quickly as possible.

2.

All

3.

Pakistan would receive "a substantial number" of nonBengalis from Bangladesh.

4.

The 195 Pakistanis charged with war crimes would remain in
India and would not be brought to trial during the period
of repatriation, on the completion of which discussions
on their future would take place between Bangladesh, India
and Pakistan.

Bengalis in Pakistan, including the 203 charged with
subversion, would simultaneously be repatriated.

The repatriation of the Bengalis in Pakistan and the non-Bengalis
in Bangladesh began on September 19.^^

By October 2, about 4,500 Ben-

galis and 4,000 non-Bengalis were repatriated.

The first batch of 1,680

Pakistani prisoners, most of them civilian internees, women and children, were taken to the Pakistani frontier on September 28.

This three-

The text of the New Delhi agreement is in The Dawn, August 29,
1973.
26

The cost of transport was provided by the U.S., U.S.S.R.,
Britain, Canada, Australia, France and West Germany.
The estimated
cost of the operation was about $14,000,000.
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way repatriation was completed by April
30, 1974.

Under the New Delhi agreement, Pakistan undertook
to accept
"a substantial

number" of Biharis in Bangladesh.

In the

process,

Pakistan accepted about 27,000, in addition to
22,000 people who had
fled to Nepal from Bangladesh and 25,000 other
"hardship" cases;^^

whereas, 394,000 non-Bengalis (or Biharis), who had
never been domiciled
in West Pakistan, wished to emigrate to Pakistan.

Dr.

Victor Um-

brict, the former head of the U.N. Relief Operation in Dacca,
while

visiting Rawalpindi, submitted

a

plan to the Pakistan government for

the settlement of Biharis on uncultivated land in Sind with inter-

national aid.

29

The Pakistan government rejected the proposal, on

the grounds that there was an unpublished understanding with India

that in addition to returning Pakistanis and the members of divided

families, only about 25,000 "hardship cases" among the Biharis should
be admitted.

It was also pointed out that the Biharis were not

farmers but artisans, industrial workers and traders, and that the
proposal would meet with opposition from the Sindhis.
The matter was further discussed at a tripartite meeting in

New Delhi.

Regarding the Biharis, Pakistan reiterated its past stand,

but promised to be more sympathetic in reviewing the applications.

In

the same meeting Bangladesh agreed to abandon the proposed trial of
27

A statement released by the foreign affairs office of Pakistan

on November 1, 1973.
OO

Archives

°A survey report conducted by the IRC, in Keesing's Contemporary
London, March 25-31, 1974.
,

29

^The Dawn

,

October 26, 1973.

145

195 prisoners as an "act of clemency.

The repatriation of the 72,795 prisoners of
war and 17,186

interned civilians was completed on April
30, 1974.
to return to Pakistan included Lieutenant
General

The final group

A.A.K. Niazi, the

former Pakistani commander in East Pakistan.

Recognition
emotional

of

Bangladesh

.

The recognition of Bangladesh was

issue for Pakistan.

was questioned.

a

highly

The very basis of Pakistan's existence

To many Pakistanis, recognition of Bangladesh was the

repudiation of the "Two Nation Theory" on which the state of Pakistan
had been founded.
India, from the very beginning, pressed Pakistan for the recog-

nition of Bangladesh and made it

a

precondition for the release of

POWs, but President Bhutto resisted with patience.
in favor of recognition yet he took time

cons of this action to his countrymen.

He was personally

in explaining the pros and

He did not want to take any

action unless public opinion was in its favor.

He tried to convince his

people saying that the concept of Muslim nationhood in the Indian sub-

continent had originally envisaged two separate states in the northeast
and the northwest with some confederal link between them.

However,

he emphasized that Pakistan's stand on the issue was unchanged.
a

couple of voices were raised
30

9,

in

Though

the beginning for the recognition of

The new tripartite agreement was signed at New Delhi on April

1974.
31

"Mr.

August 1972.

Bhutto's Speech at the National Assembly," in The Dawn

,

.

146

Bangladesh,

Mr.

Bhutto was looking for mass
support which was still

not forthcoming.
to__thej:ecoan^^

With

view to having an idea

a

of public opinion at large about
this issue, Mr. Bhutto took a
tour

of the country.

He addressed public gatherings
at various places and

explained the importance of recognition.

During this tour he realized

that the mass opinion was still not
favoring any action leading to

Bangladesh's recognition.

The right-wing opposition parties had
organ-

ized a violent campaign against the
views of the government.

As a re-

sult of this campaign, student demonstrations
were held in various
parts of the country.

The unrest spread all over the country especi-

ally in Sind and Punjab provinces.

Even lawyers participated in such

demonstrations
These developments forced Bhutto to change his mind at
least
for the time being.

He reverted to constitutional

measures by seeking

the advisory opinion of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

According to

this opinion the National Assembly was legally empowered to adopt

a

resolution authorizing the government to grant recognition to Bangladesh when any such step would be in the interest of the nation.
32

Mr. Asghar Khan, Chairman Tehri k-e-Istaqlal
made the demand
for recognition as early as January 11 and Wal
Khan, Head of National
Awami Party, came up with the argument that Mr. Bhutto's assumption of
the Presidency implied tacit acceptance of Bangladesh because the popular mandate was given to hitn only by the Western wing of Pakistan.
,

i

^^
34

The Dawn

,

December 12, 1972.

The Pakistan Supreme Court ruling came on July 7, 1973, that
President Bhutto had the power under the constitution to recognize Bangladesh.
A resolution, authorizing the government to accord formal
recognition at an appropriate time, was placed before the National Assembly which adopted it unanimously with opposition absent.
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Though Mr. Bhutto got the authorization
from the Assembly, he continued
refusal of Bangladesh recognition.

Actually he was looking for some

proper time at which the decision would arouse
as little opposition as

possible from the general public.

The best occasion for such an action

turned out to be the Islamic summit meeting held
at Lahore in February
1974.

^

Role of the Islamic summit in recognition of Bangladesh

.

The

Islamic summit was arranged by Pakistan and was attended by
the heads
of states/governments and foreign ministers of almost all
the Muslim

countries.

The presence of these important personalities of the Islamic

world created an atmosphere charged with feelings of universal brotherhood of Islam.

Psychologically it was the right time for recognition

of Bangladesh and the government of Pakistan took advantage of it.

The dignitaries from Muslim countries played an important role
in bringing about a reconciliation between Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The

Secretary General of the Islamic Secretariat went to Dacca, with
Bhutto's consent, to invite Sheikh Mujibur Rahman to attend the summit.
-3C

It was

described as "the first step toward formal recognition."

Sheikh Mujib, however, refused to attend unless Pakistan first accorded
formal

recognition.
As the summit date was approaching,

the foreign ministers of

the Islamic countries met at Lahore for pre-summit discussions and

preparation of the agenda.

At this meeting it was decided to send

a

delegation, on behalf of the Islamic world, to persuade the Bangladesh

^^Mr.

1974.

Bhutto's address; the text

is

in The Dawn

,

February 23,
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government to attend the

s»™H

meeting.

The delegation was comprised

of representatives from Kuwait,
Somalia, Lebanon, Algeria,
Senegal,
and the P.L.O.
Pakistan, realizing the importance
of the issue, did not want
to lose this opportunity.

the summit, in

a

A few hours before the opening
session of

nationally televised address, Mr.
Bhutto made the

historic announcement of recognition
of Bangladesh.

To create a

favorable atmosphere he declared that
the government had ignored the

pressure from big powers regarding
recognition of Bangladesh, but it
could not reject the advice of Muslim
brothers who were present in

Lahore

36

After this declaration of formal recognition.
Sheikh Mujibur
Rahman attended the Islamic summit meeting.
a

warm welcome by

a

cheering crowd.

At Lahore, he was given

Before leaving for home. Sheikh

Mujib extended an invitation to Mr. Bhutto to visit
Bangladesh
scribing him as "an old friend."

With this started

a

de-

new chapter in

the relations of the two countries, originally two parts
of one

sovereign state.
The appropriate moment selected by Mr. Bhutto for the recogni-

tion of Bangladesh left those against the decision in
fusion.

They were not in

a

a

state of con-

position to organize any campaign against

the government because of the strong feelings among the masses that

whatever was done by the government was under the advice of Muslim
36
37

Ibid.
Mr.

Bhutto's press conference on February 24, 1974.

"
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brothers.

The address by Col. Gaddafi of Libya
to

a

huge gathering

at Lahore, supporting Bhutto, had a
significant impact on public
OO

opinion.

E stablishment

of Diplomatic Relations, Resumption
of Trade and Travel Facilities

The accord signed at Simla was not an easy
one to implement.
But after resolving the complicated issues of troop
withdrawal and re-

turn of the prisoners of war, it was expected that
other issues like

diplomatic relations, resumption of trade, and postal and communication services wouldn't be difficult to tackle.

and emotional

Even the most crucial

issue of the recognition of Bangladesh had been resolved.

The emphasis on bilateralism in the accord implied further

negotiations on existing problems.

Pakistan had actually suggested

the immediate restoration of diplomatic relations at the very opening

session of the Simla talks but, India being reluctant, the proposal
did not go forward.

Trade and communications

.

Before talks on resumption of postal and com-

munication services could begin things took

a

different turn.

The In-

dian nuclear test created grave concerns in Pakistan and tension be-

tween the two countries rose once again.
38

After losing her East wing,

Col. Muainmar A1 -Gaddafi of Libya addressed at Lahore a huge
public gathering (over 1,000,000).
In his address, he declared that
Pakistan's decision to recognize Bangladesh was based on the unity of
Islam brotherhood and the decision was taken under the advice of all
He further declared that all Muslim countries, esMuslim countries.
Saypecially Libya, would stand with Pakistan in every circumstance.
Your friends are our friends and your enemy is
ing, "We are brothers.
our enemy,
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Pakistan was already weak and militarily inferior to
India and the

nuclear test was considered

a

clear threat to Pakistan's security.

Thus progress towards normalization of relations was blocked
for the

time being.

Although Indian leadership assured others that nuclear

energy was to be used for peaceful purposes, it was not

a

satisfactory

answer for Pakistan because of her past experience with Indian hostility.
In

the meantime, Pakistan successfully mobilized world opinion

against nuclear weapons in India and got assurances against an Indian
nuclear threat.

Having done this, Pakistan showed

a

willingness to

start negotiations on implementation of other phases of the Simla accord.

Various meetings and discussions were held between the repre-

sentatives of the two countries.

After

a

series of negotiations

a

joint communique was issued under which both governemnts agreed to
restore postal and communication services and the traveling facilities

which were suspended during the War of 1971.
telephone mul

ti

It

was also decided that

-exchange areas of Bombay and Karachi be linked by

satellite circuits.

As

far as resumption of trade, delegations of the

two countries were to exchange visits to explore further possibilities
in this regard.

The question of resumption of overflights and airlinks

was left for further discussion.

were restored shortly.

Postal and telecommunication links

It was agreed that trade should be

conducted

"on the basis of free convertible currency in accordance with foreign

^^The joint communique by India and Pakistan, in The Dawn
September 15, 1974.

,

.
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exchange regulations in force from time to time
in each country.
Initially, trade was to be handled by government
corporations though

there was provision for private sector's participation
at some later
stages

Resumptions of trade was

a

major achievement based on the Simla

agreement, as the trade relations had been cut off since the 1965
War.
Though the Tashkent declaration provided for its resumption, it never

happened because of inflexible attitudes by both sides.

Restoration of airlinks and overflights

.

Overflights by Pakistan air-

craft across Indian territory were suspended by India in early 1971
when

tvjo

Kashmiris hijacked an Indian Airlines plan, and forced the

pilot to land at Lahore.

They identified themselves as members of

a

secret organization operating inside Kashmir called the National

Liberation Front.

Pakistan refused to return the hijackers to India on

the plea that the persons, being Kashmiris, were not Indian nationals

and as such there was no legal necessity to hand them over to India.
Surpri si ngly

,

after the judicial inquiry it was alleged that the so-

called hijackers were members of the Indian Intelligence Service and
that the whole drama had been engineered by India for the purpose of

giving it

a

justification to stop Pakistan overflights across Indian

territory and thus create hurdles in the movement of people and supplies between East and West wings of Pakistan.

"^^The text of the agreement,

in The Dawn

,

December

1

,

1974.

“Pakistan Foreign Secretary's Answer to India," in The Dawn

February 5, 1974.

,

.
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Pakistan had lodged

a

complaint against this action
on the part

of India, before the Council of
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
A contention by India that
the Council had no jurisdiction
in the

matter had been rejected by the Council
and by the International

Court of Justice.

Under these circumstances the issue
of restoration

of these links proved to be tough
to handle.

India was reluctant to

allow resumption of overflights unless
the complaint was withdrawn from
ICAO, whereas Pakistan refused to
do so in the beginning.

The Indian

view was that Pakistan's complaint to
ICAO militated against the Simla

accord to settle differences
third parties.

bi

lateral ly-that is. without involving

The matter could not be resolved until Mr.
Bhutto,

in order to give a new impetus to this
process of normalization,

showed his willingness to withdraw the case from
the ICAO.

Subse-

quently, discussions were held and an agreement was
reached, which contained the following important points besides restoration
of airlinks:^^
1.

The two countries would send a joint letter to ICAO withdrawing their respective complaints. Overflights and airlinks would be restored.

2.

Goods and passenger traffic by rail would be resumed through
Wagah-Attari border (Lahore in Pakistan and Amritsar in
India)

3.

Diplomatic relations would be reestablished at the ambassador's level.

4.

Private sectors would be allowed to participate in trade
and commerce between the two countries.

5.

The issue of civilian detainees would be resolved expeditiously, and efforts would be made to locate and repatriate
persons still untraced.
42

The text is in The Dawn, May 15, 1976.
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The implementation of this agreement
was completed shortly

after that.

The overflights were resumed and
the rail

links between

India and Pakistan, snapped since the
1965 War, were restored in 1976.

Another important step towards the process
of normal ization
of relations was the resumption of
diplomatic relations.

After almost

four years of their suspension the two
countries reestablished diplo-

matic relations.

The ambassadors of the two countries
arrived to re-

sume their responsibilities by the inaugural
flights of PIA and Air
India.

With this,

a

foundation of

a

new phase of cordial relations was

begun.

43

The India Express

,

July 17, 1976.

CHAPTER

VII

CONCLUSION

Present State of Relations Between India
and Pakistan
Since the return of the POWs

,

the exchange of their respective

citizens between Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the
recognition of the
latter by Pakistan, Indo-Paki stan relations have been
correct.

detonation of

a

India's

nuclear device on May 18, 1974, did not alter the inten-

tion of bettering future relations, nor did Delhi's
decision to make

Kashmir an ordinary state within the Indian union.

It is true that in

both instances, Bhutto made statements critical of the Indian
government.

But his public declarations were meant primarily for domestic

consumption, intended to pacify his audiences.

The Indians were con-

demned and warned that Pakistan could not stand idly by.

Pakistan,

too, could build nuclear weapons if it wished to put its resources into

such

a

program.

Bhutto called for

a

nationwide work stoppage to demon-

strate Pakistan's dissatisfaction with the Indian decision to absorb
Kashmir.

But the bellicosity of the past was noticeably subdued.

Pakistan under Bhutto's leadership (1972-77) tried to move with
the times.

Realizing that the old militant attitude towards India would

not profit him or his country, he emphasized reducing old enmities while

making new friends.

For more than two decades, Pakistan had harbored

the notion that it was the equal of India, despite that country's vast
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numerical superiority.

As a result, successive
Pakistani governments

assumed an aggressive posture
toward India that made any
kind of meaningful acco„»,odation difficult.

Apparently,

a

new realism is shown by

the Pakistani leadership
after Bangladesh's emergence.

law.

Sicne July 5, 1977, Pakistan
is under another spell of
martial
South Asia saw a brand of
populism in the early 1970s.
From

Colombo to New Delhi and from Islamabad
to Dacca, regimes were swept
into office and stayed in power by
arousing the expectations of the

masses through leftist slogans and
programs.

Unfortunately, they

couldn't translate them into reality,
which gave way to discontentment
and resort to unconstitutional
methods to contain it.

All

of those

regimes have coll apsed--through electoral
defeat in India and Sri
Lanka, through military takeover in
Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Armed forces of Pakistan, particularly the
army, have played
a

dominant role in the country since its existence.

gaged in four armed conflicts with India in
30 years.

They have been enFor almost half

of this period, the military of Pakistan, with the
army as its vanguard
has wielded the sceptre as well

as the sword.

Traditionally the domes-

tic interests of the armed forces establishment in Pakistan
had been

linked to Pakistan's posture of confrontation with India.

An inflated

military establishment could only be justified in terms of

a

from India.

threat

This inflated military machine is considered essential

in

order to preserve the political power of the top military elite as the
arbiters of the country's destiny.
But this time, instead of playing up the tune of constant Indian

threat, the military regime of Pakistan under General Ziaul Hag seems to

156

follow the foreign policy broadly formulated
by Bhutto's government.
In

its relationship with India, Pakistan is
trying to resolve the

problems and promote relations on the principle
of bilateralism.

Normalization of relations

is

taking place slowly but steadily.

The process has been started by the exchange of
visitors.

Efforts have

been made by both countries to provide visa facilities
to people to
travel easily in both countries.

To create good will and to ease ten-

sion, hockey teams of India and Pakistan have exchanged visits.^
On the diplomatic scene, India's External Minister, A.B.

Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan in February 1978 is the most important

development which has taken place recently.^

He is the first Indian

Foreign Minister in the last 14 years to come to Pakistan to negotiate
with his Pakistani counterpart on matters of mutual interest.

interesting that Mr. Vajpayee, who as

denounced the Simla agreement as

a

a

It

is

member of the Jan Sangh party

"stab in the back," came to Pakistan

to discuss matters in the spirit of the Simla agreement.

While address-

ing a press conference, he showed his desire to bring relations between

the two countries to normal.
try to remove these."

He said,

"if there are misgivings we will

3

Besides exploring the possibilities of improving trade, both
sides have shown

a

keen interest in promoting exchanges in various

Hhe Indian hockey team visited Pakistan in January 1978 and
the Pakistani team went to India in February 1978 to play a series of
matches with each other.
2

Mr.

Vajpayee visited Pakistan on February 6, 1978.

^The Hindu, February 18, 1978.
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fields like culture and sports.

An important topic which came
under

discussion related to the Salal dam project
on the Chenab River in
Jammu and Kashmir.

The talks resulted in an agreement.^

Pakistan,

under the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, was
entitled to examine the
Indian design of the hydroelectric project
that country planned to
build.

It had

originally raised objections on the grounds
that the

design did not conform to the criteria laid down
in that treaty.

Af-

ter the restoration of diplomatic relations under
the Simla agreement,
an initiative was taken by both countries to
resume bilateral negotia-

tions to resolve this problem.

Talks have been continued since 1974.

Two rounds of discussions were held at the foreign
secretary's level
in October 1976 at New Delhi and Islatnabad, but no
agreement was

reached.

Mr.

Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan was mostly to solve this

problem bilaterally.

g

The good will generated by the normalization of relations be-

tween the two countries nearly two years ago has not been allowed to

suffer

setback during the past year which witnessed internal changes

a

in governments in both countries.

Settling of disputes through bi-

lateral negotiations shows the intentions of India and Pakistan to

maintain normal relations and to live in peace.

It is for the first

time in the last thirty years that the subcontinent is not one of the

troubled areas of the world, at least for the time being and in the
immediate future.
4

The agreement was signed on the Salal Hydroelectric Project
on the Chenab in Jammu and Kashmir on April 14, 1978.
5

The text of the agreement is in India News

,

April

17,

1978.
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Pakist an's Relations with the
Muslim Countries

One of the most significant
developments in Pakistan's foreign

policy in the post-1971 period has been
the renewal of emphasis on her

close ties with the Muslim countries of
the Middle East.

The strategic

interrelationship between Pakistan and the Middle
East has never been
as important as it is today.

The world's greatest reservoir of oil,

the center of the vital network of
communications between Europe, Asia

and Africa, the Middle East has progress! vely
emerged as

a

powerful

force in international politics.

Located on its periphery, Pakistan enjoys

a

special position

in this region by virtue of the fact that it
occupies the sensitive

transitional zone which links the Middle East with South Asia.

Pakis-

tan, stretching from the Arabian Sea to the Hindu Kush, can either

prove to be

a

useful buffer between the cultural and political zones

which lie to its east and west, or in the event of its failure to forge
a

national

identity it could turn into an area of great political in-

stability which would threaten the stability of its neighbors as well.
Until

1971, Pakistan with its two wings lying on either ends of the

subcontinent was established as

a

oriented towards the subcontinent.

South Asian power and its policy was
But with the secession of Bangla-

desh, Islamabad has given an increasing emphasis to its "Middle East

option" adding

a

new dimension to the politics of the region.

Pakis-

tan is half inclined just to turn its back to India.

The changes which have come about in the Middle East have also
a

profound impact on Pakistan's relations with this region.

With the
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British withdrawal from east of Suez in
1971, the Gulf States emerged
as an important area to watch.

states came together in

a

Previously weak and divided, these

new union known as the United Arab Emirates

(UAE) which with its oil wealth and strategic
location on the Gulf is

now viewed as an important entity in the area.

also assumed
Gulf.

a

new role for itself as

a

Concurrently, Iran has

major military power in the

Spending over $3 billion annually on arms purchase, Iran
hopes

to build up its military potential

from the Gulf region altogether.

so as to exclude foreign influence

This objective is not too difficult

to achieve since Iran exercises control

over the Straits of Hormuz which

constitute the entry to the Gulf and through which 85 percent of the

non-communist world's crude oil passes.
adopted by Iran led to

a

Initially, this active role

confrontation between Iran on the east bank

and the Arabs on the west bank of the Gulf.
If this trend had continued,

it would be difficult to say what

course the relationship between Pakistan and the Middle East would have
followed.

But fortunately events have helped to smooth out

of major differences in the region.

a

number

The Iranians and the Arabs reached

an understanding on the issues dividing them.

Iraq and Iran have come

to terms on their border disputes and the Kurdish problem.

Saudi Arabia have managed to coordinate their oil

Iran and

policy and the Gulf

States have tacitly accepted Iran's new role in the region.
With the inclination to settle the longstanding disputes among
the Arabs,

the overall picture of the Middle East has changed.

The

^Saudi Arabia agreed to give up its claim to Bureimi in exchange for an additional corridor to the Gulf, where it plans to build

.
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Arabs have discovered

given them

a

a

potent weapon in the form of oil which has

significant place in the power balance in the
area.

Now

the pattern of power is determined not simply
by the big powers alone
but also by the local governments.

The end of their local confronta-

tions, combined with their oil power, have given
these states greater

independence in dealings with the great powers, which otherwise
would
not have been possible.

These factors have enabled Pakistan to forge

an advantageous relationship with the Middle East.

This policy has

been determined largely by its own political, economic and strategic
i

nte rests

Immediately after the fall of Dacca in December 1971, Pakistan
found itself in

a

diplomatically vulnerable position.

The only powers

which had not expressed hostile criticism of Islamabad's efforts to
safeguard its territorial

integrity during the 1971 crisis were China

and the Muslim countries of the Middle East.

With the secession of

Bangladesh, India claimed to be the predominant power in South Asia.
Faced with

a

stupendous task especially in view of the limited options

as a result of 1971

events, Pakistan could either accept a subordinate

role in the subcontinent with India acting as the sole power in charge
of the security management in the region or steer itself out of its

diplomatic isolation and then negotiate with New Delhi from

a

position

of strength.

The Pakistan government decided to explore fully its diplomatic

Kuwait and Iraq have also settled their difnew port and a refinery.
For furferences by agreeing to give Iraq a wider access to the Gulf.
East,"
ther details, see Zubeida Mustafa, "Pakistan and the Middle
Pacific Community: An Asian Quarterly Review 7:4, July 1976.

a

,
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options.

Its foreign policy now
focused on the Middle East which,

along with China, could be expected
to provide the counterweight
to the
enhanced Indo-Soviet influence in
the subcontinent.
This came easily
because Pakistan had always placed
great emphasis on the religious

solidarity and the common cultural
heritage which linked and identified
it closely with the people
of the Middle

East7

Pakistan's undivided support to the Arabs
in their struggle

against Israel and its non-involvement in
the inter-Arab disputes had
generated sufficient good will to enable it
to effectively develop its
Middle East option.

President Bhutto effectively employed personal

diplomacy as an instrument of foreign policy
and succeeded in winning
substantial political and diplomatic support from
the countries of the

Middle East for Pakistan's stand on the unresolved
issues emanating
from the December 1971 war.^
The support extended by the Middle East governments helped

Pakistan in overcoming its isolation.

Subsequently, it negotiated suc-

cessfully with India and secured its main objectives without making
any
major concessions.

The Middle Eastern powers played

a

more tangible

role in respect of Pakistan's policy towards Bangladesh.
them, such as Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the UAE

,

A number of

did not recognize

Bangladesh until after Pakistan had extended recognition.

Even the

^For a detailed account of Pakistan's relations with the Middle
East until 1965, see Khalida Oureshi, "Pakistan and the Middle East," in
Pakistan Horizon (Karachi: Pakistan Institute of International Affairs,
second quarter 1966), pp. 156-166.
g

Support and the role played by Muslim countries in solving
Pakistan's problems has already been discussed in the previous chapters.
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other Arab states did not grant
precipitate recognition «hich could
have jeopardized Pakistan's interests.
Since then the Pakistan government has
consolidated its ties

with the Middle East through frequent
exchange of visits at the highest
level.

Pakistan's close links with this region
have been demonstrated

on many occasions.

In

October 1973, when the fourth Arab-Israel
war

broke out, the Pakistan government extended
full diplomatic support to
the Arabs and showed greater involvement than
it had in previous crises.
In

1974, at the suggestion of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan
played host to the

Islamic summit conference.

Though essentially an organization of Mus-

lims from all over the world, the Islamic conference is
oriented to-

wards the Middle East whose problems it mainly projects.
tan's close involvement with this organization represented

Hence Pakisa

positive

shift in its policy from South Asia to the Middle East.

There has been

a

phenomenal expansion of economic ties between

Pakistan and its Middle East neighbors.

Previously, economic contacts

betvyeen Pakistan and the Arab countries of the Middle East were scanty.

However, Islamabad did enjoy

a

reasonable degree of economic coopera-

tion with Iran and Turkey under the Regional Cooperation for Develop-

ment (RCD).
By 1972-73, the economic picture of the Middle East had changed

drastically.

The energy crisis and the rise in oil prices provided the

oil-producing states with an abundance of petrodollars which they wished
to invest for their own economic development.

But lacking in trained

manpower, they had to turn to others for help in their development planning efforts.

A great many skilled and unskilled Pakistanis work in

.
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the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia,
and Libya.

They send close to $500

million in remittances to relatives
in Pakistan.^

The Arab states

are also extending financial assistance
for Pakistan in the form of
soft loans.

As a result, Pakistan's overwhelming
dependence on

Western economic aid is giving way to

a

economic assistance from the Middle East

nificant role.

diversified policy in which
is

coming to occupy

Pakistan has been able to secure

a

special

a

sig-

position

because it has manpower, expertise and
technical knowhow to offer to
the Middle East.

Muslim countries of the Middle East have
national

integrity.

a

stake in Pakistan's

This is especially true of the nations who are

geographically contiguous to Pakistan.

Were Pakistan to be beset with

instability, it would threaten the national security and
stability of
the enti re region

Indi an and Pakistani

Relations with Iran

Pakistan's link with the Middle East is also enhanced by the
special

strategic requirements of the countries in this region.

than the Arab countries,

Other

Iran falls in the category of the countries

who have strategic interests in Pakistan's stability and solidarity.
Iran has extended considerable political and military support to Pakis-

tan in order to ensure stability in the region, which would serve
9

There are estimated to be 20,000 Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia,
30,000 in the UAE, 25,000 in Kuwait and 10,000 in Behrein.
^*^For the economic assistance given by the Muslim countries to
Pakistan, see Mustafa, "Pakistan and the Middle East."
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Iranian strategic interests.’'
1971.

Since the secession of
Bangladesh u,

Iran has found its security
interests even more closely
linked

with Pakistan.

It

feared that if the events of
1971 were to generate

forces and pressures which would
lead to further dismemberment
of the
country, it would have a profound
impact on Iran.
The Shah of Iran

moved swiftly to intensify his ties
with Islamabad to provide it
with
counterpoise it needed to check centrifugal
tendencies.
Since January
1972, an exchange of many visits has
taken place at the highest level.

The Shah of Iran attaches great
importance to Pakistan's territorial

integrity; he has declared on many
occasions that his country would
be seriously affected if another
separatist movement broke out in
Paki Stan.

12

Iran has never displayed much interest
either in the Pakhtoonis
tan issue or in Pakistan's problems with
India,

the other hand,
tan.

including Kashmir.

it has been deeply concerned about unrest

in

On

Baluchis-

When Soviet arms were found hidden in the Iraqi
Embassy in Islama

bad, and were alleged to have been earmarked
for subversive elements in

both Pakistani and Iranian Baluchistan, the Iranian
government could
not pretend indifference.

almost continuous contact.

Since then the two governments have been in

Pakistan is receiving considerable economic

assistance from Iran, and the two countries are entering into joint
projects in Baluchistan.

The hope is that economic development will

Iran's western and northern flanks have been subjected to instability arising from the tensions in Iran's relations with Iraq, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union.
1

The Shah's statement, in The Dawn , October 26, 1973; also see
the Shah's interview with the International Herald Tribune, April 23,
1 973.
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break down traditional tribal

consciousness.

loyalties and generate greater
national

Iran’s concern with Pakistan’s
territorial

integrity

arises also from its own need to
safeguard its lines of communications
through the Hormuz Straits which lie
close to the Pakistan coast.
Despite its close historic ties with
Pakistan, Iran made

a

calculated move in late 1973 to improve
its relations with India.

Pre-

viously concerned about the adverse
fallout effects of Pakistan’s further dismemberment, the Shah’s opinion
seemed to change when he visited
New Delhi

in October 1974.

transfer from Iran to Pakistan was

’’not

really relevant” any longer be-

cause of Iran's "firm friendship with India,”
and his ’’unvarying policy
of promoting peace and friendship between
India and Pakistan.

This turnabout in the Iranian perception was the
result of

a

series of high level visits and exchange of views
between Indian and

Iranian leaders beginning in July 1973 and culminating in the
Shah’s

trip to New Delhi in October 1974.

As a result of these meetings. New

Delhi was able to convince Teheran that India had as much at stake
in

the territorial

integrity of Pakistan as did Iran and that on this is-

sue their interests coincided rather than diverged.
in tensions

The relaxation

in the subcontinent following Pakistan’s recognition of

Bangladesh in February 1974 and the tripartite accord among India,
Pakistan, and Bangladesh in April

1974, further strengthened Iran’s

conviction that Indo-Paki stani tensions were not likely to escalate in
1

The Shah’s interview with the International Herald Tribune,
April 23, 1973.
14

The Times of India, October 4, 1974.
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the near future to

become

a

point where the dismemberment
of Pakistan would

possibility for which Iran would
have to make contingency

a

plans.

After the Shah's visit to India in
1974,

a

lations between the two countries was
inaugurated.

economic agreement providing for

a

new pattern of reThey signed an

$37 million Iranian loan for Indian

economic development and the sale of Iranian
oil to India at
siderably discounted price.

a

con-

This process of improving relations con-

tinues and today relations between India and
Iran are closer than they
have been ever before.

This has helped to broaden Iran's power base
in

the region and diversify its links with the
subcontinent.

Iranian interest in the region coincides with Pakistan's
own

interest to maintain stability on its western and southern
flanks.

Pakistan's strategic requirements were best demonstrated in its
attitude towards the military pacts.

While it withdrew from SEATO in

November 1973, Pakistan revived its interest in CENTO.

It has been

said that Iran had promised Pakistan to supply 50 F-5 jet fighters to

replace the outdated F-86 saber jets.^^

The Pakistan and Afghanistan Border Conflict

Afghanistan lies along the northwestern border region of the
subcontinent.

It

is

a

landlocked territory but forms

a

bridge between

the subcontinent on the one hand and Soviet-central Asia on the other.

After the formation of Pakistan in 1947, the Afghanistan government at^^

Washington Post

,

March 8, 1975.
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tempted to raise

Baluchistan too).

a

border issue and claimed the
NWFP (and occasionally
Since Pushtu speaking people
live on both sides

of the border, Afghan nationalists
raised

ment of Pakhtoonistan,

a

a

demand for the establish-

country which had not existed in
the past.

Afghanistan was the only country to
vote against Pakistan's

admission to the United Nations in 1947
on the ground that it could
not recognize the NWFP as part of
Pakistan until that province had been
given an opportunity to opt for independence.

Relations of Pakistan

with Afghanistan have seldom been good,
in spite of repeated Pakistani

efforts to resolve outstanding differences
between them.^^

The 1973

coup that ousted Zahir Shah from his throne
and returned Mohammad Daud
to power did not augur well

for Pakistan.

Since the stability of the

Daud regime in Afghanistan rested considerably
on its appeal to Pan-

Pakhtoon nationalism, there was bound to be an escalation,
at least

a

verbal escalation, in the project of detaching the
Pushtu-speaking

areas of Pakistan and their establishment as an Afghan dominated
state.

Islamabad could, of course, easily handle the Afghan "danger"
if there were not the impression that "behind every Afghan there
stands
a

Russian.

Within days of consolidating his authority, Daud reasserted

his support for Pakhtoonistan.

from violent attacks; he said:

Bhutto reacted skillfully and refrained
"we have nothing but the most fraternal

For the Afghan claim and dispute on the Durand Line, see
Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers (Studies in a Contemporary Problem)

(London: Pall Mall

Press, 1968), pp. 89, 92; and also Vali, pp. 92-116.

^^For an account of Afghanistan and Pakistan relations, see
Zubeida Mustafa, "Afghanistan and the Asian Power Balance," in Paci fic
Community: An Asian Quarterly Review 6:2 (January 1975).
,

98

168

sentiments towards Afghanistan.

While there is no question
of our com-

promising our sovereignty and
territorial

integrity, we will spare no

effort in establishing cordial
relations with Afghanistan."'®

Although Daud did not attend the
Lahore Muslim summit, he did
send

a

representative.

The Afghan ambassador seized
the opportunity to

propagandize the cause of "oppressed
minorities."

Afghanistan appar-

ently wanted the Muslim world
to know the depth of its
animosity towards Pakistan, and this bitterness
led Kabul to look with greater

friendship to the Soviet Union and
India.

The Muslim summit brought

Bhutto and Mujib together, but it
could not play the same role as far
as Daud was concerned.

Certainly Pakistanis are convinced of
Afghanis-

tan's continuing enmity.
A united Pakistan should be able
to defend itself against

provocations from Afghanistan.

number of factors.

But the situation is complicated by

Pakistan's frontiers are

Afghans can, and have, supplied arms to
is

obvious that Pakistan fears

India.

1

a

a

a

a

turbulent region; and

variety of dissidents.

It

joint action by Afghanistan and

Kabul's support for the dissident elements in NWFP and

Baluchistan and the timing of the Daud coup could not have been
more
inopportune from Islamabad's point of view.

It gave the Pathan and the

Baluchi counter-elite the moment they needed to embark upon

a

course

of open defiance of centra! authority.

1

19

New York Times

,

August 4, 1973.

In the summer of 1974, Bhutto publically aired his concern
that the troops of both India and Afghanistan were concentrating on
Pakistan's frontiers.

-
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Although from the Pakistan
government's point of view the
threat was manageable and not
at all comparable to the
East Pakistani
situation in 1970-71, it did create
additional headaches.

assertion of the Pakhtoonistan
question in

a

Daud's re-

rather militant fashion

overshadowed India's role as enemy
number one in Pakistan's eyes.

It

interesting to note that, since
1972, Pakistan has been looking
westward not only in its search of friends
(Iran, the Arab Emirates, Saudi
is

Arabia, Libya) but also for adversaries
(Afghanistan).

Anyhow, this

does not mean that Indo-Pakistan
tensions will disappear overnight.
It does mean that they are likely
to be reduced if for no other reason

than that Pakistan's limited decision-making
capabilities would now be

more involved in its relations with its
western neighbors.

Prospects of Relations Between India and Pakistan
The events of 1971 culminating in the separation
of East Pakistan from West Pakistan radically transformed the
very character of the

Pakistani state.

As a result of the loss of the East wing, Pakistan

for the first time in its history is on the threshold of evolving

viable national

identity for itself based on territorial terms.

a

As

long as East and West Pakistan were kept together in an uneasy marriage, Pakistan was forced to project itself as an "ideological state."
The new situation that emerged after 1971 not only demonstrated the

power realities on the subcontinent, but also created the possibility
for Pakistan to attempt a redefinition of its own national
in viable territorial

terms.

identity

Today's Pakistan is not only geographical

ly whole but it is relatively homogeneous in cultural

terms.
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The Signing of the

Sin, la

agreement has ushered ,n

ne« era of
peace through bilateral
negotiations in this troubled
subcontinent.
The optimism regarding
Indo-Pakistani relations is also
due to the es-

tablishment of

a

new power equilibrium in
South Asia.

a

This means that

Pakistan understands that it
is not possible to change
the status quo
in the subcontinent by
force.
There is a need, therefore,
for both
countries to agree to build a
structure of peace in South Asia
based
on the acceptance of the
status quo.

The prospects of an Indo-Pakistani
detente, which emerged from
the Simla agreement in 1972,
are reasonably good.
Its progress depends
primarily on the development of
political trust in each other by the

ruling elite of India and Pakistan.

Unfortunately, this has always

been lacking in the Indo-Pakistan
relationship.

This, however, does not

rule out the prospect for such trust
emerging in the future as a result
of a changed domestic and

i

nternational context.

With Pakistan reduced in size and in military
power--even
less of a match for India than before--Indians
and Indian policy makers

need not see Pakistan as

a

threat to their security.

For the first

time since 1947, and particularly since 1954 when
Pakistan's military

capabilities were augmented by its military alliance with
the United
States, the Indian decision makers can take
of Indo-Pakistani relations.

a

relatively relaxed view

This assessment means a return to normal-

ity in Indian reflexes towards Pakistani moves.
As for the presumption still

present in certain Pakistani cir-

cles that India is interested in the further dismemberment of Pakistan,
it would be enough to say that such a policy goal

on

India's part is

171

not probable.

The cost of such an
operation, in human and material

terms, to India would be almost
prohibitive.

If Pakistan were to be

broken up again, parts of it may
go to Iran and Afghanistan.
to be assumed that

It is not

India would wish or permit
such a development.

Any
parts of Pakistan that India might
want to swallow would be extremely

difficult to absorb.

The reintroduction of large
Muslim populations

into the Indian polity would
tend to tear apart the fabric of
its domes
tic peace, unity, and cohesion.

,
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